Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure complaint against Jeffrey White. In 2014, based on an agreed-to judgment by the parties, the court entered a final judgment of foreclosure. Thereafter, White moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (4), alleging that Wells Fargo lacked standing to foreclose and that Wells Fargo’s failure to establish standing deprived the court of jurisdiction, rendering the judgment void. The district court denied White’s motion, finding that White was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief pursuant to either Rule 60(b)(1) or (4), as (1) the parties had not been mistaken about the facts or the law regarding standing when they agreed to the entry of judgment; and (2) Plaintiff had a fair opportunity and a significant incentive to challenge Wells Fargo’s standing but failed to do so. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. White" on Justia Law

A Bank filed a residential foreclosure complaint against Appellant, alleging that Appellant executed a promissory note and a mortgage securing the note on certain property and that Appellant defaulted on the note. The Bank claimed that, through a series of endorsements and assignments, the Bank had acquired rights in the mortgage and authority to enforce the note. The trial court entered a judgment in Appellant’s favor, concluding that the Bank failed to provide Appellant with a statutorily-complaint notice of the default and of his right to cure. The court then prospectively reserved to the Bank the right to relitigate a second foreclosure action. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the judgment reserving to the parties the right to relitigate all issues in a future foreclosure action, as the trial court entered a final judgments on the merits in favor of Appellant, and there was no special reason identified for affirmatively reserving the parties’ rights to relitigate. The Court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tannenbaum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a former school property from the Town of Dexter for future redevelopment, and the Town initially supported Plaintiff’s redevelopment efforts. After Plaintiff contested the Town’s tax assessment of the property, the Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) issued a stop work order and notice of violation prohibiting all work on the property. Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendant, the Town of Dexter, alleging that the Town’s actions, through its CEO, were arbitrary and capricious and deprived him of equal protection of law and the use and enjoyment of property, in violation of both the federal and state constitutions. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages. The superior court granted the Town’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the grounds that Plaintiff (1) failed to allege that the CEO’s actions were taken pursuant to a municipal policy, (2) failed to pursue available administrative relief, and (3) failed to allege that he faced discriminatory treatment as compared with others who were similarly situated. View "Marshall v. Town of Dexter" on Justia Law

BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP filed a complaint for foreclosure against Scott and Kristina Greenleaf. Bank of America, N.A. (the Bank) was substituted for BAC after the entities merged. After a trial, the court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of the Bank. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment based on the Bank’s lack of standing. On remand, the district court dismissed without prejudice the action due to the Bank’s standing defect. Scott appealed, arguing that the court was compelled to enter judgment in his favor because the Court vacated the Bank’s judgment after a completed trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the district court properly disposed of the case by entering a dismissal without prejudice. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Greenleaf" on Justia Law

In 1973, the City of South Portland issued a variance to Kay Loring that brought her parcel of land, which was previously nonconforming, into dimensional conformity. For purposes of land use regulation, Loring’s 4,703 square foot lot became the equivalent of a conforming 5,000 square foot lot. In 2013, the City’s Building Inspector issued a building permit based on the 1973 variance that authorized Loring to construct a single-family house on her lot. Mary Campbell and others (collectively, Campbell), who owned nearby lots, appealed the issuance of the permit. The South Portland Board of Appeals affirmed the Building Inspector’s action, and the superior court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the 1973 variance was still in force when the building permit was issued, and the Building Inspector was authorized to act on Loring’s permit application; and (2) Campbell did not preserve her argument for municipal or judicial review that the building permit was not lawful because the proposed development would exceed the density restrictions for that zoning district. View "Campbell v. City of S. Portland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned most of Mouse Island in the Town of Southport in common with Defendants. Plaintiffs filed a complaint for equitable partition. Defendants counterclaimed. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ complaint for equitable partition. After a trial, the court awarded Defendants damages for nonpayment of commonly-shared expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the rights of first refusal in the parties’ deeds violated the rule against perpetuities and were therefore void as a matter of law; (2) the rights of first refusal in the parties’ separate contractual agreements with one another were valid vis-à-vis each other and constituted an effective waiver of these parties’ rights to equitable partition; and (3) the superior court did not err in apportioning expenses. View "Pew v. Sayler" on Justia Law

Defendants executed a note and mortgage deed in favor of a third party, and after several transactions, all rights created by the instruments were assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Defendants later defaulted, and Wells Fargo initiated this action for foreclosure. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the notice of default issued by Wells Fargo did not comply with Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111. The district court granted Defendants’ motion and entered summary judgment for them. In that same order, the court dismissed the foreclosure action without prejudice. The court then amended its previous order so that summary judgment was granted “in part.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the court’s orders of partial summary judgment and dismissal of the foreclosure action, holding that the trial court erred by granting less than full summary judgment and by dismissing the foreclosure action without prejudice. Remanded for reinstatement of the initial entry of full summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Girouard" on Justia Law

Bank of America brought this foreclosure action against Marianne Gregor. Homeward Residential, Inc. was later substituted as plaintiff. The district court entered judgment for Gregor, determining that Homeward Residential had not established that it had standing to foreclose on the mortgage. In its judgment, the court stated that “[t]he parties may relitigate issues discussed herein in a future action.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Homeward Residential lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure claim; but (2) erred when it made findings and entered judgment for Gregor rather than dismissing the action for lack of standing. Remanded for an entry of a dismissal without prejudice. View "Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Gregor" on Justia Law

Libby O’Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC (LOKC) filed a complaint for breach of contract against Sharon Blanchard and simultaneously filed a motion for approval of attachment and trustee process against Blanchard’s property. Blanchard objected to LOKC’s motion but did include a supporting affidavit or other supporting documentation. The district court determined that Blanchard had waived her objection to the motion and considered the merits of the attachment motion without a hearing. The court then ordered attachment and trustee process against Blanchard’s real and personal property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court’s findings in support of attachment and trustee process were supported by competent evidence in the motion record. View "Kingsley v. Blanchard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Bruce, Cynthia, and Rodney Pooler seeing to establish the locations of common boundaries among three properties. The parties settled their claims, and the superior court entered a consent order resolving Plaintiff’s right to access South Crane Lane by requiring the Poolers to grant Plaintiff an easement over their driveway. Plaintiff later filed a post-judgment motion for contempt against Ricky and Monica Conant as Rodney Pooler’s successors-in-interest, alleging that they were in contempt of the consent order by blocking Plaintiff’s access to their driveway. The court denied the motion for contempt, finding that the consent order did not recognize an easement over the Conants’ lot. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) vacated the judgment as to the determination that Plaintiff did not have a deeded easement, as the contempt motion did not call for the court to determine separately whether Plaintiff had a deeded easement; and (2) otherwise affirmed the denial of the motion for contempt, holding that the court did not err in concluding that any right that Plaintiff had to use the Conants’ driveway did not flow from the consent order. View "Beckerman v. Pooler" on Justia Law