Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Dana Ramsdell contends that a provision in his 2006 divorce decree is ambiguous. While his divorce petition was pending, Mr. Ramsdell won a personal injury lawsuit. Under the terms of the divorce decree, Ms. Worden would receive twenty percent of the âpotential inchoate claimâ from the personal injury lawsuit. Arguing that the term âinchoate claimâ was ambiguous, Mr. Ramsdell petitioned the district court for reconsideration of the divorce courtâs award to his ex-wife, money from his personal injury suit. The district court affirmed the award. The Supreme Court, finding no error in the lower courtsâ interpretation of the divorce judgment or its calculation of the money she received, affirmed the order lower courtâs decision.

Lynne Bond appealed a judgment entered in the district court that denied part of her appeal to have her divorce decree amended. Mrs. Bond argued that the court erred or abused its discretion when it characterized her ex-husband Sheridan Bondâs business property as âalmost entirely nonmarital and of negligible value.â As a result of the incorrect valuation of the business, Mrs. Bond argues the disposition of the marital property saddled her with a disproportionate share of the marital debts. The lower court made specific findings regarding the length of the marriage, the partiesâ ages and incomes. The court determined that the business was gifted to Mr. Bond from his mother, and that there was little equity in it. The Supreme Court found that the lower courtâs factual determinations were fully supported by the record, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in reaching its conclusion. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

Appellants Daniel Luker and several other attorneys appealed the grant of summary judgment to the State Tax Assessor on their petitions for review of tax assessments for the 2004 and 2005 tax years. The firm for which they worked was organized as a Maine limited liability partnership (LLP), with its principal place of business in Portland. While the firm was a limited liability corporation (LLC), each attorney joined as a member, but each worked out of the firmâs New Hampshire office. As members of a Maine LLC, the attorneys were required to pay Maine income taxes. In December, 2003, each attorney formed a New Hampshire professional corporation (PC) to hold his respective interest in the Maine LLC. When the firm reorganized as a LLP, each attorney transferred his respective partnership interest in the firm to their individual PCs. Each PC then signed a partnership agreement with the firm. Each attorney was the sole shareholder and director for his PC, and served as the PCâs president, treasurer and secretary. None of the PCs employed office staff or other attorneys. Each PC entered into an arrangement through which it was designated a âco-employerâ of the attorney for purposes of firm profit sharing and benefits. In 2004 and 2005, each PC received partnership distributions from the firm. The size of the distribution depended on the performance of the attorney. The salary of each attorney roughly equated to the size of the distribution they received from the firm. Each PC deducted all payments to its respective attorney as a cost of doing business, thereby minimizing the PCâs taxable income. The State Tax Assessor viewed the creation of the PCs as an attempt to evade Maine income taxes, disregarded the corporate entities and assessed a tax on the distributions as income. The attorneys appealed the assessments. The district court granted summary judgment in the Assessorâs favor, and the Supreme Court agreed with the district court. The Supreme Court in affirming the lower courtâs decision, held that each attorney individually, not his respective PC, earned the income from the partnership distributions, and must pay income taxes.

In October, 2002, a trial court entered a judgment on a jury verdict finding Defendant Jeffrey Cookson guilty on two counts of intentional murder for the deaths of his ex-girlfriend and her best friend. The court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive life sentences. During the trial, witness David Vantol confessed privately to Defendantâs attorney and a private investigator that he had committed both murders. Immediately after the jury returned its verdict against Defendant, defense counsel disclosed the confession to the court and prosecutor. Later that day, Vantol lead police to a spot in the woods where he had buried miscellaneous articles of clothing, and a gun that testing would reveal was the murder weapon. Vantol continued to confess to the murders, but police did not believe him. They asked him to take a polygraph test, but he failed it. Frantic that no one believed him, Vantol threatened to harm himself. Later he would be admitted to the hospital. While there, Vantol recanted his confessions, and told investigators the items he provided were unrelated to murders. The State kept the items in its possession. Defendant filed motions with the court to have DNA testing done on the clothing and other items still in the Stateâs possession. The Superior Court denied Defendantâs motion regarding the clothing testing, but only gave an analysis of the applicable statute that was the basis of its denial. The court ultimately concluded that Defendant failed to meet the chain-of-custody requirement of the statute. The court did not engage in any analysis or provide any other reasoning for its decision. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Courtâs decision and remanded the case back to the court so that it may issue findings on all points raised by Defendantâs post-conviction DNA motion.

Victor Bravo Aviation is a Connecticut company founded and established by E. Brian Cleary and his wife Vicki in 2002. In 2004, Victor Bravo contracted to purchase an aircraft from Columbia Aircraft Sales in Connecticut. The aircraft was constructed in France. It was flown to the USA with scheduled stops in Maine and Connecticut in 2005. Victor Bravo took possession of the aircraft in Connecticut as its owner. The aircraft was flown its first twelve months in Maine and other surrounding states. The aircraft made thirty-seven flights to Maine. It was stationary in Maine for 156 days with approximately 121 overnight lay-overs. Victor Bravo never had the aircraft registered in Maine. Victor Bravo was assessed with Maine use taxes on the aircraft in February 2007. Victor Bravo appealed this assessment to the Superior Court which was upheld. On appeal, the Supreme Court made the distinction between the facts of this case with those in the "Blue Yonder" case which was decided April 26, 2011. It was determined that the aircraft owned by Victor Bravo was used in a manner that went beyond having a âtemporary, transient presenceâ in Maine. The Court held that under these circumstances, the aircraft should be properly considered to have âcome to restâ in Maine, and therefore subject to the Maine use tax. The Court affirmed the Superior Court and Assessorâs decisions.

