Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Juanita C. Clark and her husband complained to the Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) of the Town of Phippsburg about a neighbor, Dan Gurney, who was allegedly operating a nuisance wood-selling business in violation of the land use ordinance. The Board of Appeals found that Gurney’s business constituted a nuisance, but the Board of Selectmen later found that the nuisance had been abated. After the Superior Court affirmed the Board of Selectmen’s decision, Clark and her husband appealed, resulting in a prior ruling by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that the Board of Selectmen had exceeded its authority and violated due process. The matter was remanded for proper action.Following remand, the Board of Selectmen conducted a series of meetings, some involving ex parte communications with Gurney and limiting public participation. Ultimately, the Board agreed to enter into a consent agreement with Gurney and the CEO issued a cease-and-desist order. Clark later reported that Gurney continued to violate the order, submitting evidence to the CEO, who informed the Board that legal action should be considered. The Board held further discussions, some of which Clark was not notified about, and eventually voted that there was no violation and that no action would be taken. The CEO then notified Clark of this decision. When Clark sought formal findings, the Board clarified that its previous statement was just an opinion and that the CEO’s determination was final.Clark filed a complaint in the Sagadahoc County Superior Court challenging the Board’s actions and alleging due process violations. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the Board’s clarification left no final government action for review. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that Clark’s allegations regarding the Board’s refusal to take legal action presented a reviewable question of final government action. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clark v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law

A veteran with post-traumatic stress disorder sought housing in Maine and contacted D&L Apartments about an available unit. During a phone conversation, the landlord, Darrell Sproul, stated that no dogs were allowed. When the prospective tenant specifically asked if the policy included service or “federally protected” dogs, Sproul again said no dogs and advised not to apply. The prospective tenant, who anticipated soon receiving a service dog, did not pursue the rental further. The Maine Human Rights Commission filed a complaint against D&L Apartments and Sproul, alleging unlawful disability discrimination under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), based on three theories: refusal to permit a service animal, making a discriminatory statement, and refusing to rent because of disability.The Kennebec County Superior Court denied D&L’s motion for summary judgment and held a bench trial. The court found in favor of the Commission, concluding that D&L violated two provisions of the MHRA: (1) by refusing to permit the use of a service animal, in violation of 5 M.R.S. § 4582-A(3), and (2) by making a statement indicating a discriminatory limitation based on disability, in violation of 5 M.R.S. § 4581-A(1)(C). The court found it unnecessary to address the third theory. As remedies, the court ordered fair-housing training, the creation of a policy on assistance animals, and imposed a $10,000 civil penalty.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. It held that Sproul’s statements constituted an unlawful indication of a limitation or discrimination based on disability, and that the statutory protection against refusing the use of a service animal extends to prospective tenants, even if they do not yet possess the animal. The court found no error in the trial court’s interpretation or application of the MHRA and upheld the finding of liability and the remedies imposed. View "Maine Human Rights Commission v. D&L Apartments" on Justia Law

On the evening of January 1, 2023, Elizabeth Gurney, aged eighteen, hosted a party at the house she shared with her mother, Holly Gurney, in Lewiston, Maine. Holly was out of town but had instructed Elizabeth that she could have a small gathering with restrictions on the number of guests and no alcohol. The party grew unexpectedly large and unruly, with many uninvited guests, including individuals involved with drugs. After several masked, uninvited individuals returned to the party and refused to leave, Elizabeth asked Zachary Wilson, a guest, to help remove them. While Wilson escorted one of the intruders outside, the intruder shot and injured him.Wilson filed suit in the Androscoggin County Superior Court against Elizabeth and Holly Gurney, alleging premises liability and, as to Holly, negligent entrustment. He argued that the Gurneys owed him a duty to maintain safe premises and to protect him from foreseeable harm, and that Holly was negligent in entrusting the house to Elizabeth. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the Gurneys, determining that they did not owe a duty to protect Wilson from the criminal act of a third party and that negligent entrustment does not apply to real property. Wilson appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The Court held that neither of the Gurneys owed Wilson a duty to protect him from the criminal actions of third parties under the circumstances, as no special relationship existed between the parties and the Gurneys did not create a situation of foreseeable, high risk. The Court also held that the tort of negligent entrustment applies only to chattels, not to real property, and declined to expand the doctrine. Thus, summary judgment for the Gurneys was upheld. View "Wilson v. Gurney" on Justia Law

