Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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A woman was injured while visiting a property owned by a couple who were seeking tenants for a mobile home located on their land. The injury occurred when she stepped into a gap between the entryway stairs and the mobile home, a gap created during ongoing repairs. The couple had a homeowners insurance policy with State Mutual Insurance Company, but the policy’s declarations page listed a different property as the covered premises. The injured woman sued the couple for negligence, and the parties later entered into a settlement and stipulated judgment, with the couple paying part of the judgment and the woman seeking the remainder from the insurer under Maine’s reach-and-apply statute.The Superior Court of Waldo County granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that the insurance policy did not cover the property where the injury occurred. The court determined that the property was not an “insured location” under the policy and that the injury arose out of a condition of the uninsured premises, thus falling within a policy exclusion. The woman appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case de novo, considering both the interpretation of the insurance policy and the application of the reach-and-apply statute. The court held that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of a premises owned by the insured but not listed as an insured location. The court also found that the property in question was not an “insured location” because the insureds did not reside there and it was not listed in the policy declarations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer, holding that the policy did not provide coverage for the injury. View "Rowe v. State Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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Carol Cutting filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A., based on treatment she received in 2013. Cutting alleged that a doctor at Down East treated her shoulder improperly and failed to obtain informed consent, particularly regarding how her Tourette’s syndrome might affect the surgery. She also claimed the doctor falsified her medical records. A prelitigation screening panel found unanimously against Cutting, determining that the doctor’s conduct did not deviate from the standard of care.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) admitted the panel’s finding into evidence at trial. The jury found that Down East was not negligent. Cutting challenged the admission of the panel’s finding, arguing it was biased and violated her due process rights. She also contested the court’s judgment as a matter of law on her claim for punitive damages, arguing that the court erred in its decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the panel’s finding. The court noted that the panel’s offer to decide the case based on written records, if both parties agreed, did not demonstrate bias, especially since the offer was declined and a full hearing was held. The court also found that the trial court provided the jury with the necessary instructions to contextualize the panel’s finding, preserving Cutting’s right to a jury trial.Regarding punitive damages, the court held that any error in granting Down East’s motion for judgment as a matter of law was harmless. Since the jury found no negligence, they could not award any damages, including punitive damages. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A. View "Cutting v. Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A." on Justia Law

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Josh Rinaldi, an inmate at the Maine Correctional Center, slipped on an untreated patch of ice on a paved road within the correctional center, referred to as the "Runway," and broke his ankle. Rinaldi filed a twelve-count complaint asserting various tort claims, arguing that the State was not immune under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA) due to an exception for injuries sustained in or on an appurtenance to a public building.The Superior Court (Androscoggin County) granted Rinaldi's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that the Maine Correctional Center is a public building under the MTCA and that the Runway is an appurtenance to the correctional center's buildings. The State appealed, arguing that it was immune from liability under the MTCA and that the Runway did not fall under any exceptions to the MTCA.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Runway is not an appurtenance to the correctional center's buildings. The court applied a three-element test to determine whether the Runway was an appurtenance: physical annexation to the realty, adaptation to the realty, and intent to be irremovable from the realty. The court found that the Runway was not physically annexed to the buildings, was not specially adapted to the buildings, and was not intended to be irremovable from the realty. Therefore, the Runway did not meet the criteria for an appurtenance under the MTCA.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment granting Rinaldi's motion for partial summary judgment and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the State was immune from liability under the MTCA. View "Rinaldi v. Maine Correctional Center" on Justia Law

