Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A.H. was born in 2010 with extreme medical needs. A.H. required hospitalization three times when she was in the care of her parents. Eventually, the Department of Health and Human Services placed the child in a foster home. After being placed in a foster home, A.H. began receiving adequate nutrition and became healthier. Because A.H.'s parents demonstrated that they had limited intellectual capacity and failed to progress in rehabilitation, the Department petitioned for the termination of each parent's parental rights. After a hearing, the district court terminated both parents' parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) the parents were not able to protect A.H. from jeopardy; (2) the parents were unable to take responsibility for A.H. within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs; and (3) the termination of parental rights and adoption by the foster parents was in A.H.'s best interest. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

Padraic Conroy and Heather Wicks owned real property as tenants in common. In 2010, Wicks filed a complaint seeking an equitable partition and sale of the house, with profits to be split equally between her and Conroy. Following a jury-waived trial, the trial court granted Wicks's petition and ordered the sale of the house. The court ordered the profits to be split equally between the parties subject to a credit due to Wicks for Conroy's rent-free occupancy of the downstairs apartment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in (1) finding there was no contract in which the parties agreed Conroy would live in the house rent-free; (2) crediting Wicks for one-half of the fair rental value of the downstairs apartment during the period Conroy lived there; and (3) denying Conroy the opportunity to buy out Wicks's interest in the property. View "Wicks v. Conroy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful sexual contact and unlawful sexual touching. This was the third trial held after two mistrials in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) delcaring a mistrial at the second trial; (2) denying Defendant's motion for a new trial filed after the third trial on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct in the prosecutor's gestures during the third trial, which Defendant claimed telegraphed the prosecutor's personal opinion or witness credibility; and (3) failing to limit, on its own initiative, alleged misstatements of law and fact that the prosecutor made in closing argument and in rebuttal at the third trial. View "State v. Carey" on Justia Law

After a hearing, Mother's rights to her two-year-old daughter were terminated. The district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned the child, that Mother was unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy, and that the child was thriving in the foster home. Mother appealed, arguing that she was denied due process because her attorney was ineffective and that insufficient evidence supported the judgment of termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in concluding that termination was in the child's best interest; and (2) Mother was not denied due process because her attorney provided effective assistance of counsel. View "In re S.P." on Justia Law

Fourteen-year-old Kenneth's paternal aunt (Aunt) and her son filed joined petitions for the appointment of a conservator and guardian based on Kenneth's mother's (Mother) inability to create a tolerable living situation for Kenneth. The probate court appointed Mother and Aunt as Kenneth's coguardians subject to Mother's compliance with certain conditions. The court's order provided that if Mother failed to comply with any of the conditions then Aunt could remove Kenneth from Mother's residence, and the court would then terminate Mother's guardianship. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the probate court's order could not be reconciled with the principles established in Guardianship of Jewel M. View "In re Guardianship of Kenneth" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawful trafficking in a scheduled drug. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless administrative inspection of a bus on which he was a passenger and a search of his person. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even if the police violated the Fourth Amendment while conducting the warrantless administrative inspection of the bus, the court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, as Defendant's voluntary consent to a dog sniff was sufficiently attenuated from the bus inspection, and the dog's alert on Defendant constituted sufficient probable cause for the agents to proceed with the search of Defendant's person. View "State v. Ntim" on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Wilk, 14 M.R.S. 6321, attaching documents, including a 2005 mortgage ($459,375) from Wilk in favor of the original lender’s nominee, MERS; a 2008 assignment from MERS to IndyMac; and a 2010 assignment by the FDIC, as the receiver for IndyMac, to Deutsche Bank. Trial evidence included a 2011 assignment from OneWest Bank to Deutsche Bank, executed approximately two weeks prior to the FDIC conveyance to OneWest Bank, purporting to grant “all interest” OneWest Bank then held in the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. On cross-examination, Deutsche Bank’s only witness confirmed that the assignment from OneWest Bank to Deutsche Bank was prior in time to the assignment from the FDIC to OneWest Bank. Deutsche Bank did not introduce the 2010 mortgage assignment, which it had attached to the complaint and which purported to transfer the mortgage from the FDIC to Deutsche Bank. The court entered a judgment of foreclosure. The Maine Supreme Court vacated, holding that Deutsche Bank failed to prove that it is the assignee of the mortgage. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Wilk " on Justia Law

Since 2001, Callaghan has worked part-time at the South Portland Library. Edwards works for the Parks and Recreation Department about four hours per week. Both are subject to a personnel policy, which, following 2010-2011 amendments, provides that city employees may not seek or accept nomination or election to any South Portland elective office; use the influence of their employment for or against any candidate for city elective office; circulate petitions or campaign literature for any city elective office; solicit or receive subscriptions, contributions or political service from any person for or against any candidate for any city elective office; or use city property to assist or advocate for or against any candidate. Callaghan has served on the School Board since 2007. When Callaghan sought reelection in 2011, the City Clerk stated that the personnel policy amendments prevented placement of her name on the ballot. Edwards had served on the Board for 18 years. In 2010, Edwards expressed interest in filling a vacancy on the Board. After the City Clerk questioned whether Edwards could be appointed given his city employment, Edwards did not pursue the appointment. Edwards and Callaghan filed a complaint, 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the policy was an unconstitutional restraint on political speech. The trial court entered partial summary judgment for the employees and an injunction barring enforcement of a prohibition on any city employee seeking election to or serving on the School Board or, on their own time, from circulating petitions or campaign literature and soliciting or receiving contributions or political service for or against candidates in School Board elections. The Maine Supreme Court affirmed as to the employees, but vacated the judgment to the extent that it invalidates the policy as to employees who were not parties. View "Callaghan v. City of South Portland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a general construction company. In 2010, the Maine Department of Labor Bureau of Unemployment Compensation conducted a random audit of Plaintiff's business to verify that twenty-four individuals that worked for Plaintiff were independent contractors. The Bureau determined the individuals were employees of Plaintiff and thus assessed Plaintiff unpaid unemployment tax liability for each of these individuals. The Unemployment Insurance Commission affirmed the Bureau's determination as to twenty-two of the individuals - salespeople, a bookkeeper, and skilled workers employed as subcontractors. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the Commission's decision as to the bookkeeper and the salespeople; but (2) vacated the Commission's judgment with regard to eighteen of the subcontractors, holding that Plaintiff met its burden of demonstrating that the subcontractors met all three criteria listed in 26 Me. Rev. Stat. 1043(11)(E)(1) to (3). Remanded. View "Sinclair Builders, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case involved two potential easements across oceanfront property that provided access to two beaches. Charles Parsons once owned all of the property involved. In 1915, a plan divided the property into lots and identified several roads. One of the lots, commonly referred to as the Farm Lot, was owned by Helen Rose and Nathaniel Merrill, who acquired title to the lot by deed from their father. The father, in turn, inherited the property through the residuary clause of his wife Helen's will. Rose and Merrill filed a complaint asking the court for a declaratory judgment that the owners of the Farm Lot had the right to use easements over two roads based on chain of title or adverse possession. Defendants, several neighbors, filed a counterclaim asking for a declaratory judgment that Rose and Merrill did not have the right to use the easements. The court found that merger extinguished the easements and no later deed revived the easements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the easements were established through merger, Helen's codicil established easements for the benefit of the Farm Lot. Remanded for consideration of whether the easements created by the codicil still existed or were abandoned. View "Rose v. Parsons" on Justia Law