Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Anne Sullivan-Thorne (Defendant) executed a mortgage on her house in favor of IndyMac Bank, FSB. Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Company filed an action against Defendant relating to damage done to the home. As part of the litigation, Defendant filed an action against IndyMac seeking to have all insurance proceeds payable to her alone. IndyMac counterclaimed against Defendant, alleging that Defendant had breached the note and mortgage and that Defendant had caused IndyMac not to receive payment of insurance proceeds in an amount sufficient to repair the property. The superior court dismissed IndyMac's counterclaim and entered a final judgment in which the court ordered that Cambridge re-issue the insurance proceeds and make them payable to Defendant alone. IndyMac later assigned the mortgage to Wilmington Trust Company (Plaintiff), who filed this action seeking a judgment of foreclosure against Defendant. The district court entered summary judgment for Defendant, finding that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that because Wilmington's foreclosure claim did not present matters that "were, or might have been, litigated" in the earlier action, the court erred in entering summary judgment for Defendant on claim preclusion grounds. View "Wilmington Trust Co. v. Sullivan-Thorne" on Justia Law

Appellant was the owner of lots in a subdivision. Appellant and others in the area used a right-of-way to access the lake for recreational purposes. Appellees, who owned lots adjacent to the right-of-way, later refused to let others use the right-of-way. Appellant filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the parties' rights in the right-of-way. The superior court concluded that Appellee owned the right-of-way pursuant to the Paper Streets Act and that the right-of-way was not part of a common scheme of development. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) did not err in its application of the Paper Streets Act; and (2) did not err in finding there was no common scheme of development. View "Tisdale v. Buch" on Justia Law

Defendant leased a single-family dwelling to Tenants pursuant to a lease agreement in which Tenants were permitted to keep pets but would be responsible for any property damage or disturbance caused by their pets. Three times in one month, a dog owned by Tenants allegedly attacked Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Defendants seeking damages on a common law theory of negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there were no triable issues as to whether Defendants were ever in possession of control over Tenants' dog, the superior court did not err in its judgment. View "Fields v. Hayden" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was eighteen years old at the time, was badly injured in a single-vehicle accident. While she lay sedated at the hospital, a police trooper, without providing Miranda warnings, questioned Defendant about the car accident, seeking information as to who was driving. After a pause in the questioning, the trooper told Defendant that two of her friends who had been in the car were dead and urged Defendant to tell the truth about who was driving. Defendant subsequently made inculpatory statements. Defendant was indicted on two counts of manslaughter, two counts of aggravated criminal OUI, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident that resulted in serious bodily injury. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress as to all statements Defendant made after the pause in the interview, concluding (1) at that point, Defendant became a suspect and was in custody because she reasonably did not believe that she was free to terminate the interview; and (2) consequently, Defendant should have been given Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Defendant's statements throughout were voluntary but that Defendant was in custody after the break in the interview. View "State v. Lowe" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated criminal trespass and unlawful sexual contact. Appellant appealed his conviction, contending that, because he was motivated by his subconscious thoughts, was experiencing a blackout, and was under the influence of prescription drugs and alcohol during the encounter with the victim, he was not consciously aware of his acts and therefore did not act with the requisite culpable state of mind when he entered the victim's dwelling without her permission and subjected her to sexual contact without her consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in this instance, substantial evidence existed to show that Appellant's actions were taken knowingly and with intent. View "State v. Kepner" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of domestic violence assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State's closing argument contained comments that impermissibly drew attention to her decision not to testify in her own defense. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the prosecutor's statements were accurate recitations of the state of the evidence and did not expressly or implicitly comment on Defendant's failure to testify or suggest that the evidence must be accepted because it was unrebutted; and (2) therefore, the statements did not constitute misconduct. View "State v. Bean" on Justia Law

John Hardy leased part of land to Littlebrook Airport Development Co. (LADC). John Hardy died, leaving his wife Jean as the sole surviving owner of the leased property. In 2005, Jean sold the leased property to and assigned her interest in the lease to Littlebrook Ventures (LV), which executed a mortgage in Hardy's favor. Pursuant to the mortgage LV agreed not to modify the lease without Hardy's prior consent. LADC then assigned its interest in the lease to Windmill USA. Windmill and LV purported to amend the lease in accordance with a previously executed declaration amendment. LV later conveyed the property back to Hardy by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Hardy purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and conveyed it to Sweet Peas, LLC. Littlebrook Airport Condominium Association then brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment clarifying the rights of the parties pursuant to the lease. At issue was the effectiveness of the unrecorded amendment to the lease that violated the recorded mortgage covenant. The superior court concluded that the lease amendment was effective. The matter came before the Supreme Court on report. The Court discharged the report, concluding that acceptance of the report would improperly place the Court in the role of an advisory board. View "Littlebrook Airpark Condo. Ass'n v. Sweet Peas, LLC " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder and one count of arson. The trial court imposed three concurrent life sentences on the murder convictions and a consecutive fifteen-year sentence on the arson conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and the sentences, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements that he made to the police, as the confessions were made voluntarily and their admission at trial did not violate Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights; (2) declining to instruct the jury concerning the potential consequences of a verdict of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity; and (3) sentencing Defendant. View "Maine v. Ormsby" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Kenneth and Shelley Burek, alleging that the Bureks had defaulted on a promissory note held by Wells Fargo, thus breaching a condition of a corresponding mortgage held by the bank. During trial, the superior court admitted into evidence the promissory note, mortgage, and loan modification agreement between the Bureks and Wells Fargo proffered by Wells Fargo in addition to other documents. The trial court entered a judgment of foreclosure for Wells Fargo, concluding that the bank failed to prove it was a holder of the note but that it was entitled to enforce the note as a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent evidence supported the superior court's conclusion that Wells Fargo certified its proof of ownership of the mortgage note for purposes of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6321 by demonstrating that it was a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 11, 3-1301. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burek" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of theft by misapplication of property and securities fraud. Defendant appealed, contending that the court's jury instructions impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto him to prove his innocence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the burden of proof was not improperly shifted onto Defendant to prove his innocence where (1) there was no obvious error in the instructions the trial court gave because, as a whole, the instructions correctly stated the law; and (2) the court correctly stated the State's burden of proof and Defendant's presumption of innocence several times during the jury selection, at the beginning of the trial, in its final instructions, and in its written instructions sent to the jury room. View "State v. Philbrook" on Justia Law