Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Gary Gauthier Jr. and his co-defendant were each convicted of murder following a joint jury trial. After the Supreme Court affirmed their convictions, Gauthier filed a petition for post-conviction review, claiming he had been denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. The superior court denied Gauthier's petition, finding the strategy adopted by Gauthier's attorney did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the post-conviction court's findings were supported by competent record evidence and the court did not commit clear error in concluding that Gauthier failed to meet his burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Gauthier v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant Stanley Ward was convicted of kidnapping, attempted murder, and robbery and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of fifty years, all but forty-five years suspended. Ward challenged the sentences on the grounds that (1) the length of the sentences, both individually and collectively, violated his constitutional protection against cruel or unusual punishment; (2) when the court found the facts necessary to impose consecutive sentences, resulting in a longer period of incarceration than the statutory maximum for any of his convictions individual, it violated his constitutional right to trial by jury; and (3) the court erred in its application of Me. Rev. Stat. 1256 in imposing consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Ward's collective and individual sentences did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment; (2) the superior court's imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate Ward's right to trial by jury; and (3) the superior court properly determined that the statute did not bar the imposition of consecutive sentences under these circumstances. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law

Eryn Steele was married to Chris Steele when Ryan Botticello allegedly assaulted Chris. Chris sued Ryan and his father for damages related to his injuries and later settled and released his claim against the Botticellos. Later, Eryn sued the Botticellos for damages related to her loss of consortium. The Botticellos asserted the affirmative defense of release in their amended answer and moved for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Botticellos, concluding that, under Brown v. Crown Equipment Corp., Chris's release barred Eryn's consortium claim because it was derivative of Chris's underlying tort claim. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of summary judgment, holding that an injured person's settlement and release of a claim for personal injuries does not preclude that person's spouse from recovering for loss of consortium when the spouse was not a party to the settlement and release. Remanded. View "Steele v. Botticello" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert St. Onge, president and member of Winterwood, operated a composting facility at his farm that accepted solid waste and converted it into compost for sale. The Department of Environmental Protection filed a land use complaint against Winterwood related to the discharge of pollutants from its composting operation into a nearby brook. The court entered a contempt order that required Winterwood to cease the discharge of pollutants into state waters. On the Department's motion to enforce the contempt order, the court ordered that Winterwood was immediately prohibited from receiving any other composting material. Later, four different waste companies delivered waste to Winterwood for composting. The state filed a criminal complaint and summons, charging St. Onge as principal of Winterwood with contempt. In superior court, St. Onge signed a jury trial waiver. The court adjudicated St. Onge to be in contempt as a Class D crime and sentenced him to six months in jail. St. Onge appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed all aspects of the judgment with the exception of the Class D modification. Because an adjudication of contempt with punitive sanctions is not a Class D crime, the judgment was modified accordingly. View "State v. St. Onge" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a 2005 divorce judgment, the court awarded Christiane McAllister possession of the couple's marital home and monthly spousal support that would cover the house expenses until October 2009. Christiane was required to refinance the house in her name no later than November 1, 2009, or, alternatively, sell the house. The first $63,000 of any remaining proceeds was to go to Christiane in lieu of alimony. Christiane filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment on October 29, 2009, asserting that she could not pay her normal living expenses after spousal support terminated because of a drop on the value of the house. The court modified the divorce judgment, ordering Russell McAllister to pay support for an additional 36 months. Russell appealed, arguing that the court (1) made an error of law by modifying a division of marital property, (2) abused its discretion in modifying spousal support based on a substantial change in circumstances, and (3) abused its discretion by granting relief pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Christiane was entitled to relief on the basis of a substantial change in circumstances, and that the grant of relief pursuant to 60(b)(6) was harmless error. View "McAllister v. McAllister" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Scott Hackett aggravated a pre-existing low back injury while working as a long distance truck driver for Western Express. After Hackett was terminated for reasons unconnected to his injury, Hackett filed a petition for award to the Workers' Compensation Board and was awarded ongoing partial incapacity benefits for a gradual injury to his lower back. When calculating Hackett's weekly wage, the hearing officer (1) excluded the nine cents per mile Hackett received as per diem pay, concluding that it was paid to cover special expenses, and (2) concluded that the per diem payments were not a fringe benefit that could be included to a limited extent in average weekly wage. Hackett appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the hearing officer's decision but remanded for a recalculation of Hackett's fringe benefits pursuant to Me. W.C.B. R. ch. 1, 5(1). View "Hackett v. Western Express, Inc." on Justia Law

Cach, L.L.C., alleging that it was an assignee of Bank of America, filed a complaint against Nathaniel Kulas seeking principal and interest on an unpaid credit card balance. The complaint stated that Kulas owed $6042 on the account. Cach then filed a motion for summary judgment, supporting its motion with affidavits and other documents alleging that the balance due on the account was $6042. In response, Kulas filed an objections to the summary judgment motion. The court found Kulas's responses were procedurally defective and granted Cach's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Cach's support for its assertions that it received an assignment of the account from the bank and that Kulas owed $6042 on the account was inadequate. Because Cach failed to properly establish each element of its claim without dispute as to material fact, the Court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case. View "Cach, L.L.C. v. Kulas" on Justia Law

In 2004, Matthew Doucette injured his back while working for Sysco. Doucette did not lose any earnings as a result of his injury and had no further problems with his back until 2008 when he reinjured it while working for a different employer. In 2009, Doucette filed a petition for award against Sysco for the 2004 injury, alleging entitlement to compensation from 2004 to the present. Doucette also asserted a fourteen-day rule violation against Sysco for failing to file a notice of controversy (NOC) within fourteen days of receiving the petition. Although there was some disagreement over the date of the filing, the Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer found the NOC was filed on the fifteenth day and determined Sysco was in violation of the fourteen-day rule. Sysco appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing officer did not err in determining a fourteen-day rule violation occurred, (2) the hearing officer did not err in awarding total benefits from the date of the injury when the employee suffered no loss of earnings as a result of the injury, and (3) the award was not excessive and unfair. View " Doucette v. Hallsmith/Sysco Food Services, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Theodore Stanislaw pleaded guilty to nine counts of unlawful sexual contact and assault, among them three counts of Class B unlawful sexual contact. On each of the three Class B offenses, the superior court sentenced Stanislaw to nine years of imprisonment, to be served consecutively. Stanislaw appealed, arguing that the court erred in setting the basic period of incarceration at nine years because it did not consider other possible means of committing the same crimes. The Supreme Court vacated the sentences and remanded. The Court held the lower court misapplied the first step of the three-step sentencing analysis codified at 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. 1252-C by not objectively considering the nature and seriousness of the unlawful sexual contact offenses in determining the basic period of incarceration. The lower court failed to provide any rationale for its determination that Stanislaw's offenses, which did not include aggravating factors such as the use of violence, warranted sentences just one year less than the maximum allowed. View "State v. Stanislaw" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, appellant Michael Skarbinski was convicted on several counts, all of which arose from appellant's filing requests for tax refunds claiming no taxable income for three years when appellant had received substantial income. The supreme judicial court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err when it instructed the jury on principles of tax law, and the court's instructions did not infringe upon the jury's role as fact-finder; (2) the court did not err in instructing the jury that if appellant believed the tax laws to be unconstitutional or illegal, or otherwise disagreed with them without an objectively reasonable good faith belief, his belief was not a defense to the charges; (3) the State's closing argument was not inflammatory and it did not improperly interject irrelevant issues into the case; and (4) the jury could have found each element of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. View "State v. Skarbinski" on Justia Law