A gravel pit in the Town of Sabattus was granted conditional approval in 2003 to mine gravel from a four-acre area adjacent to F. Sanborn Road, with requirements for buffer zones and slope ratios. The Abutters, who own properties along the shore and use the road for access, raised concerns about compliance with these conditions. In late 2023, the Town found violations, including expansion beyond the permitted area and encroachment into the buffer zone and Shoreland Zoning area. Poirier, the operator, agreed to cease excavation, and the Town issued a notice of violation.Following negotiations, the Town filed a land use complaint and proposed a consent judgment in spring 2025. The District Court in Lewiston allowed the Abutters to intervene and heard their objections to the consent judgment, which required Poirier to execute a new reclamation plan, stabilize the berm, create a thirty-foot reclaimed buffer, and cease further mineral extraction. The Abutters argued that the judgment violated state law and local ordinances by not requiring a fifty-foot buffer and permitting ongoing violations. The District Court approved the consent judgment in September 2025, and the Abutters appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the matter de novo, applying the standard from Pike Industries, Inc. v. City of Westbrook. The Court held that the consent judgment did not violate state performance standards, as it required compliance with Maine law and allowed for enforcement if violations occurred. The judgment was consistent with the Town's ordinances, as the ordinances applied to new development or active excavation, not reclamation. The Court found no impermissible effects on third parties and no violation of public policy, concluding that the judgment was fair, adequate, and reasonable. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Town of Sabattus v. L.P. Poirier & Son, Inc." on Justia Law

A condominium resident entered into an agreement with the developer, the unit owners’ association, and other unit owners after concerns were raised about infrastructure and proposed changes to the condominium plan. The agreement required the developer to complete infrastructure work, pay a sum to the association, and convey a vacant lot to the association in exchange for the unit owners withdrawing their opposition to a planning board application. The agreement included a provision requiring planning board approval of the developer’s application by March 1, 2023, as a condition for the parties’ obligations. The planning board, however, did not approve the application until March 28, 2023. After learning that the lot was to be sold to a third party, the resident sued for specific performance of the agreement.The Superior Court (York County) granted the developer’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the failure to obtain planning board approval by the specified date was an unmet condition precedent, discharging all parties from their obligations under the agreement. The court also dismissed the resident’s claims for quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief on independent grounds.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed whether the timing requirement for planning board approval was necessarily a material condition precedent as a matter of law. The Court held that, in actions seeking equitable relief such as specific performance, whether time is of the essence is a factual question dependent on the intent of the parties and the circumstances. The Court concluded that the materiality of the March 1 deadline could not be determined solely from the pleadings, and that the complaint alleged facts which, if proven, could entitle the resident to relief. The Court vacated the dismissal of the breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Constance L. Beane v. Village on Great Brook, LLC" on Justia Law

Neils Point, LLC owns a farm property in Harpswell, Maine, which it leased to Joseph and Laura Grady for agricultural use. The Gradys resided on the property and operated the farm under successive lease agreements, culminating in a 2017 extension titled “Commercial Agricultural Lease Agreement.” This lease specified that it was not a residential rental, set rent as a percentage of the farm’s net proceeds, and required arbitration for disputes. Neils Point alleged that the Gradys breached the lease by miscalculating rent, failing to pay on time, and not using the land as productive cropland.After Neils Point initiated arbitration in 2024, the Gradys responded by admitting the dispute was subject to arbitration and made their own arbitration demand under the lease. The arbitration hearing was held in July 2025, with both parties participating fully and without objection to either the process or the arbitrability of the dispute. The arbitrator found in favor of Neils Point, concluding that the Gradys breached the lease by improperly deducting expenses, failing to pay rent, and not maintaining the farm’s productivity. Damages were awarded, and the Gradys were ordered to vacate the property.The Cumberland County Superior Court confirmed the arbitration award and denied the Gradys’ subsequent motion to vacate, in which they argued for the first time that the arbitration provision was void because the lease was residential and the arbitrator exceeded his authority. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the Gradys’ participation in arbitration without objection waived their right to challenge the validity of the arbitration clause or the arbitrator’s authority. The Court further held that the arbitrator’s construction of the lease was rational, and thus confirmation of the award was proper. View "Neils Point, LLC v. Grady" on Justia Law

