Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Town of Carthage filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to two 160-acres parcels of undeveloped land and claiming that it owned the land based on its uninterrupted possession of the land for over a century. Friends of Maine’s Mountains filed an answer and counterclaim, claiming that it obtained an interest in the land by a quitclaim release deed executed through an alleged descendent of the parcels’ last known owner. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town pursuant to the municipal delinquent tax title statute and declared that the Town owned the two lots in fee simple absolute. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in determining that the Town obtained title through a tax sale in 1905. View "Town of Carthage v. Friends of Maine's Mountains" on Justia Law

The beach easement dispute in this case concerned the intertidal area in front of oceanfront lots owned by Beverly and David Gravison, Sandra Titcomb, and Darlene and Lewis Edwards. The Gravisons filed a deed reformation complaint seeking to reform a deed to include the intertidal zone. Neighboring property owners counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment confirming the existence of deed easements over the oceanfront lots at issue. The superior court (1) denied the Gravisons’ reformation claim, (2) declared that the neighboring property owners held easements permitting recreational use of the beach located in front of the Edwardses’ and the Gravisons’ property, and (3) declared that neighboring property owners held easements in a perimeter path located on the properties owned by the Gravisons, Titcomb, and the Edwardses. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of the Gravisons’ complaint for deed reformation; (2) affirmed the superior court’s decision on all issues pertaining to the perimeter path; and (3) affirmed in part and vacated in part the court’s decision regarding the beach easements and clarified the judgment to reflect that the neighbors’ beach rights were limited to recreational activities reasonably related to bathing and boating. View "Gravison v. Fisher" on Justia Law

After Sloan’s Cove, LLC executed a power of sale foreclosure on Armand Vachon’s property, Vachon and Oceanic Inn, Inc. (collectively, Oceanic) filed suit claiming that Sloan’s Cove improperly conducted the sale. The trial court (1) dismissed Oceanic’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (2) granted summary judgment against Oceanic on its claims for breach of contract and accounting and in favor of Sloan’s Cove on its counterclaim seeking a declaration that its foreclosure by sale of the Oceanic Inn property was legal and effective. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed as amended, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment, but that the judgment must be amended to correct a clerical error. View "Oceanic Inn, Inc. v. Sloan's Cove, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Eastport learned that Husson University would no longer lease seventeen acres of publicly owned oceanfront property after the 2011-12 school year. In 2011, the City Council voted to accept an offer by First Perry Realty, LLC and CPM Constructors to purchase the property for $300,000. Phyllis Bradbury and David Gholson brought this action seeking declaratory and equitable relief that would prevent the sale of the City property, arguing that the sale of the property was not “advertised” within the meaning of the Eastport City Charter then in effect. The superior court denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the City Council took adequate measures to publicly advertise the sale of the property. View "Bradbury v. City of Eastport" on Justia Law

Defendants defaulted on their mortgage, and U.S. Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure. Following the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. Greenleaf, the Bank filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the foreclosure action without prejudice, arguing that it could not proceed with the foreclosure because it did not have a mortgage assignment from the original lender and thus did not have standing to pursue the action. Defendants countered that the motion should be dismissed with prejudice so that they could be awarded attorney fees. The trial court granted the Bank’s motion but dismissed the case with prejudice. The court subsequently issued a correction of the record stating that the dismissal of the Bank’s action was without prejudice. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of dismissal with prejudice and subsequent judgment of dismissal without prejudice, holding that the trial court erred in dismissing the Bank’s action with prejudice and did not have authority under the circumstances to change that outcome to a dismissal without prejudice. Remanded for the entry of judgment of dismissal without prejudice. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Curit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for abatement of real property taxes that the Town of Lebanon assessed against her property for the tax years 2011 through 2013. The Town denied the application on the basis that the taxes had been paid. After a de novo hearing, the York County Commissioners ultimately denied Plaintiff’s application for abatement for tax years 2011 and 2012 and remanded the matter for further action with respect to tax year 2013. The superior court affirmed the decision of the Commissioners with respect to the 2011 and 2012 tax years. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to supply the Court with a complete and defined record of the evidence and arguments presented to the Commissioners, the Court could not review Plaintiff’s argument that the Commissioners were compelled to authorize an abatement. View "Penkul v. Town of Lebanon" on Justia Law

Carol Reece applied for a coastal sand dune permit to create a vehicle access way to her property abutting a beach and to develop and lawn and walkway on the property. The Department of Environmental Protection granted the permit. Abutting landowner Jonathan Day and others appealed. The Board of Environmental Protection reached a de novo decision granting Reece’s application. The superior court vacated the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court’s judgment, holding that the Board’s interpretations of its own ambiguous rules do not conflict with the relevant statutes or with the rules, and the rules do not compel at the interpretation reached by the superior court. Remanded for entry of a judgment affirming the Board’s decision to grant Reece the permit. View "Day v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

John Dyer gave a promissory note and a mortgage on property securing the note to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The mortgage contained language naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as lender’s nominee. The Bank of New York later filed a complaint for foreclosure, asserting that Dyer had stopped making payments on the note and that he owed the Bank over $1 million. During the trial, the Bank filed a motion to dismiss its complaint without prejudice on the ground that it did not have the requisite standing to pursue its claim. Dyer filed an objection requesting that any dismissal be with prejudice and that he be awarded his attorney fees and costs. The district court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss without prejudice and declined to award additional attorney fees or costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint without prejudice and in declining to award Dyer his full attorney fees and costs. View "Bank of New York v. Dyer" on Justia Law

The Scotts joined owned inland property located in the Town of Owls Head. The Edwardses jointly owned waterfront property near the Scotts’ property. A way extended across the Edwardses’ property, terminating in a cul-de-sac that was located partly on the Edwardses’ property. In 2011, the Edwardses sued the Scotts and the the Town seeking a declaratory judgment that the Scotts had no right to use and the Town had no interest in Plaintiffs’ property. The superior court concluded (1) a 1986 dedication and its acceptance by the Town created a public easement that extended over the way and cul-de-sac located on the Edwardses’ land; and (2) a 1924 conveyance created an easement over the beach located on the Edwardses’ property that benefitted the Scotts’ property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) did not err in finding that the Edwardses’ predecessor intended to create a public easement over the way and cul-de-sac; and (2) did not err in concluding that the dedication petition sufficiently described the property. View "Edwards v. Blackman" on Justia Law

Richard French was the owner of an undeveloped lot with no road access. When the Estate of Martha Gutzan denied French use of an access easement across property owned by the Estate, French brought this action to quiet title. After a nonjury trial, the trial court concluded that French owned an access easement over the Estate’s property. Specifically, the court found that an 1880 transaction reserved the easement in question and that the easement passed with the land to French. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that French owned an access easement across the Estate’s property. View "French v. Estate of Gutzan" on Justia Law