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Peter A. Smith visited Mercy Hospital twice in June 2017 with symptoms indicative of Lyme disease. Dr. John R. Henson misdiagnosed him on both occasions, leading to a lack of appropriate treatment. Smith subsequently developed Lyme carditis and died on July 2, 2017. His parents, Angela M. Smith and Richard T. Smith Jr., as co-personal representatives of his estate, filed a medical negligence lawsuit against Henson, Mercy Hospital, and Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) ruled that Maine’s Wrongful Death Act allowed recovery for pecuniary injuries even if the decedent would not have provided financial support to the beneficiaries. A jury found the defendants liable and awarded damages, including $2 million for pecuniary injury to Smith’s parents, despite no evidence that Smith would have financially supported them.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the applicable wrongful death statute authorized recovery for pecuniary injury only when the death deprived one or more of the people identified in the statute of prospective financial gain. The court concluded that damages for such a loss were not available when the loss was asserted only by the estate. Consequently, the court vacated the portion of the judgment awarding damages for pecuniary injury. All other aspects of the judgment were unaffected, and the case was remanded for entry of a modified judgment consistent with the opinion. View "Smith v. Henson" on Justia Law

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Kiril Lozanov and Capital City Renewables, Inc. (CCR) appealed a Superior Court decision granting summary judgment in favor of Lily B. Piel. Lozanov and CCR alleged that Piel, a former employee, accessed and disclosed Lozanov’s personal emails without authorization, which included confidential information about a wind project unrelated to CCR. Lozanov claimed that Piel’s actions led to increased child support obligations and health issues due to stress from related litigation.The Superior Court dismissed CCR’s claim for intrusion upon seclusion, as the company did not have a right to privacy in Lozanov’s emails. Lozanov’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was also dismissed, as the court found Piel’s conduct was not outrageous enough to warrant such a claim. The court allowed Lozanov’s intrusion upon seclusion claim to proceed but ultimately granted summary judgment for Piel on all counts, finding no evidence that Piel’s actions caused the alleged damages.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The court found no evidence that Piel breached any duty owed to CCR or that her actions caused the damages claimed by Lozanov and CCR. The court also concluded that CCR's and Lozanov’s damages were too remote and speculative to support their claims. Additionally, the court noted that public policy considerations barred recovery, as Lozanov’s attempt to hide assets in a child support proceeding was contrary to the best interests of the child and public policy. View "Capital City Renewables, Inc. v. Piel" on Justia Law

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An inmate at the Hancock County Jail, Monica J. Johnson, died by suicide after being incarcerated from September 21 to September 29, 2018. Her estate and surviving spouse filed a medical malpractice notice of claim against Hancock County and several county officials and employees, alleging negligence in her care. The County and its employees, along with Jail Housing Officer Kayla Dumond, appealed the Superior Court's denial of their motions for summary judgment.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) denied the motions for summary judgment, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) applied to the defendants and that the defendants had not demonstrated immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal.The court concluded that the issue of whether the defendants are "health care providers" under the MHSA is not immediately appealable. Additionally, the court decided to defer to the federal court on the issue of immunity under the MTCA, as the federal court is handling a related case involving the same parties and facts. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, allowing the MHSA screening process to proceed, with the understanding that the federal court will continue with the litigation once the screening process is completed. View "Carney v. Hancock County" on Justia Law

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In November 2021, Lincoln Medical administered a COVID-19 vaccine to the five-year-old child of Jeremiah Hogan and Siara Jean Harrington at a school clinic without obtaining parental consent. Hogan filed a notice of claim in the Superior Court against the doctor, Lincoln Medical Partners, and MaineHealth, Inc., alleging various torts including professional negligence, battery, and false imprisonment on behalf of the child, and emotional distress and tortious interference with parental rights on behalf of the parents.The Superior Court appointed a chair for the prelitigation screening panel, and Lincoln Medical moved to dismiss the notice of claim, citing immunity under the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss, interpreting the PREP Act to provide immunity to the defendants with no applicable exceptions. Hogan appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the PREP Act provides broad immunity to covered persons, including individuals and corporations, from suits related to the administration of covered countermeasures, such as the COVID-19 vaccine. The court found that the federal statute preempts state law that would otherwise allow Hogan to sue, as the claims were directly related to the administration of the vaccine. The court concluded that the defendants were immune from Hogan’s claims under the PREP Act, and the state tort claims were preempted by federal law. View "Hogan v. Lincoln Medical Partners" on Justia Law