The Maine Human Rights Commission filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court alleging that a landlord discriminated against his tenant based on sex, asserting claims under both the Maine Human Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act. After litigation began, the tenant requested a judicial settlement conference. The landlord did not attend the conference, but his attorney and daughter attended, allegedly with his authority to settle. After the conference, a record form stated that the parties had agreed to a full and final settlement, but disagreements arose during subsequent exchanges of draft settlement agreements, particularly over provisions related to an acknowledgment of antidiscrimination laws and certain “public-relief terms” such as fair-housing training and property management oversight.The Kennebec County Superior Court reviewed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the court found that the parties intended to be bound by an agreement reached at the settlement conference, as reflected in the settlement conference record form. The court identified five basic terms as the substance of the agreement, including a payment to the tenant and specific non-monetary provisions. The court ordered the parties to execute an agreement consistent with these terms, except for the acknowledgment provision, which it found was not part of the agreement.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the record was insufficient to support the Superior Court’s finding that the parties mutually assented to all material terms of a binding settlement agreement. The Supreme Judicial Court held that, in the absence of an evidentiary hearing or a sufficiently detailed record, the lower court erred in enforcing the settlement. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the parties actually reached a binding agreement and, if so, its precise terms. View "Maine Human Rights Commission v. Larkin" on Justia Law

Chip and Anne Andrews applied to the Town of Kittery for approval of a conservation subdivision. Their application sought waivers from certain general street design and construction standards, such as requirements for right-of-way width, street length, street grade, and sidewalk width, as outlined in the town’s Land Use and Development Code. The Planning Board held several hearings, received public input, and ultimately granted the requested waivers and approved the subdivision, finding the waivers met the ordinance’s requirements and did not adversely affect public health, safety, the natural environment, or general welfare. Judith Andrews, a neighboring landowner, opposed the waivers, arguing that only the Board of Appeals could grant such relief because, in her view, the street standards functioned as zoning requirements.After the Planning Board’s decision, Judith Andrews sought judicial review in the Maine Superior Court (York County). The court affirmed the Planning Board’s decision, concluding that the street standards at issue were not zoning requirements, but rather subdivision standards that the Planning Board was authorized to waive under the Code. The Superior Court found that the Board acted within its delegated authority and that no variance from the Board of Appeals was required.On further appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the Planning Board’s decision directly, as the trial court had acted in an appellate capacity. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the general street standards in the Code were not zoning requirements, but rather general, town-wide subdivision standards, and therefore could be waived by the Planning Board under its express authority. The Court distinguished these standards from zone-specific zoning requirements, clarified that there was no violation of state law, and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Andrews v. Town of Kittery" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when a property owner sought to construct a small campground on the rear portion of her land in the Town of Tremont. The property was split between two zones: the front in a Commercial Fishery/Maritime Activity (CFMA) zone, containing a residence and an existing paved access way, and the rear in a Residential-Business (RB) zone, where the campground would be located. While campgrounds are allowed in the RB zone, the issue centered on whether the proposed use of the existing access way, traversing the CFMA zone, violated local zoning restrictions, particularly those prohibiting expansion of nonconforming driveways in that zone.After the initial application was denied by the Tremont Planning Board due to concerns over site access, subsequent applications and appeals followed. The Planning Board, after remand from the Superior Court (transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket), held hearings and issued findings that the access way was a driveway, not a road or trail, and that the proposed project would unlawfully expand a nonconforming use. The Board of Appeals affirmed the denial. The Superior Court again reviewed the matter, finding legal error in the Board’s failure to fully consider the length of the access way and the “similar use” argument, and ordered the Board to approve the application and direct issuance of a permit.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case, applying a standard that gives deference to the Planning Board’s findings of fact and reviews legal interpretations de novo. The Court held that the Board’s determination—that the access way was a driveway and that the proposed expansion was prohibited under the ordinance—was supported by substantial evidence. The Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to affirm the Planning Board’s denial of the application. View "Brogdon v. Town of Tremont" on Justia Law

A developer sought approval from a municipal planning board to build a new residential subdivision, proposing two access roads: one through an existing neighboring subdivision and another via a road in a neighboring town. The developer’s plan designated the road through the existing subdivision as the main entrance and the other as an emergency access. During public hearings and board review, nearby residents and their homeowners’ association raised concerns about traffic safety, particularly for pedestrians and children, on the proposed main access road. After review and site visits, the planning board approved the subdivision but imposed a condition requiring that the road through the existing subdivision be limited to emergency access, making the other road the primary entrance.The developer challenged this condition in the York County Superior Court, arguing that the planning board lacked authority to impose such a restriction, that the decision was unsupported by evidence, and that it was arbitrary and capricious. The Superior Court initially remanded the matter for additional findings, after which the planning board reaffirmed its condition, citing pedestrian and bicycle safety concerns. The Superior Court ultimately denied the developer’s appeal, upholding the planning board’s decision.On further appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the planning board’s decision directly for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or lack of substantial evidence. The Court held that the planning board had authority under the municipal ordinance to impose conditions to ensure public safety, that the condition was supported by substantial evidence including resident testimony and board observations, and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Mick Land Development, Inc. v. Town of South Berwick" on Justia Law