Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The superior court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion or committed legal or factual error in several respects. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant’s appeal, holding that because Defendant’s filings to the Court complied with neither the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure nor the Court’s specific orders to him, Defendant failed to comply with Me. R. App. P. 8, which appellants must adhere to in order to receive proper appellate review. View "Major v. Chiang" on Justia Law

In this bankruptcy case, Bank of America obtained a junior foreclosure judgment and received the Debtor’s equity of redemption for a senior mortgage. Bank of America did not sell this interest within the specified time period, nor did it appear in the senior foreclosure to assert its interest in redeeming the senior mortgage within the redemption period. Peoples United Bank, the holder of the senior mortgage, then filed a foreclosure complaint. Bank of America and the Debtor failed to appear in the action and were defaulted. Thereafter, Peoples United was granted a foreclosure judgment. Bank of America was not named as a distributee in the resulting judgment. Bank of America subsequently purchased Peoples United’s interest in the Debtor’s senior mortgage debt, and Peoples United postponed the foreclosure sale. Bank of America successfully moved to substitute itself in place of Peoples United as the plaintiff in the senior foreclosure. The Trustee then moved to sell the premises free of liens, interests, and encumbrances. Bank of America objected. The bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of Bank of America. The federal district court disagreed with the bankruptcy court and certified an unsettled state law question to the Maine Supreme Court. The Court answered that Bank of America, who failed to appear in the senior foreclosure and was not named as a distributee in the resulting judgment, did not have any rights to the excess proceeds from that foreclosure sale. View "Bankruptcy Estate of Everest v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

In 2007, Amy Chartier executed a promissory note, and as security, Amy and her husband, Ronald, executed a mortgage encumbering their residential property. The note and mortgage were eventually assigned to CitiMortgage, Inc. In 2010, CitiMortgage filed a complaint alleging that Amy was in default and seeking foreclosure of the mortgage. In their answer, the Chartiers alleged that CitiMortgage failed to provide a notice of default and right to cure as required by the mortgage. After a non-jury trial, the district court entered a judgment of foreclosure for CitiMortgage, concluding that the notice of default complied with the terms of the mortgage. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the district court erred in entering judgment against the Chartiers because the notice of default provided by CitiMortgage did not comply with the conditions in the mortgage instrument. View "CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Chartier" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was two adjacent beachfront lots - lot 113 and lot 114. In 1989, as a result of a merger clause in a zoning ordnance, the lots were merged into a single, nonconforming, grandfathered lot. Despite the merger clause’s prohibition of any separation of a merged lot that would result in an area that did not meet minimum lot-size requirements, the owner separated the lots and conveyed them to two different individuals. Carol Reece acquired lot 113. In 2013, Plaintiff, who owned property abutting lot 113, sought a declaratory judgment that lot 113 was not a grandfathered nonconforming lot. Reece subsequently acquired lot 114. The superior court granted summary judgment for Reece. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Reece’s recombination of lots 113 and 114 did not effect a resurrection of the grandfathered status that the lots had when they were previously merged. View "Day v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law

In May 2010, the Bar Harbor Appeals Board issued two decisions requiring the Bar Harbor Planning Board to approve a site plan for construction of a hotel on land abutting land owned by the Witham Family Limited Partnership in Bar Harbor. Witham filed a complaint challenging both decisions. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s judgment dismissing the complaint and remanded. Also in May 2010, on remand from the Appeals Board, the Planning Board issued a decision containing new findings and approving of the proposed site plan. No appeal was taken from this decision. In May 2012, the Planning Board approved of an amended site plan. Witham did not appeal from the May 2012 decision or the issuance of any building permits or other permits. In October 2013, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Business and Consumer Docket justice affirmed the Planning Board’s determinations. Witham appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot because Witham did not appeal from the Planning Board’s May 2010 decision approving the proposed site plan or the Planning Board’s May 2012 approval of an amended site plan and because the hotel was now fully operational. View "Witham Family Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

