Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the Town of Kittery Planning Board’s approval of a site plan application for development of a hotel on Route 1. The court held (1) the Board’s finding that a pitched roof for the building was not practicable was supported by substantial evidence, and the Board was authorized to approve a flat-roof design under the circumstances; (2) regarding the height of the building, the Board did not err in its application of the zoning ordinance’s height restrictions; and (3) the Board’s decision regarding the roof design and building height did not amount to a variance. View "Balano v. Town of Kittery" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo appealed from the district court’s judgment dismissing its foreclosure complaint against Defendant as a sanction for pretrial misconduct. After a nontestimonial hearing, the court ordered the action dismissed with prejudice. Wells Fargo moved to alter or amend the judgment to provide for a dismissal without prejudice. The district court denied the motion and maintained the dismissal with prejudice. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case to the district court to conduct a proceeding that comports with the process recently articulated in Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Cope, ___ A.3d ___, issued on April 11, 2017, holding that the process used by the trial court did not entirely follow the procedural steps that a court should take before imposing the sanction of dismissal with prejudice. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Welch-Gallant" on Justia Law

The superior court determined that Appellants were liable for certain charges beyond undisputed amounts of principal and interest owed pursuant to a promissory note owned by Appellee. The note had been secured by a mortgage but an assignment failed to convey to Appellee all of the rights created by the mortgage. “[T]o avoid unjust enrichment,” the judgment allowed Appellee to retain the entire disputed amount. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part because the trial court did not sufficiently distinguish which charges were obligations pursuant to the note and which charges were obligations only pursuant to the invalid mortgage. The court remanded the case for a determination of what amount, if any, Appellee may retain pursuant to the note. View "Knope v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

Green Tree Servicing, LLC filed a complaint against Thelma Cope to foreclose on her residential property. Green Tree later moved to dismiss its foreclosure complaint without prejudice on the grounds that it lacked standing to proceed with the action. The superior court denied Green Tree’s motion to dismiss the complaint without prejudice and instead dismissed the complaint with prejudice as a sanction for Green Tree’s pretrial conduct. Upon reconsideration, the court concluded that it did not have the authority to impose a dismissal with prejudice because Green Tree did not have standing to bring the foreclosure complaint in the first place. The court then entered an amended order that dismissed the action without prejudice. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that a trial court has the discretion to dismiss a foreclosure complaint with prejudice as a sanction even when the plaintiff lacks standing. Remanded. View "Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Cope" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concerned two superior court judgments addressing issues on abutting properties - Mary’s Store and the Bus Lot - that Appellant owned in Kittery. Appellant appealed from a judgment finding him in contempt for violating a procedural order for failure to remove a burnt bus from the Mary’s Store property and challenged the court’s affirmance of the Kittery Town Council’s finding that the Mary’s Store structure constitutes a dangerous building pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17, 2851 and ordering that it be demolished. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed both judgments, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in finding Appellant in contempt for violating the procedural order; and (2) the Town Council’s decision that the Mary’s Store building was dangerous was supported by substantial evidence, and the Town council’s order to demolish the building was not an abuse of discretion. View "Town of Kittery v. Dineen" on Justia Law

After acquiring a parcel of oceanfront property, Osprey Landing, LLC purchased a title insurance policy from First American Title Insurance Company. In connection with litigation with neighboring landowners, the subject property’s previous owner executed affidavits and a deposition that Osprey claimed created the risk of a future public prescriptive easement claim adverse to Osprey’s title. Osprey sent a request to First American invoking title insurance coverage asking First American to take some action to either perfect osprey’s title or compensate Osprey for this perceived title defect. First American declined, and Osprey filed suit to enforce First American’s purported duty to defend and indemnify Osprey. The superior court granted First American’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Miller’s statements did not create a “triggering event” requiring First American to take any action, and no obligation was imposed on First American under these circumstances to preemptively indemnify Osprey. View "Osprey Landing, LLC v. First American Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

David Bordetsky filed a complaint for foreclosure against JAK Realty Trust, alleging that Gregory O’Halloran, as trustee of the Trust, executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage on property located in Benton and that the Trust had defaulted on the note. After a nonjury trial, the court issued a judgment in favor of the Trust, concluding that Bordetsky was required to, but did not, comply with the requirements for a notice of default and right to cure contained in Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the requirements for a notice of default and right to cure contained in section 6111 did not apply to Bordetsky’s foreclosure action against the Trust. Remanded. View "Bordetsky v. JAK Realty Trust" on Justia Law

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. filed a complaint against Terrance Lowell seeking foreclosure on residential property. The complaint alleged that Lowell had defaulted by failing to make payments due on a promissory note. After a bench trial, the district court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of JPMorgan. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the district court properly admitted certain documents pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule; but (2) the district court erred by finding that the notice of default issued by JPMorgan complied with the requirement established in Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111(1-A)(C), which is a required element of foreclosure. Remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Lowell. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Lowell" on Justia Law

The Town of Cumberland applied for site plan review of a proposed development involving Broad Cove Reserve property that it owned. The Town of Cumberland Board of Adjustment and Appeals determined that the Town’s proposed development was permitted within the Low Density Residential district as a municipal use. The Estate of Merrill P. Robbins, which owned land abutting the Broad Cove Reserve property, appealed, arguing that the Town’s development was prohibited under the terms of the relevant ordinance. The superior court affirmed, concluding that the plain language of the ordinance supported the Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ determination. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the meaning of “municipal use” as used in the ordinance was unambiguous and that the Town’s proposed facility was allowed under the terms of the ordinance. View "Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Town of Cumberland" on Justia Law

The Town of Cumberland applied for site plan review of a proposed development involving Broad Cove Reserve property that it owned. The Town of Cumberland Board of Adjustment and Appeals determined that the Town’s proposed development was permitted within the Low Density Residential district as a municipal use. The Estate of Merrill P. Robbins, which owned land abutting the Broad Cove Reserve property, appealed, arguing that the Town’s development was prohibited under the terms of the relevant ordinance. The superior court affirmed, concluding that the plain language of the ordinance supported the Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the meaning of “municipal use” as used in the ordinance was unambiguous and that the Town’s proposed facility was allowed under the terms of the ordinance. View "Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Town of Cumberland" on Justia Law