Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, FIA Card Services, filed a complaint against Defendant to recover damages for Defendant's unpaid credit card account. The district court subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff, as the moving party and party with the burden of proof at trial, failed to establish that there was no dispute of material fact as to each element of the cause of action where the record did not sufficiently establish either the existence of Defendant's credit card account or that Plaintiff was the owner of that account. Remanded. View "FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Saintonge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the administratrix of a Massachusetts estate appointed by a Massachusetts court. Part of the estate was a parcel of real property located in Maine that was later sold. The estate and the IRS agreed to value the back parcel at $950,000. Plaintiff later filed an amended Maine estate tax return, but insufficient funds remained in the estate to pay the Maine assessment. Plaintiff received a notice of assessment for Maine estate tax informing her that, as the estate's personal representative, she was personally liable for the money owed by the estate. Upon Plaintiff's request for reconsideration, the Assessor upheld an adjusted assessment of $98,180. The superior court vacated the Assessor's decision, concluding that the Assessor lacked jurisdiction to impose personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on a personal representative appointed by an out-of-state court to administer a foreign estate. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment against Plaintiff, holding that Maine tax law provides the Assessor with the authority to hold a personal representative appointed by an out-of-state court personally liable for unpaid Maine estate taxes resulting from the sale of real property located in Maine. View "Metcalf v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

Child was placed with her maternal grandaunt (Grandaunt) after child was removed from her mother's custody. The district court subsequently terminated Parents' parental rights to Child. Child was kept with Grandaunt until the Department of Health and Human Services reconsidered placing Child on adoption with Grandaunt and eventually removed Child from Grandaunt's care. Grandaunt subsequently filed a motion to intervene in the child protection proceeding and filed a motion for a placement hearing. The trial court denied the motions without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Grandaunt failed to establish a permanent and legally recognized relationship with Child after having an opportunity to do so, the trial court did not err in declining her motion to intervene; and (2) because Grandaunt did not qualify as a relative and was properly denied intervenor status, she did not have standing to seek placement of Child with her. View "In re N.W." on Justia Law

The Maine Labor Relations Board determined that firefighters for the City of Augusta who retired after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement between the City and the firefighters union were entitled to retiree health insurance benefits under the expired agreement's terms. The Board based its decision upon its determination that the retirement benefits were part of the static status quo that must be maintained during continuing negotiations. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not err in concluding that the City must continue to pay the retirees retiree health insurance benefits during negotiations in order to maintain the static status quo. View "City of Augusta v. Me. Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Paul Dyer held licenses as an insurance producer and consultant. Because of Dyer's alleged misconduct, the Bureau of Insurance filed a petition for enforcement against Dyer alleging that Dyer violated the Maine Insurance Code and seeking the revocation of his licenses and requesting civil penalties and restitution. After a hearing, the Superintendent of Insurance concluded that Dyer violated the identified provisions of the Insurance Code, revoked Dyer's licenses, and ordered him to pay civil penalties and restitution. Dyer appealed the judgment entered in the business and consumer docket affirming the Superintendent's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Superintendent did not err in interpreting the Insurance Code or in making factual findings and did not abuse his discretion by imposing penalties permitted in the statute. View "Dyer v. Superintendent of Ins." on Justia Law

The day after J.R. was born, he entered the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services due to his parents' violent relationship, their substance abuse, and J.R.'s display of symptoms of drug withdrawals. Mother and Father agreed to reunification plans. After a hearing, the district court found J.R. was in circumstances of jeopardy while in the parents' care. Thereafter, the Department filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents. After a hearing, the district court entered an order terminating the parental rights of both parents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding that termination was in the best interest of J.R.; (2) finding that Father was unfit; and (3) denying Father's motion to recuse and in denying Father's attorney's motion to withdraw. View "In re J.R." on Justia Law

Two minor children were removed from Mother's home based on allegations of domestic violence and substance abuse. After a trial, the trial court terminated both Mother's and Father's parental rights, finding three bases of unfitness as to each parent and determining that termination of each parent's parental rights was in the children's best interest. Mother and Father appealed, arguing, among other things, that the children were at risk of being in long-term foster care in part because the children were both over the age of ten. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err finding that both Mother and Father were unfit to parent the children; and (2) the court acted within its discretion when it determined that, for the children, being freed for adoption was much preferable to waiting for either parent to create a safe home for them. View "In re C.P." on Justia Law

Wife filed a complaint for divorce from Husband in 2010. Upon the filing of the divorce complaint, an injunction automatically issued barring either party from transferring marital property without the written consent of the parties or the permission of the court. Despite the outstanding injunction, Husband transferred certain marital assets to third parties. The district court later entered a judgment finding Husband committed financial misconduct through his criminal activity and by distributing assets during the divorce in violation of the court's injunction. The court also determined the parental rights and responsibilities as to the child of the marriage and distributed what remained of the marital estate. Wife appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment because it did not address Husband's responsibility for child support. Remanded with directions for the court to review its entire judgment to ensure that the judgment reflected an equitable resolution of the financial disputes between the parties in light of Husband's apparent violation of the court's financial preliminary injunction. View "King v. King" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon. Applying the minimum mandatory sentencing provision of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 17-A, 1252(5), apparently on its own initiative, the trial court sentenced Defendant to one year in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence imposed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court did not err in excluding or limiting certain evidence Defendant sought to introduce through a lay witness, a private investigator; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion for a mistrial and instead provided a curative instruction in response to a comment the prosecutor made in rebuttal; and (4) because the parties agreed that the court should reconsider the sentence, the sentence should be vacated. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Kline" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased property from Charles Johnson. During the pendency of the sale of the property, Johnson misrepresented the condition of the property and failed to disclose its prior use as a junkyard. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Johnson alleging various causes of action and seeking damages for loss of investment, undisclosed physical problems with the property, and emotional distress. While he owned the disputed property, Johnson maintained a homeowners insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate refused to defend or indemnify Johnson on Plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs and Johnson subsequently reached an agreement resolving the underlying complaint, and the superior court entered a judgment against Johnson for $330,000. Plaintiffs then initiated a reach and apply action against Allstate. The trial court granted summary judgment for Johnson, determining that the policy did not cover the damages Plaintiffs suffered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' damages did not constitute covered "bodily injury" or "property damage" pursuant to the Allstate homeowners insurance policy. View "Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law