When the father of Daniel Albert and Carlton Albert died, the father’s company was left in trust for the benefit of Daniel and Carlton. In 1984, Daniel bought the land from company and later conveyed it to Carlton in exchange for Carlton’s shares in the company. In 1992, Daniel purchased the land from Carlton and, in turn, released Carlton from his debt on a loan Daniel had previously extended to him. In 2010, Carlton commenced this action seeking imposition of a constructive trust on the land, alleging that, at the time of the 1992 land transfer, Daniel breached a confidential relationship existing between them. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) in finding that Daniel and Carlton did not have a confidential relationship at the time of the land conveyance; and (2) in concluding, alternatively, that even if a confidential relationship did exist, the 1992 land transaction was free of any undue influence affecting Carlton’s interests. View "Albert v. Albert" on Justia Law

Pisgah Mountain, LLC applied to the Town of Clifton Planning Board for approval to construct and operate a wind energy project. Peter and Julie Beckford, who own land adjacent to the proposed development site, timely appealed the Board’s decision to the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA). The ZBA denied the appeal. Thereafter, the Beckfords filed a complaint in superior court pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B. Pisgah and the Town moved to dismiss the Beckfords’ complaint on the ground that it was filed outside of the forty-five-day appeal period. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the forty-five-day appeal period started when the ZBA issued its written findings and decision and not on the day the ZBA voted to deny the appeal. The court then vacated the Board’s decision to approve the permit. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the statutory appeal period commenced with the ZBA’s public vote, and therefore, the Beckfords’ Rule 80B appeal was untimely filed. View "Beckford v. Town of Clifton" on Justia Law

The Bank of Maine filed a complaint seeking foreclosure of Defendant’s primary residence. Defendant failed to file a timely answer, and the superior court later entered Defendant’s default. Defendant responded to the complaint and requested mediation on the date default was entered. The court granted summary judgment to the Bank and entered judgments of foreclosure that included legal fees. Defendant appealed, arguing that the time limit established by Me. R. Civ. P. 93 improperly limits a defendant’s substantive right to mediation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 93 is not an improper limitation of the substantive rights of litigants; and (2) because Defendant did not request mediation pursuant to Rule 93 in a timely manner, the court did abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for mediation. View "Bank of Maine v. Peterson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the boundary separating the parties’ parcels of land and the ownership of an eleven-acre triangular area of land. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking to quiet title to the disputed area and alleging claims of trespass and slander of title. Defendants counterclaimed. The trial court entered judgment (1) in favor of Plaintiff on her claims of adverse possession and acquiescence, on Plaintiff's common law trespass claim, and on all of Defendant’s counterclaims, and (2) in favor of Defendants on each of the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) determining that Plaintiff had established the elements of adverse possession; (2) rejecting Plaintiff’s slander of title claim and statutory trespass claim pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 7551-B; and (3) refusing to award treble damages pursuant to 14 Me. Rev. Stat. 7552(4)(B). View "Harvey v. Furrow" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the boundary between land owned by the parties to this case and an area of land with disputed ownership. Christopher and Diana Grondin filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment establishing the common boundary between their property and the property owned by Susan Hanscom. Hanscom filed a counterclaim also seeking a declaratory judgment as to the common boundary and alternatively seeking title to the disputed area through the doctrines of acquiescence and adverse possession. The superior court declared that the properties’ boundaries were as indicated on a certain survey, concluded that Hanscom had not gained title by acquiescence, and found only partially in Hanscom’s favor on her claim of adverse possession. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Marchese survey was sound in law and fact, and the superior court was free to accept its findings; (2) the superior court did not err in determining that Hanscom had not obtained title to the disputed area by acquiescence; and (3) the superior court did not err in finding that Hanscom had sustained her adverse possession claim only in part. View "Grondin v. Hanscom" on Justia Law