Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michael filed a complaint for divorce from Laurel. The district court dissolved Michael's marriage to Laurel and ordered Michael to (1) maintain health insurance for Laurel as an element of spousal support, and (2) be responsible for Laurel's future nonmarital federal tax debt. The Supreme Court vacated portions of the divorce judgment, holding that the district court (1) erred in awarding spousal support without making findings about the costs of the mandated health care insurance payments or the health care insurance alternatives and in ordering Michael to provide health insurance coverage for Laurel indefinitely; and (2) erred in failing to clarify the tax years to which it intended its order regarding tax payments to apply. Remanded. View "Finucan v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to a term of thirty-eight years incarceration. Defendant subsequently filed two motions for a new trial, both of which were denied. Defendant appealed, asserting that the State's alleged failure to disclose evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and the discovery of new evidence after trial entitled him to a new trial. The trial court denied both motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the undisclosed evidence, although helpful to Defendant, did not undermine confidence in the jury's verdict; and (2) to the extent that the newly discovered evidence would be admissible at a new trial, it consisted primarily of impeachment evidence that was cumulative of the evidence the jury heard at trial or concerned a witness not critical to the State's case, and therefore, it was not clear the evidence would change the outcome of the trial. View "State v. Twardus" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to aggravated operating after habitual offender revocation, operating after habitual offender revocation, and criminal OUI. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the lower court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officer who stopped his vehicle lacked an objectively reasonable suspicion for stopping his vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record supported the conclusion that the officer who stopped the vehicle Defendant was operating had a subjective and objectively reasonable suspicion that the operator of the vehicle was operating while under the influence of intoxicants; and (2) the lower court did not err in declining to dismiss the charges arising from operating after revocation. View "State v. Spiegel" on Justia Law

The City Council authorized the City Manager to sell a parcel of oceanfront property known as "the Boat School." Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the sale agreement was invalid due to the City's failure to advertise in accordance with its charter, and moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent the sale of the property. Defendants counterclaimed against Plaintiffs for slander of title and tortious interference with a contract. Plaintiffs filed a special motion to dismiss the counterclaims of Defendants pursuant to Maine's anti-SLAPP statute because Defendants' counterclaims were based on Plaintiffs' petitioning activity. The district court (1) declined to address the merits of Plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss because it was filed after the sixty-day period provided by the statute; (2) granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' complaint; (3) granted in part and denied in part summary judgment for Plaintiffs on Defendants' counterclaims. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the merits of Plaintiffs' untimely special motion. View "Bradbury v. City of Eastport" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for multiple offenses of unlawful sexual contact, unlawful sexual touching, and assault. On appeal, Defendant challenged, inter alia, the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his computer pursuant to a search warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, as (i) the search warrant was supported by probable cause, and (ii) a clerical error in the jurat of the warrant affidavit did not affect the validity of the search warrant; and (2) the trial court did not clearly err in admitting testimony concerning sexually suggestive websites that Defendant viewed on his home and work computers. View "State v. Vrooman" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the intentional or knowing murder of his wife. The sentencing court imposed a final sentence of forty years in prison. Defendant appealed his sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing court did not err in applying the first step of the sentencing analysis required by Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1252-C(1) in setting Defendant's basic sentence; (2) Defendant's argument that availability of basic sentence information implicates all criminal defendants' equal protection and due process rights failed; and (3) the court appropriately considered objective, factually reliable information in placing Defendant's conduct along a continuum of seriousness. View "State v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Less than eighteen months after the district court entered a judgment granting Husband and Wife a divorce, Husband moved to terminate spousal support payments. Wife did not file a response or opposition to the motion but did appear with counsel at a hearing on the motion. The district court granted Husband's motion for the entry of a default judgment against Wife on the ground that Wife failed to file an objection to Husband's motion as required by Me. R. Civ. P. 7(c). The default judgment terminated spousal support. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred as a matter of law in applying Rule 7 and not Me. R. Civ. P. 105 and in failing to allow Wife to be heard on the substance of Husband's motion. Remanded. View "Bertin v. Bertin" on Justia Law

After Husband and Wife separated, they stipulated to shared parental rights and responsibilities for their two children. The district court later entered a divorce judgment determining marital property, marital debt, and spousal support. The court concluded that the circumstances of his case warranted an equal division of marital property and debt even though Husband had a significantly greater earning capacity than Wife. Wife appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration of the property distribution and debt allocation, holding that the gulf between the parties' expected post-marriage earnings did not constitute a circumstance that would justify an equal division of marital property and debt. On remand, the court was instructed to reconsider the issues of spousal support and attorney fees along with the parties' financial relationship. View "Thumith v. Thumith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff maintained a homeowners insurance policy with Insurer that excluded from coverage any claims for "injury arising out of the business pursuits" of Plaintiff. In 2011, a third party filed a complaint against Plaintiff, contending that Plaintiff published false and defamatory statements regarding the third party. In response to the complaint, Plaintiff tendered defense of the suit to Insurer, which declined to defend Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Insurer had a duty to defend him in the pending action by the third party. The superior court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for entry of a summary judgment in favor of Insurer, holding that Insurer had no duty to defend Plaintiff because the third party suit was based entirely on activity falling within the policy's exclusion for Plaintiff's "business pursuits." View "Hardenbergh v. Patrons Oxford Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of operating under the influence of intoxicants (OUI) with one previous OUI conviction within a ten-year period. Defendant appealed, contending that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and the events that followed and in applying the corpus delicti rule as modified by Me. Rev. Stat. 29-A, 2431(4). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant was not subject to an unlawful arrest when the HGN test was administered, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress; and (2 )the trial court reasonably inferred that a statement made by Defendant was an admission of driving, and the statement was sufficient to establish that Defendant operated a vehicle without further proof of corpus delicti. View "State v. White" on Justia Law