Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gloria Carignan, whose property was bordered by Willow Street - a paper street - filed a complaint against Paul Dumas and Robert Richard, an alleged contractor for Dumas, asserting six causes of action relating to Richard’s use of Willow Street to access Dumas’s parcel of land. Carignan later amended her complaint to seek declaratory judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Carignan and denied summary judgment for Dumas. Dumas appealed, arguing that the court erred in interpreting a provision of the Paper Streets Act to apply retrospectively. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and therefore vacated the entry of summary judgment for Carignan and the denial of summary judgment for Dumas, holding that the court erred in its application of sections 3031 and 3032 of the Paper Streets Act and its finding that Dumas had abandoned any easement to which he might be entitled. Remanded. View "Carignan v. Dumas" on Justia Law

After a public hearing, the Town of Stockton Spring’s Board of Selectman determined that a structure owned by Hollie Beal was a dangerous building or nuisance pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17, 2851. The superior court affirmed the decision of the Board. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Beal’s contention that the Board violated her due process rights when it allegedly denied her the opportunity to be heard, to cross-examine witnesses, and to have an impartial fact-finder was unavailing; and (2) there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s findings. View "Beal v. Town of Stockton Springs" on Justia Law

21 Seabran, LLC applied for two permits necessary to renovate a garage on a lakefront parcel. The Town of Naples Code Enforcement Officer denied the permits, concluding that the parcel would have insufficient shore frontage to comply with state and local law. The Town of Naples Board of Appeals denied 21 Seabran’s appeal, concluding that the proposed renovation would add to the parcel a second “residential dwelling unit” for purposes of the Town of Naples Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, which would render the parcel noncompliant. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the Board’s determination that the proposed structure was a residential dwelling unit was erroneous; and (2) the Board’s conclusion that the parcel failed to comply with the minimum lot size law and rules was erroneous. View "21 Seabran, LLC v. Town of Naples" on Justia Law

Friends of the Motherhouse, a nonprofit corporation and two individuals (collectively, Friends) filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Portland City Council’s rezoning of a parcel owned by Sea Coast at Baxter Woods Associates, LLC and Motherhouse Associates LP (collectively, Sea Coast) was invalid. Sea Coast successfully moved to intervene and then moved for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Sea Coast. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its broad legislative authority, and therefore, the superior court did not err in finding that Sea Coast was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Friends of the Motherhouse v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The Fryeburg Academy, a private secondary school, applied to the Town of Fryeburg Planning Board for permits authorizing changes in the use of two parcels of leased land. Following a hearing, the Planning Board approved the Academy’s applications for both parcels. Specifically, the Town allowed the Academy to use one parcel of land (the Land Lot) as an outdoor classroom and to use a building on the second parcel of land (the House Lot) to house administrative offices. The Fryeburg Trust, which owns property abutting both lots, appealed. The superior court affirmed the Planning Board’s decision to grant the Land Lot permit but vacated the Planning Board’s decision to grant the House Lot. The Trust, the Academy, and the Town all appealed, challenging the interpretation of the definition of secondary school in Fryeburg’s Land Use Ordinance. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Planning Board, holding (1) the Academy’s proposed use of the Land Lot fit within the definition of secondary school; and (2) the proposed use of the House Lot was permissible under the Ordinance. View "Fryeburg Trust v. Town of Fryeburg" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owed parcels of real estate in the Town of Liberty that were accessed by a public road. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully requested that the Town repair the road. The Town Select Board subsequently voted that the “upper portion” of the road had been abandoned and that a public easement was retained over the abounded portion. Plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint seeking relief pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B - challenging the Town’s determination that the road had been abandoned - and seeking an award of damages. Plaintiffs then moved for leave to amend their complaint seeking to change the Rule 80B action to an action for a declaratory judgment. The superior court dismissed the complaint, determining that Plaintiffs' Rule 80B complaint was untimely and that they could not recover damages. The court further denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend, concluding that a Rule 80B action, rather than a declaratory judgment action, was the proper means to challenge the Town’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) vacated the order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend and remanded to allow the court to address the motion for leave to amend in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "Paul v. Town of Liberty" on Justia Law

James Levis filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and quiet title claiming title to a section of mudflat by adverse possession and by deed from his ex-wife. Levis named Gustav Konitzky, an abutting neighbor and boat-builder, as a party in interest. Default judgment was entered against the remaining defendants (the Cartland heirs), but the district court later set aside the default judgment. The court then granted summary judgment in favor of Konitzky. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment against the Cartland heirs and did not err in granting summary judgment in Konitzky’s favor on Levis’s quiet title action. View "Levis v. Konitzky" on Justia Law

In Petrin v. Town of Scarborough, the Supreme Judicial Court, in considering challenges to increases in municipal property taxes for parcels located in neighborhoods in the Town of Scarborough, concluded that the Town’s practice of undervaluing separate but abutting lots held in common ownership resulted in discriminatory tax treatment. In this separate action, the Court addressed similar challenges brought by owners of residential waterfront properties located in an area of Scarborough not at issue in Petrin. Plaintiffs appealed a judgment determining that they did not have standing to pursue one of their challenges but otherwise affirming the Scarborough Board of Assessment Review’s denial of their tax abatement petitions. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to pursue their challenges; (2) the Board did not err in concluding that a partial revaluation conducted by the Town was proper; but (3) the Board erred by denying Plaintiffs’ requests for abatement based on the Town’s practice of undervaluing abutting lots, which resulted in discriminatory assessments. View "Angell Family 2012 Prouts Neck Trusts v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

Richard and Ann Cayer filed a petition to secede from the Town of Madawaska. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted and the Governor approved a bill changing the Legislature’s practice for receiving and considering secession petitions. The Town determined that the amended statute governing legislature consideration applied to the Cayers’ petition, and the Madawaska Board of Select People declined the Cayers’ requests to schedule an advisory referendum on the Cayers’ petition. The Cayers sought review of the Town’s denial of their request to schedule an advisory referendum and sought a declaratory judgment that the repealed version of the secession statute applied to their petition. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Town and found the Cayers’ challenge to the Town’s explicit refusal to take any action untimely. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in determining that the appeal was untimely; (2) the Town’s actions provided no basis for a civil rights claim or a declaratory judgment action; and (3) an action for a writ of mandamus provided no alternative cause of action. View "Cayer v. Town of Madawaska" on Justia Law

Harold Burbank was the owner of an interest in a coastal property that was owned in joint tenancy by fourteen owners (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs, the owners of a cluster of properties neighboring the Burbank property, filed a complaint asserting that they had acquired an easement over a portion of the Burbank property. After a trial, the trial court granted a prescriptive easement and ordered partition by sale of the property. Burbank appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed and ordered sanctions against Burbank, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it granted a prescriptive easement and ordered partition by sale of the property; (2) the remainder of Burbank’s arguments were either improperly raised, meritless, or both; and (3) Burbank should be sanctioned for his repeated misconduct in prosecuting this appeal. View "Lincoln v. Burbank" on Justia Law