Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this defamation case, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of Marie Gunning’s complaint without prejudice for failure to effect service on the defendants, holding that Gunning was estopped from a prior California judgment from continuing to seek the Does’ identities. Marie Gunning brought suit against the anonymous publisher and writer (collectively, John Doe) of News as Viewed from a Crow’s Nest (Crow's Nest), a publication distributed locally in Freeport, Maine and accessible on the Internet, claiming that Crow’s Nest published defamatory statements about her in several of its issues. During the proceedings, a California court quashed a subpoena that Gunning served on the Crow’s Nest website host seeking to identify Doe. Thereafter, the superior court dismissed Gunning’s complaint without prejudice for failure to effect service on the defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the issue decided by the California court in a final judgment was the same issue that Gunning sought to have a Maine court revisit, and because Gunning had the opportunity and incentive to litigate that issue in California, she was estopped from relitigating it in the Maine action. View "Gunning v. Doe" on Justia Law

Amy Canney’s minor child, Nicholai, was bitten by a dog kept by Eric Burns, a neighbor who performed on-call maintenance work on properties owned by Strathglass Holdings, Inc. Canney filed a complaint on behalf of Nicholai against Strathglass, claiming that Burns was at all pertinent times the agent, servant or employee of Strathglass and was maintaining the property for the benefit of Strathglass. The superior court granted summary judgment for Strathglass, concluding that Burns was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the dog bite. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) neither Burns’s acts or omissions nor Nicholai’s presence on his premises were related to Burns’s employment or agency with Strathglass, and therefore, summary judgment on Canney’s respondent superior claims was proper; and (2) Canney’s complaint failed to allege a theory of direct liability against Strathglass, and she offered no evidence that would support a direct claim of negligence against Strathglass. View "Canney v. Strathglass Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Aleshia Diviney was injured when she slipped and fell on ice outside of her dormitory, located on the University of Southern Maine (USM) Gorham campus. Diviney filed a complaint alleging premises liability against USM, the University of Maine System (UMS), and the State. UMS moved for summary judgment, asserting untimely notice. The superior court granted summary judgment for UMS, concluding that Diviney did not file notice satisfying the statutory requirements until after the 180-day deadline had passed and that Diviney could not show “good cause” to excuse her failure to timely file notice. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the grant of summary judgment was proper because the question of “good cause” did not present genuine issues of material fact, and the court properly applied the language of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 8107 to the facts in the record. View "Diviney v. University of Maine System" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was terminated from his employment from Bath Iron Works (BIW), Plaintiff grieved the termination. The Local S7 Union Grievance Committee voted not to arbitrate the grievance. Thereafter, represented by Attorney John R. Lemieux, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Union and BIW, alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement and discrimination. The magistrate judge issued a recommended decision granting a summary judgment in favor of BIW and the Union. The superior court affirmed the magistrate judge’s recommended decision, and the court of appeals affirmed. Plaintiff then filed this action against Lemieux, alleging legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Lemieux, concluding that Plaintiff failed to put forth prima facie evidence of causation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper because Plaintiff failed to put forth prima facie evidence of causation to support his claims. View "Brooks v. Lemieux" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff gave birth to a son, she filed a complaint against Merck & Co., Inc. and the United States, alleging that a community health center physician negligently failed to insert into her arm an implant manufactured by Merck that was designed to prevent pregnancy as a result of Merck’s defective applicator. The federal court certified questions of state law to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The Court answered (1) the protection of Maine’s Wrongful Birth statute extends to Merck as a drug manufacturer and distributor; and (2) pursuant to the Wrongful Birth statute, Plaintiff may not recover any damages on her claims against either defendant because of the nature of the procedure she underwent. View "Doherty v. Merck & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Philip Barnard was significantly injured when a deck attached to an apartment owed by William Condon collapsed while Barnard was standing on it. Barnard and his wife, Jaime Wilson, filed a complaint against Condon, alleging negligence and seeking damages for, among other things, Wilson’s loss of consortium. Barnard and Wilson divorced during the pendency of the lawsuit. After a trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Barnard on his complaint but awarded no damages on Wilson’s derivative claim for loss of consortium. Wilson appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in denying Wilson’s motion for additur or a new trial on the grounds that the jury’s verdict was manifestly inadequate and internally inconsistent because Wilson failed to meet her burden of demonstrating any of the available grounds for overturning the jury’s verdict. View "Wilson v. Condon" on Justia Law

Harris Management and JJR Associates filed a complaint against Paul Coulombe and two LLCs under his control (collectively, Defendants), alleging seven causes of action arising from allegations that Coulombe had misrepresented his commitment to hire Harris Management to manage a golf course, which Coulombe was preparing to purchase, in an effort to obtain nearby property from JJR Associates at a discount and to prevent Harris from purchasing the golf club. During discovery, the court entered an order providing that Coulombe must permit Harris to discover the communications among Coulombe, his counsel, and a third party, concluding that those communications were either not subject to the attorney-client privilege or were discoverable because the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment except with respect to one communication that the Court concluded the trial court must consider further on remand, holding that, with the exception of those pages, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the release of specific communications between Coulombe and his attorneys. View "Harris Management, Inc. v. Coulombe" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff, frustrated with then-proposed budget cuts to mental health services, sent the Governor a series of emails that were interpreted as threatening. Plaintiff was delivered to MaineGeneral Medical Center for a psychiatric evaluation, where she was eventually subjected to a search and held against her will for the night in a locked room. Plaintiff later filed an action against MaineGeneral and Scott Kemmerer, an emergency room physician, alleging that Defendants deprived her of liberty without due process and subjected her to an unreasonable search in violation of the Maine Civil Rights Act (MCRA). Defendants filed for entry of summary judgment as to the MCRA claims. The court (1) granted the motion as to MaineGeneral, determining that MaineGeneral could not be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees under the MCRA; and (2) denied the motion as to Kemmerer. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of summary judgment as to Kemmerer on issues of immunity, holding that Kemmerer was not entitled to absolute immunity or common law qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s MCRA claims; and (2) did not reach Kemmerer’s remaining arguments in this interlocutory appeal. View "Clifford v. MaineGeneral Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

After Ellen Clark and John McLane ended their relationship, Clark instituted protection from abuse proceedings against McLane. The district court issued a protection order for a period of one year prohibiting McLane from having contact with Clark and ordering McLane to disable and refrain from undertaking further efforts designed to disseminate information about Clark to others. McLane appealed, contending that insufficient evidence supported the court’s finding that he abused Clark within the meaning of the protection from abuse statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence Clark presented was sufficient as a matter of law to support the court’s finding of abuse.View "Clark v. McLane" on Justia Law

After Daniel Nickerson suffered a fatal heart attack, Nickerson’s wife, Cecelia, as personal representative of Nickerson’s estate, filed professional negligence and wrongful death claims against Daniel’s doctor, Dr. Alan Carter, and vicarious liability claims against Mercy Primary Care, Dr. Carter’s employer. A jury found that Dr. Carter was negligent but not the legal cause of Daniel’s death. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment, holding that the court erred in admitting the findings of a medical malpractice screening panel, as the panel chair’s consideration of evidence outside the record violated the Maine Health Security Act and Maine’s procedural rules. Remanded.View "Estate of Nickerson v. Carter" on Justia Law