Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1973, the City of South Portland issued a variance to Kay Loring that brought her parcel of land, which was previously nonconforming, into dimensional conformity. For purposes of land use regulation, Loring’s 4,703 square foot lot became the equivalent of a conforming 5,000 square foot lot. In 2013, the City’s Building Inspector issued a building permit based on the 1973 variance that authorized Loring to construct a single-family house on her lot. Mary Campbell and others (collectively, Campbell), who owned nearby lots, appealed the issuance of the permit. The South Portland Board of Appeals affirmed the Building Inspector’s action, and the superior court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the 1973 variance was still in force when the building permit was issued, and the Building Inspector was authorized to act on Loring’s permit application; and (2) Campbell did not preserve her argument for municipal or judicial review that the building permit was not lawful because the proposed development would exceed the density restrictions for that zoning district. View "Campbell v. City of S. Portland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned most of Mouse Island in the Town of Southport in common with Defendants. Plaintiffs filed a complaint for equitable partition. Defendants counterclaimed. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ complaint for equitable partition. After a trial, the court awarded Defendants damages for nonpayment of commonly-shared expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the rights of first refusal in the parties’ deeds violated the rule against perpetuities and were therefore void as a matter of law; (2) the rights of first refusal in the parties’ separate contractual agreements with one another were valid vis-à-vis each other and constituted an effective waiver of these parties’ rights to equitable partition; and (3) the superior court did not err in apportioning expenses. View "Pew v. Sayler" on Justia Law

Defendants executed a note and mortgage deed in favor of a third party, and after several transactions, all rights created by the instruments were assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Defendants later defaulted, and Wells Fargo initiated this action for foreclosure. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the notice of default issued by Wells Fargo did not comply with Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111. The district court granted Defendants’ motion and entered summary judgment for them. In that same order, the court dismissed the foreclosure action without prejudice. The court then amended its previous order so that summary judgment was granted “in part.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the court’s orders of partial summary judgment and dismissal of the foreclosure action, holding that the trial court erred by granting less than full summary judgment and by dismissing the foreclosure action without prejudice. Remanded for reinstatement of the initial entry of full summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Girouard" on Justia Law

Bank of America brought this foreclosure action against Marianne Gregor. Homeward Residential, Inc. was later substituted as plaintiff. The district court entered judgment for Gregor, determining that Homeward Residential had not established that it had standing to foreclose on the mortgage. In its judgment, the court stated that “[t]he parties may relitigate issues discussed herein in a future action.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Homeward Residential lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure claim; but (2) erred when it made findings and entered judgment for Gregor rather than dismissing the action for lack of standing. Remanded for an entry of a dismissal without prejudice. View "Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Gregor" on Justia Law

Libby O’Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC (LOKC) filed a complaint for breach of contract against Sharon Blanchard and simultaneously filed a motion for approval of attachment and trustee process against Blanchard’s property. Blanchard objected to LOKC’s motion but did include a supporting affidavit or other supporting documentation. The district court determined that Blanchard had waived her objection to the motion and considered the merits of the attachment motion without a hearing. The court then ordered attachment and trustee process against Blanchard’s real and personal property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court’s findings in support of attachment and trustee process were supported by competent evidence in the motion record. View "Kingsley v. Blanchard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Bruce, Cynthia, and Rodney Pooler seeing to establish the locations of common boundaries among three properties. The parties settled their claims, and the superior court entered a consent order resolving Plaintiff’s right to access South Crane Lane by requiring the Poolers to grant Plaintiff an easement over their driveway. Plaintiff later filed a post-judgment motion for contempt against Ricky and Monica Conant as Rodney Pooler’s successors-in-interest, alleging that they were in contempt of the consent order by blocking Plaintiff’s access to their driveway. The court denied the motion for contempt, finding that the consent order did not recognize an easement over the Conants’ lot. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) vacated the judgment as to the determination that Plaintiff did not have a deeded easement, as the contempt motion did not call for the court to determine separately whether Plaintiff had a deeded easement; and (2) otherwise affirmed the denial of the motion for contempt, holding that the court did not err in concluding that any right that Plaintiff had to use the Conants’ driveway did not flow from the consent order. View "Beckerman v. Pooler" on Justia Law

The dispute in this case involved the continuing existence, scope, and extent of easements over two roads leading to the beach or ocean in Kennebunk. In the Supreme Court’s opinion issued on the first appeal, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was vacated in part and remanded for consideration of issues the court had not reached related to the continued existence or abandonment of the easements. On remanded, instead of presenting evidence or testimony for trial, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Helen Rose and Nathaniel Merrill on their claim for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that because there were several genuine issues of material fact in dispute in this case, summary judgment was not appropriate. Remanded. View "Rose v. Parsons" on Justia Law

When Mason Station, LLC failed to pay assessed property taxes on multiple properties in the Town of Wiscasset, the Town filed a complaint against Mason Station for taxes owed on those properties and on certain personal property. Mason Station failed to timely file an answer, and the clerk entered a default and default judgment against Mason Station. Nearly eighteen months after the judgment was entered, Mason Station moved to set aside the default and for relief from default judgment, alleging that several days before the entry of the default judgment in favor of the Town, the Town had obtained ownership of the properties for which taxes were owed through automatic foreclosure and that the foreclosed properties had an assessed value in excess of the total amount owed on the judgment. The trial court declined to grant Mason Station relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the motions to set aside default and for relief from judgment, as Mason Station offered no good excuse for failing to file a timely answer to the Town’s complaint and failed to perform its duty to take legal steps to protect its own interests in the original litigation. View "Town of Wiscasset v. Mason Station, LLC" on Justia Law

Robert and Carol Rice filed a complaint against their neighbors, James and Carol Cook, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract regarding the parties’ shared boundary line and seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Cooks counterclaimed, seeking similar relief. After a jury-waived trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the Cooks and granted injunctive relief and monetary damages. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in (1) finding that the parties never reached an agreement regarding their common boundary line; (2) finding that the Rices’ fences were “unnecessarily high” or “unreasonably interfered” with the Cooks’ use and enjoyment of their property pursuant to a common law theory of nuisance; and (3) enjoining the Rices from building a fence of any height along a portion of their boundary with the Cooks based on its determination that the Rices built their fences with the intent to annoy the Cooks and to interfere with the Cooks’ use of their property. View "Rice v. Cook" on Justia Law

Wayne and Michelle McClellan applied for a conditional use permit to build a disc-golf course in the City of Saco on property abutting a campground owned by Fred Fitanides. The Saco Planning Board voted to grant conditional approval for the project and issued the conditional use permits. The Saco Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the Planning Board issued the permits in compliance with the City of Saco Zoning Ordinance; and (2) Fitanides was not prejudiced by any procedural irregularities in the administrative process. View "Fitanides v. City of Saco" on Justia Law