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The case involves Eastern Maine Medical Center and eight other Maine hospitals (the Hospitals) who filed a 509-page complaint against various businesses and individuals (the Opioid Sellers) involved in the marketing and distribution of prescription opioids. The Hospitals alleged that the Opioid Sellers created illegitimate demand for opioids and unlawfully increased supply, leading to an opioid epidemic that caused the Hospitals to incur high costs for treating patients with opioid misuse, addiction, and dependency, with only partial reimbursement from insurance.The Business and Consumer Docket (Duddy, J.) dismissed the Hospitals' complaint. The court found that the complaint did not comply with the requirement for a "short and plain statement" of the claim but chose to dismiss it based on the legal insufficiency of the claims. The court concluded that the Hospitals could not recover under any of their legal theories, including negligence, public nuisance, unjust enrichment, fraud and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and civil conspiracy. The court also denied the Hospitals' request for leave to amend their complaint.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's dismissal. The court held that the Hospitals' claims were legally insufficient. Specifically, the court found that the Hospitals did not have a direct negligence claim, as they did not suffer harm directly caused by the Opioid Sellers. The fraud and misrepresentation claims failed due to lack of reliance by the Hospitals on the Opioid Sellers' misrepresentations. The unjust enrichment claim was dismissed because the Hospitals did not confer a benefit on the Opioid Sellers. The public nuisance claim failed as the Hospitals did not suffer a special injury different in kind from the public. Lastly, the civil conspiracy claim was dismissed as it required an underlying tort, which was not present. The court concluded that the deficiencies in the complaint could not be remedied by amendment. View "Eastern Maine Medical Center v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

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Robert E. Dupuis and twelve other plaintiffs filed lawsuits against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, seeking damages for sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by the Bishop’s clergy when the plaintiffs were minor children. Their claims were previously barred by the statute of limitations. The Bishop moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that 14 M.R.S. § 752-C(3) (2022), which purports to revive the plaintiffs’ claims, deprives the Bishop of a constitutionally protected vested right.The Business and Consumer Docket (McKeon, J.) denied the Bishop’s motions but reported its orders to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court under Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c). The court accepted the report to determine whether the retroactive application of section 752-C(3) is constitutional.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the retroactive application of section 752-C(3) contravenes centuries of precedent and multiple provisions of the Maine Declaration of Rights, as well as the Constitution’s provisions regarding separation of powers. The court concluded that once a statute of limitations has expired for a claim, a right to be free of that claim has vested, and the claim cannot be revived. Therefore, section 752-C(3) is unconstitutional as applied to expired claims. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Dupuis v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland" on Justia Law

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In October 2020, Elliot Fama, employed by Sanford Contracting, was working on a project in Scarborough, Maine. After work, he and his co-worker, Robert Clarke, consumed alcohol at a hotel and a tavern. Later, in the hotel parking lot, Clarke struck Mr. Fama, causing him to fall and sustain fatal injuries. Laureen Fama, Mr. Fama’s widow, settled a workers’ compensation claim in Massachusetts for $400,000.Laureen Fama then filed a lawsuit in Cumberland County Superior Court against Bob’s LLC, which operated the tavern, and Clarke. She alleged liquor liability, wrongful death, loss of consortium, and battery. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the workers’ compensation settlement precluded the lawsuit. The Superior Court denied these motions, leading to the current appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that under Maine’s Workers’ Compensation Act (MWCA), Ms. Fama’s settlement barred her from suing Clarke, as the Act’s immunity provisions extend to co-employees. Consequently, Clarke was exempt from the lawsuit. The court further held that because Clarke could not be retained as a defendant, the claims against Bob’s LLC failed under the “named and retained” provisions of Maine’s Liquor Liability Act (MLLA).The court vacated the Superior Court’s order denying summary judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Bob’s LLC and Clarke. View "Fama v. Bob's LLC" on Justia Law