Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

James Levis filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and quiet title claiming title to a section of mudflat by adverse possession and by deed from his ex-wife. Levis named Gustav Konitzky, an abutting neighbor and boat-builder, as a party in interest. Default judgment was entered against the remaining defendants (the Cartland heirs), but the district court later set aside the default judgment. The court then granted summary judgment in favor of Konitzky. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment against the Cartland heirs and did not err in granting summary judgment in Konitzky’s favor on Levis’s quiet title action. View "Levis v. Konitzky" on Justia Law

In Petrin v. Town of Scarborough, the Supreme Judicial Court, in considering challenges to increases in municipal property taxes for parcels located in neighborhoods in the Town of Scarborough, concluded that the Town’s practice of undervaluing separate but abutting lots held in common ownership resulted in discriminatory tax treatment. In this separate action, the Court addressed similar challenges brought by owners of residential waterfront properties located in an area of Scarborough not at issue in Petrin. Plaintiffs appealed a judgment determining that they did not have standing to pursue one of their challenges but otherwise affirming the Scarborough Board of Assessment Review’s denial of their tax abatement petitions. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to pursue their challenges; (2) the Board did not err in concluding that a partial revaluation conducted by the Town was proper; but (3) the Board erred by denying Plaintiffs’ requests for abatement based on the Town’s practice of undervaluing abutting lots, which resulted in discriminatory assessments. View "Angell Family 2012 Prouts Neck Trusts v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

Richard and Ann Cayer filed a petition to secede from the Town of Madawaska. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted and the Governor approved a bill changing the Legislature’s practice for receiving and considering secession petitions. The Town determined that the amended statute governing legislature consideration applied to the Cayers’ petition, and the Madawaska Board of Select People declined the Cayers’ requests to schedule an advisory referendum on the Cayers’ petition. The Cayers sought review of the Town’s denial of their request to schedule an advisory referendum and sought a declaratory judgment that the repealed version of the secession statute applied to their petition. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Town and found the Cayers’ challenge to the Town’s explicit refusal to take any action untimely. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in determining that the appeal was untimely; (2) the Town’s actions provided no basis for a civil rights claim or a declaratory judgment action; and (3) an action for a writ of mandamus provided no alternative cause of action. View "Cayer v. Town of Madawaska" on Justia Law

Harold Burbank was the owner of an interest in a coastal property that was owned in joint tenancy by fourteen owners (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs, the owners of a cluster of properties neighboring the Burbank property, filed a complaint asserting that they had acquired an easement over a portion of the Burbank property. After a trial, the trial court granted a prescriptive easement and ordered partition by sale of the property. Burbank appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed and ordered sanctions against Burbank, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it granted a prescriptive easement and ordered partition by sale of the property; (2) the remainder of Burbank’s arguments were either improperly raised, meritless, or both; and (3) Burbank should be sanctioned for his repeated misconduct in prosecuting this appeal. View "Lincoln v. Burbank" on Justia Law

Drilling Blasting Rock Specialists, Inc. (DBRS) filed a complaint against Paul Rheaume, asserting that Rheaume should be held personally liable for intentionally and negligently misrepresenting that there were no encumbrances on property DBRS purchased. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Rheaume, concluding that DBRS’s negligent and intentional misrepresentation claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the trial court (1) correctly granted summary judgment against DBRS on the negligent misrepresentation claim; but (2) erred in granting summary judgment on the intentional misrepresentation claim, as there exists a factual dispute regard the commencement of the limitations period applicable to this claim. Remanded. View "Drilling & Blasting Rock Specialists, Inc. v. Rheaume" on Justia Law

As a result of a partial revaluation of parcels of land located within the Town of Scarborough, including land owned by Plaintiffs, the municipal assessment of the parcels of land increased. Plaintiffs sought abatements from the Town assessor and the Scarborough Board of Assessment Review without success. Plaintiffs appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that they bore an unequal share of the Town’s overall tax burden. The Business and Consumer Docket concluded that Plaintiffs did not have standing to seek remedial relief because Plaintiffs’ properties were not treated differently than the properties of other taxpayers. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the Town’s method of assessing separate but abutting parcels held in common ownership resulted in unequal apportionment, and the Board erred in concluding that the unlawful practice did not result in discriminatory assessments of Plaintiffs’ properties; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs had standing to pursue all of their challenges. Remanded. View "Petrin v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

Ocean Communities Federal Credit Union filed a foreclosure complaint against Guy Roberge and Lisa Pombriant concerning certain residential property. The district court granted a summary judgment for foreclosure and sale in favor of the Credit Union in the amount of $144,998.97, concluding that the Credit Union established its entitlement to a summary judgment as to each element of foreclosure. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the Credit Union’s summary judgment filings failed to establish at least four of the necessary eight elements for a residential foreclosure. Remanded for a trial. View "Ocean Cmtys. Fed. Credit Union v. Roberge" on Justia Law

Claimants, members of the public, brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the public had acquired a prescriptive easement over a parcel of property known as Cedar Beach Road owned by Gables Real Estate LLC. After a bench trial, the superior court entered judgment declaring that the public had acquired a prescriptive easement over Cedar Beach Road. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Claimants failed to establish the element of adversity, and Gables Real Estate established nonacquiescence, thereby defeating Claimants’ action for recognition of a public prescriptive easement as a matter of law. View "Cedar Beach/Cedar Island Supporters, Inc. v. Gables Real Estate LLC" on Justia Law

In 2012, Nationstar Mortgage LLC filed a foreclosure action against Timothy Halfacre. The trial court entered judgment for Halfacre. Nationstar subsequently filed a new foreclosure action against Halfacre. The superior court concluded that the foreclosure action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. On appeal, Nationstar asserted that it lacked standing to bring the action, and therefore, the action should be dismissed without prejudice. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and dismissed the case, holding that Nationstar lacked standing to foreclose on the mortgage. Further, the Court left to the trial court the determination of whether a sanction should be imposed in this matter. View "Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Halfacre" on Justia Law

Lois Young filed a complaint claiming that her transfer of her home to her former foster child, Joseph Lagasse, and his wife was the result of undue influence and therefore should be voided. The trial court concluded Plaintiff did not meet her burden of establishing that the property transfer was improvident transfer of title within the meaning of the Improvident Transfers of Title Act, and therefore denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court did not err by not applying a statutory presumption that a transfer of assets by an elderly, dependent person is a result of undue influence unless that person was represented by independent counsel at the time of the transfer; and (2) the record supported a finding that the transfer was not the result of undue influence. View "Young v. Lagasse" on Justia Law