Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The district court's dismissal of Arthur Neudek's motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities provisions in connection with his 2006 divorce from Deborah Neudek, is vacated and remanded where the district court failed to conduct a hearing on Arthur's motion to modify. The supreme court held that the rules of procedure in family division cases expressly require the court to conduct a hearing on a motion to modify unless two specific conditions are met, both of which did not apply in Arthur's case. The court noted that when one party's filing of serial motions to modify becomes burdensome for the opposing party, the court may create orders or impose sanctions tailored to the circumstances presented. View "Neudek v. Neudek" on Justia Law

Appellant, a former corrections officer, was dismissed after an administrative hearing on November 4, 2009. On November 18, the commissioners issued their written decision which containted their findings and rationale. On December 18, the appellant filed a compliant asserting a due process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and a wrongful termination claim pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. 501(3)(A). At issue was what constitutes ânotice of any actionâ to trigger M.R. Civ. P. 80B(b)âs 30-day time limit for filing an administrative appeal. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower courtâs dismissal of appellantâs due process and wrongful termination claims as untimely, holding that Rule 80B(b)âs time limit for seeking review of a decision to dismiss an employee does not commence until the employee receives a written decision of the county commissioners or personnel board. The Court also held that because appellant did not have an opportunity to address his suspension before he was terminated, direct review pursuant to Rule 80B(b) would not provide an adequate remedy for appellantâs Section 1983 claim; therefore, denial of appellantâs right to due process of law was independent of his administrative appeal.

In district court, appellants were held liable for violating the Town of Levantâs Article 1010 land use ordinance by allowing a third partyâs mobile home to be moved onto and remain on their land after receiving multiple notices of the violation. At issue was whether appellants could be held responsible for a violation caused by a third party and whether there was evidence that they played a role in leaving the mobile home on their property. The Court affirmed, holding that (1) under the four-factor analysis outlined in Town of Boothbay v. Jenness, the landowners were responsible for land use violations committed on their property, and (2) there was sufficient evidence that the appellants had notice of the violation and the ability and opportunity to correct the violation but failed to do so.

Sisters of Charity Health System, Inc. (SOCHS) sued its former employees, Douglas Farrago, MD, Raymond Stone, DO and Carolyn Kase, DO, to enforce restrictive covenants contained in contractual agreements between the doctors and SOCHS. The Superior Court entered a judgment in favor of SOCHS and ordered each doctor to pay liquidated damages pursuant to clauses in their contracts. On appeal, the doctors contended that the restrictive covenants and liquidated damages clauses were unenforceable. The Supreme Court's focus on appeal was whether the covenants reasonably sought to protect a legitimate business of SOCHS. The Court concluded that the covenants did protect legitimate business interests, and the contracts contained enforceable liquidated damages provisions. The Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court in favor of SOCHS.

sPlaintiff Craig Burns was injured when an overhead garage door struck him on the head when he was at work. Plaintiff sued the installer of the door, Defendant Architectural Doors and Windows (ADW), on a products liability theory only to discover that ADW did not manufacture or supply the alleged defective door. The trial court granted ADWâs motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not allowing him to present evidence for alternate theories under which he could hold ADW accountable. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial courtâs actions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial courtâs judgment in favor of ADW.

Petitioners Dana and Robin Murphy appealed a judgment entered in favor of Respondent HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. (HSBC), which allowed HSBC to foreclose on and sell the Murphyâs house. The Murphys contended that the court erred by granting HSBC summary judgment when there were numerous errors that primarily concerned HSBCâs evidence of its ownership of the note and mortgage to their house. In particular, the Murphys challenged the trustworthiness of multiple affidavits filed by HSBC in support of its motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the affidavits submitted by HSBC were âinherently untrustworthyâ and the business records attached to them were not admissible at trial. The Court held that the trial court erred by granting a summary judgment in this case, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Philip Galarneau, III appealed his conviction as a âhabitual offenderâ for âoperating while under the influence.â In 2008, without a lawyer, Defendant pled not guilty to the charges in the district court. On the same day, an information containing the same charges was filed in the Superior Court where the State sought to revoke Defendantâs probation from a 2007 assault conviction. The district court charges were dismissed, and Defendant made his appearance at the probation revocation hearing at Superior Court. Defendant was appointed a lawyer-for-the-day. Defendantâs case was called, the court read the charges against him and asked both Defendant and his attorney whether he was advised of his rights. The court confirmed on record that Defendant waived his right to a trial, that he was pleading guilty to habitual offender and OUI charges, and that he admitted violating his probation. The Court sentenced Defendant to approximately two years for all the charges against him. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that his sentence and conviction were unconstitutionally imposed because the court did not inform Defendant of his right to counsel at the district court. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, finding that Defendant was represented by a lawyer-for-the-day during his initial appearance at Superior Court, and that the court confirmed Defendant was advised of his rights. The Court affirmed Defendantâs conviction and sentence.

âPenelope W.â appealed lower courtsâ decisions that involuntarily committed her to a state psychiatric center. In all aspects of her case, Penelope represented herself. The trial court concluded that she was mentally ill, and that she presented a likelihood of serious harm to herself and others. The appellate court denied Penelopeâs appeal because she failed to comply with the courtâs briefing requirements. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Penelope argued that she should not have been allowed to proceed at trial without counsel, particularly since involuntary commitment was at stake. The Supreme Court found although there is a limited right to self-representation in criminal cases, the same cannot be said for a civil commitment proceeding. The Court affirmed the trial courtâs decision that ordered Penelope to be committed.

Andrew Desmond appealed a judgment of the district court that denied his motion to change the primary residence of his minor child. Mr. Desmond and his wife Abby divorced in 2007. The Supreme Court, in reviewing the decision, found that the lower court did reference the evidence presented in light of some of the "best interest factors" outlined in the state statutes to explain why it was in the child's best interest to stay with its mother. The Court concluded that although it might have made a different determination in the case, that determination would not be a basis for vacating the lower court's order. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

MMG Insurance Company (MMG) appealed a summary judgment entered in Superior Court in favor of Jennifer Jacobi. Ms. Jacobi rented a home from MMG's insured, Barbara Bennett. Ms. Bennett left Maine to live in New Mexico, but her seventeen-year-old son remained in Maine in an "in-law" apartment attached to the home. The son repeatedly sexually assaulted Ms. Jacobi's seven-year-old daughter. Ms. Jacobi reported the incidents to the police, and informed Ms. Bennett. Ms. Jacobi filed suit against Ms. Bennett on multiple grounds. In particular, her claim for "negligent infliction of emotional distress" served as one of the grounds for review by the Supreme Court. Ms. Bennett and her son were insured by a homeowner's policy issued by MMG. The policy that covered Ms. Bennett had a $300,000 limit per occurrence for "bodily injury." MMG notified Ms. Bennett that it would not participate in Ms. Jacobi's action because the policy contained an exclusion for claims arising from sexual abuse. Ms. Bennett failed to file an answer to Ms. Jacobi's complaint, and a default was entered against her. Ms. Jacobi sought enforcement of her default judgment against MMG, and eventually won at trial. MMG appealed, arguing that the court misinterpreted its insurance policy. The Supreme Court found there was no basis for recovery of damages under the MMG homeowner's policy. The Court reversed the judgment in favor of Ms. Jacobi from the lower court, and remanded the case for further proceedings.