Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a jury-waived trial, Daniel Milne was convicted of eluding an officer, passing a roadblock, operating a vehicle after suspension, and driving to endanger. Milne appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's finding him guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the charges of eluding an officer and passing a roadblock. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Milne's conviction for eluding an officer, and (2) vacated Milne's conviction for passing a roadblock, holding that the available evidence in the record was insufficient to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Milne committed the offense where there was no clearly identifiable police roadblock requiring vehicles to stop. Remanded for reconsideration of sentence. View "State v. Milne" on Justia Law

While on patrol, a state police trooper clocked a Pontiac traveling at a speed well above the speed limit. As the trooper was making a turn to pursue the car, a motorcycle driven by Ronald LaPlante passed him. The trooper lost sight of the car but did come upon the motorcycle. The trooper stopped LaPlante for the sole purpose of asking about the direction of the Pontiac but obtained sufficient for the State to charge LaPlante with criminal operating under the influence. LaPlante moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the vehicle stop, but the superior court denied the motion. LaPlante was then convicted of operating under the influence. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) a law enforcement officer's investigation of a third party's civil speeding offense does not justify the discretionary seizure of a motorist in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion, and (2) the superior court erred when it denied LaPlante's motion to suppress. Remanded. View "State v. LaPlante" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to criminal charges, Terry Chesnel received judgments of conviction requiring him to pay $3700 in court fines. Soon after Chesnel was incarcerated, the Department of Corrections began withdrawing twenty-five percent of all funds deposited into Chesnel's prison account to satisfy his court fines. Chesnel later filed a petition for post-conviction review, asserting that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. His petition did not mention the Department's collection of funds from his prison account. The superior court denied Chesnel's petition, and no appeal was taken. Two years later, Chesnel filed a motion to modify the conditions governing the collection of his court fines while he was in prison. The superior court denied the motion. Chesnel appealed, contending, inter alia, that the Department's collection of funds without notice or hearing was an unconstitutional taking and violation of due process. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because Chesnel did not raise the issue through a petition for post-conviction review, the superior court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Chesnel's motion. Remanded to the superior court for a dismissal of the motion. View "State v. Chesnel" on Justia Law

Kaihlil Nigro was convicted of two counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs with an accompanying order for criminal forfeiture following a jury trial. Nigro appealed, contending that he was deprived of a fair trial because the court did not ask prospective jurors whether they harbored prejudice or bias against members of the Islamic faith. Nigro also argued that the court erred in refusing to suppress (1) an out-of-court photographic identification made by a confidential informant, (2) evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant, and (3) documents seized during his arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nigro did not establish that the court committed obvious error in conducting voir dire, (2) the informant's identifications were properly admitted at trial despite an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure, (3) the search warrant affidavit sufficiently established probable cause, and thus the evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrant was properly admitted, and (4) the documents seized during Nigro's lawful arrest were properly admitted. View "State v. Nigro" on Justia Law

Eric and Martha Hankins executed a promissory note and mortgage on their residence in favor of the lender, Option One Mortgage Corporation, which later assigned the mortgage and note to Deutsche Bank. A loan modification agreement changed the lender to Liquidiation Properties. When the Hankinses stopped making payments on the note, Liquidation filed a complaint for foreclosure against the Hankinses. Deutsche Bank then assigned the mortgage to Liquidiation, which, in turn, assigned the mortgage and note to Kondaur Capital Corporation. Liquidation then moved to substitute Kondaur as the named plaintiff. The Hankinses did not challenge the motion to substitute, and the district court granted the motion. The district court then entered summary judgment in favor of Kondaur. Martha Hankins appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the district court did not err in substituting Kondaur as the named plaintiff because the substitution did not alter the underlying allegations of the foreclosure action or tend to produce a manifest injustice; and (2) entry of summary judgment was error because the record did not establish the essential elements of a foreclosure action without dispute as to genuine issues of material fact. Remanded. View "Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Hankins" on Justia Law

David Archer was convicted for attempted murder and elevated aggravated assault in superior court following a jury trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it allowed the State's medical expert to testify regarding the factual and medical conclusions of another physician, who did not testify, that were included in the victim's medical records; (2) the trial court acted within its discretion when it permitted a witness to testify about threats Archer made prior to the attack; and (3) the trial court acted within its discretion when it declined to play for the jury the complete records of all of Archer's phone calls to his mother from jail after the State had played portions of some of the calls for the jury. View "State v. Archer" on Justia Law

The Town of Lebanon filed a land use complaint against East Lebanon Auto Sales (the LLC) and Linda Corbin, the sole member of the LLC, alleging that property owned by the LLC in Lebanon constituted an illegal automobile graveyard and illegal junkyard and that the property had an improper subsurface wastewater system. The district court issued a judgment against the LLC and Corbin in the amount of $2000 plus attorney fees. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) vacated the decision of the district court as to Corbin individually, concluding that the record contained no evidence that suggested that Corbin abused the privilege of incorporating or that an unjust result would occur if only the LLC were held liable on the Town's complaint; and (2) affirmed the judgment of the district court in all other respects, finding the remaining issues raised by the LLC to be without merit. View "Town of Lebanon v. East Lebanon Auto Sales, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Peter Miller injured his lower back in 1992, 1995, and 1996 while working for S.D. Warren and in 1999 while working for Spinnaker Coating. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer awarded Miller sixty-five percent partial incapacity benefits apportioned equally among the four dates of injury. Later, the hearing officer (1) granted S.D. Warren's petition for review requesting permission to cease payment for the 1992 injury because it had made all payments to which Miller was entitled for that injury; (2) granted Spinnaker's petition to reduce its benefit payment accordingly; and (3) denied Miller's petition for review seeking an increase to total incapacity benefits, determining that Miller had not demonstrated a change in medical or economic circumstances. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing officer did not improperly expand the Court's holding in Cust v. University of Maine to allow for a reduction in benefits when the durational limit has expired on the first of multiple injuries. View " Miller v. Spinnaker Coating" on Justia Law

After Beneficial Maine filed a complaint for foreclosure against Timothy and Kathleen Carter in district court, Beneficial moved for summary judgment. To support its motion, Beneficial relied on an affidvait of an employee of a separate business identified as Beneficial's servicer. Beneficial cited to the affidavit as the sole evidentiary support for its allegations of its ownership of the promissory note and mortgage, the Carters' obligation on the note, the Carters' default, and the amount that the Carters owed. The district court entered summary judgment in the bank's favor on its foreclosure complaint. The Carters appealed, challenging the foundation presented by Beneficial to support the admissibility of its mortgage records pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment entered in favor of Beneficial, concluding that because the employee did not establish that she was a custodian or other qualified witness who could provide trustworthy and reliable information about the records, the affidavit could not establish the foundation for the records' admissibility. Therefore, the district court could not properly consider those records on summary judgment. Remanded. View "Beneficial Maine, Inc. v. Carter" on Justia Law

After defendant Price-Rite, a fuel delivery business, failed to fulfill its prepaid delivery contracts, the state filed a five-count complaint charging Price-Rite with four violations of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). Following a jury-waived trial, Price-Rite moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing for the first time that judgment should be granted to it because the state had not complied with the ten-day notice requirement of Me. Rev. Stat. 5, 209. The court denied the motion, finding that the failure to provide notice was inconsequential. The court then held that Price-Rite had violated the UTPA and imposed a civil penalty on Price-Rite's owner and CEO for the UTPA violations. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Price-Rite's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and (2) the trial court's finding that the owner and CEO intentionally violated the UTPA was not clearly erroneous. View "State v. Price-Rite Fuel, Inc. " on Justia Law