Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Drilling Blasting Rock Specialists, Inc. (DBRS) filed a complaint against Paul Rheaume, asserting that Rheaume should be held personally liable for intentionally and negligently misrepresenting that there were no encumbrances on property DBRS purchased. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Rheaume, concluding that DBRS’s negligent and intentional misrepresentation claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the trial court (1) correctly granted summary judgment against DBRS on the negligent misrepresentation claim; but (2) erred in granting summary judgment on the intentional misrepresentation claim, as there exists a factual dispute regard the commencement of the limitations period applicable to this claim. Remanded. View "Drilling & Blasting Rock Specialists, Inc. v. Rheaume" on Justia Law

As a result of a partial revaluation of parcels of land located within the Town of Scarborough, including land owned by Plaintiffs, the municipal assessment of the parcels of land increased. Plaintiffs sought abatements from the Town assessor and the Scarborough Board of Assessment Review without success. Plaintiffs appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that they bore an unequal share of the Town’s overall tax burden. The Business and Consumer Docket concluded that Plaintiffs did not have standing to seek remedial relief because Plaintiffs’ properties were not treated differently than the properties of other taxpayers. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the Town’s method of assessing separate but abutting parcels held in common ownership resulted in unequal apportionment, and the Board erred in concluding that the unlawful practice did not result in discriminatory assessments of Plaintiffs’ properties; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs had standing to pursue all of their challenges. Remanded. View "Petrin v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

Ocean Communities Federal Credit Union filed a foreclosure complaint against Guy Roberge and Lisa Pombriant concerning certain residential property. The district court granted a summary judgment for foreclosure and sale in favor of the Credit Union in the amount of $144,998.97, concluding that the Credit Union established its entitlement to a summary judgment as to each element of foreclosure. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the Credit Union’s summary judgment filings failed to establish at least four of the necessary eight elements for a residential foreclosure. Remanded for a trial. View "Ocean Cmtys. Fed. Credit Union v. Roberge" on Justia Law

Claimants, members of the public, brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the public had acquired a prescriptive easement over a parcel of property known as Cedar Beach Road owned by Gables Real Estate LLC. After a bench trial, the superior court entered judgment declaring that the public had acquired a prescriptive easement over Cedar Beach Road. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Claimants failed to establish the element of adversity, and Gables Real Estate established nonacquiescence, thereby defeating Claimants’ action for recognition of a public prescriptive easement as a matter of law. View "Cedar Beach/Cedar Island Supporters, Inc. v. Gables Real Estate LLC" on Justia Law

In 2012, Nationstar Mortgage LLC filed a foreclosure action against Timothy Halfacre. The trial court entered judgment for Halfacre. Nationstar subsequently filed a new foreclosure action against Halfacre. The superior court concluded that the foreclosure action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. On appeal, Nationstar asserted that it lacked standing to bring the action, and therefore, the action should be dismissed without prejudice. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and dismissed the case, holding that Nationstar lacked standing to foreclose on the mortgage. Further, the Court left to the trial court the determination of whether a sanction should be imposed in this matter. View "Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Halfacre" on Justia Law

Lois Young filed a complaint claiming that her transfer of her home to her former foster child, Joseph Lagasse, and his wife was the result of undue influence and therefore should be voided. The trial court concluded Plaintiff did not meet her burden of establishing that the property transfer was improvident transfer of title within the meaning of the Improvident Transfers of Title Act, and therefore denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court did not err by not applying a statutory presumption that a transfer of assets by an elderly, dependent person is a result of undue influence unless that person was represented by independent counsel at the time of the transfer; and (2) the record supported a finding that the transfer was not the result of undue influence. View "Young v. Lagasse" on Justia Law

The trust sought a building permit, to replace a dilapidated 1950s minesweeper deckhouse on the Owls Head property with a new, larger single-family residence. The existing structure is located partly within a 75-foot setback zone from the Atlantic Ocean; it contains a wetland of special significance that would necessitate a Maine Department of Environmental Protection permit before building. The new structure would be located partly within the setback zone, but farther from the ocean, with an addition lying completely outside of the setback zone and not encroaching on the wetland. The Planning Board approved the plan, finding that under the Town’s Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, "this is a nonconforming structure and it may be re-located, further away from the ocean, but not into the wetland ... to the greatest extent practical." The Board of Appeals reversed. The Superior Court agreed, finding the Board should not have considered the proposed addition before determining whether the relocation of the existing structure “conforms to all setback requirement[s] to the greatest practical extent.” The proper analysis would have been to first consider how the existing structure could be relocated to conform and to then consider whether an addition outside of the setback area could be constructed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court remanded, agreeing with the BOA and lower court, and finding that the Board applied the wrong ordinance section in considering the permit application. View "Osprey Family Trust v. Town of Owls Head." on Justia Law

Terrence E. Pinkham appealed the Superior Court's award of $41,500 as just compensation for the MDOT's taking of a portion of his property by eminent domain for a road improvement project. The court agreed with Pinkham's contention that the Superior Court erred by ruling that the MDOT was not required to provide in discovery those portions of its appraiser’s report appraising other properties taken for the project pursuant to 23 M.R.S. 63. In this case, the interests of justice require that Pinkham be given the opportunity to review that information in discovery - within the constraints of any protective provisions to preclude its public disclosure pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 26 - and to seek its admission at a new trial. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pinkham v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

This case arose from disputes regarding the permissible uses of an easement that burdened the land owned by Charles Wardwell and benefitted and abutting parcel owned by John and Corie Duggins. Wardwell filed a complaint requesting that the superior court declare that the Dugginses’ activities exceeded the scope of the easement. The court declared in part that the scope of the easement included hunting and recreational activity. Wardwell then moved to amend the judgment by excluding the terms “hunting and recreation” from the declaration of the scope of the easement. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err by finding that hunting and recreation were uses contemplated by the parties to the original conveyance and in denying Wardwell’s motion to amend the judgment to exclude those uses from the scope of the easement. View "Wardwell v. Duggins" on Justia Law

This case arose from the revocation of a building permit previously granted to R. Bruce Montgomery and Wanda Haddock (collectively, Montgomery). Montgomery, represented by Judy A.S. Metcalf and William V. Ferdinand Jr. (collectively, the Eaton Peabody attorneys), appealed the revocation of the permit, contesting the revocation of the part of the permit dealing with the construction of a garage. The Georgetown Planning Board left in place a stop-work order on the construction of the garage. Montgomery subsequently hired attorney Clifford H. Goodall to assist him in his attempts to apply for a building permit, without success. Montgomery filed a legal malpractice complaint against the Eaton Peabody attorneys. The superior court dismissed five of the six counts of the complaint. Montgomery subsequently filed a second amended complaint raising legal malpractice claims against Goodall. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Goodall. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) properly granted the Eaton Peabody attorneys’ motion to dismiss counts one through five of Montgomery’s complaint; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Montgomery’s motion to file a third amended complaint made three years after the commencement of the suit. View "Montgomery v. Eaton Peabody, LLP" on Justia Law