Robert and Candy Smith are the parents of a developmentally disabled child, Justan. In April, 2009, Mrs. Smith filed an appointment petition in the Probate Court to become Justan's sole guardian and conservator. The court set forth a schedule where visitation rights were divided equally between the parents. Mr. Smith intentionally prevented his wife from having her scheduled visits with Justan in June, 2009. Mrs. Smith subsequently filed a motion for contempt. The Probate Court held hearings both on the guardianship petition and Mrs. Smithâs motion for contempt. Over her ex-husband's objection, the court admitted testimonial reports from the guardian ad litem. As a result, the Probate Court entered a judgment appointing the former Mrs. Candy Smith and Mr. Smithâs new wife, Christine, as co-guardians of Justan. Christine was to become Justanâs sole conservator. The Probate Court erroneously ordered, as part of the judgment, that at least $200 per month from Justanâs social security insurance benefits be deposited into a bank account that named as account holders Justan, Christine and the former Mrs. Smith. Mr. Smiith filed a motion for findings and conclusions of law. The court complied and issued an amended judgment containing minor changes. Mr. Smith appealed. The Supreme Court found that the portion of the Lower Courtâs decision pertaining to the fore-mentioned $200 monthly deposit conflicted with Federal statues and regulations. Mr. Smith was vested with a discretionary authority to execute Justin's social security insurance monies. The Court vacated this portion of the Probate Courtâs judgment and affirmed the remainder.

Blue Yonder is a company owned by Stephen Kahn and his wife. Blue Yonder purchased an aircraft from Cirrus Design Corporation in 2002 in Minnesota. Kahn flew the aircraft from Minnesota to Massachusetts. The aircraft was registered in Massachusetts. The aircraft has never been registered in Maine. No sales or use tax has been paid on the aircraft in any jurisdiction. Kahn rented the aircraft from Blue Yonder for his personal and business use, as well as for humanitarian purposes (delivering ill or injured patients to Massachusetts through a charity program). Kahn was the only operator of the aircraft. Kahn owned properties in Maine which he visited using the aircraft. The craft was present in the state for at least twenty-one full days in a twelve-month period. Maine Revenue Service assessed a use tax on the aircraft. Blue Yonder appealed the assessment to the Superior Court. The Superior Court entered judgment for the Assessor. Blue Yonder appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that because the aircraft was used only briefly in Maine, it was exempt from the use tax when it was purchased out-of-state, and was never registered in Maine. The Court vacated the lower courtâs decision.

Anthem Health Plans of Maine, Inc., appealed a judgment that affirmed a decision by the Superintendent of Insurance. The Superintendent determined that Anthemâs proposed average rate increase of 18.5% applicable to its individual health insurance products containing a built-in 3% profit margin was excessive and discriminatory. The Superintendent then indicated that an average 10.9% rate increase containing a 0% projected profit margin would be approved by his agency. Anthem contends that in setting a profit margin at 0%, the Superintendentâs decision eliminated Anthemâs opportunity to earn a reasonable profit. Anthem brought suit alleging the superintendentâs decision violates state law and the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court held (1) that because the year in which the challenged rates were effective has passed and new rates went into effect; (2) a favorable decision on the merits would not give Anthem any relief; and (3) because federal and state laws are in transition, there is no basis for the Court to address Anthemâs appeal from the Superintendent. The Court dismissed Anthemâs appeal as moot.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Dwayne and Debbie Bonney appeal the lower courtâs decision granting summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Stephens Memorial Hospital. The Court vacated the decision on the state law claims, and remanded the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. Plaintiffs drove themselves to the hospital after a violent assault that took place at their home. A hospital security guard overheard the Plaintiffsâ discussion with nursing staff, and said that he was going to call the police. Despite the Plaintiffsâ protest, the guard made the call, and disclosed all information he overheard. Based on this information, police obtained a warrant to search the Plaintiffs' home, found evidence of marijuana cultivation, leading to the Plaintiffsâ subsequent indictment and conviction on drug trafficking charges. Citing a violation of state and federal law for unauthorized disclosure of health care information, the Plaintiffs brought suit seeking damages from the hospital and the unnamed guard. On appeal, the Court found that the lower court erred in dismissing the Plaintiffsâ state claims under summary judgment: â30-A.M.R.S. § 287 does not shield health care providers for the unauthorized reporting of confidential health care information when the reporting involved is not related to an examination of a victim performed to obtain evidence for the prosecution.â The Court upheld dismissal of the Plaintiffsâ claims under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) finding the law authorizes no private cause of action.