Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants executed a note and mortgage deed in favor of a third party, and after several transactions, all rights created by the instruments were assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Defendants later defaulted, and Wells Fargo initiated this action for foreclosure. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the notice of default issued by Wells Fargo did not comply with Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111. The district court granted Defendants’ motion and entered summary judgment for them. In that same order, the court dismissed the foreclosure action without prejudice. The court then amended its previous order so that summary judgment was granted “in part.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the court’s orders of partial summary judgment and dismissal of the foreclosure action, holding that the trial court erred by granting less than full summary judgment and by dismissing the foreclosure action without prejudice. Remanded for reinstatement of the initial entry of full summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Girouard" on Justia Law

Bank of America brought this foreclosure action against Marianne Gregor. Homeward Residential, Inc. was later substituted as plaintiff. The district court entered judgment for Gregor, determining that Homeward Residential had not established that it had standing to foreclose on the mortgage. In its judgment, the court stated that “[t]he parties may relitigate issues discussed herein in a future action.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Homeward Residential lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure claim; but (2) erred when it made findings and entered judgment for Gregor rather than dismissing the action for lack of standing. Remanded for an entry of a dismissal without prejudice. View "Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Gregor" on Justia Law

Libby O’Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC (LOKC) filed a complaint for breach of contract against Sharon Blanchard and simultaneously filed a motion for approval of attachment and trustee process against Blanchard’s property. Blanchard objected to LOKC’s motion but did include a supporting affidavit or other supporting documentation. The district court determined that Blanchard had waived her objection to the motion and considered the merits of the attachment motion without a hearing. The court then ordered attachment and trustee process against Blanchard’s real and personal property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court’s findings in support of attachment and trustee process were supported by competent evidence in the motion record. View "Kingsley v. Blanchard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Bruce, Cynthia, and Rodney Pooler seeing to establish the locations of common boundaries among three properties. The parties settled their claims, and the superior court entered a consent order resolving Plaintiff’s right to access South Crane Lane by requiring the Poolers to grant Plaintiff an easement over their driveway. Plaintiff later filed a post-judgment motion for contempt against Ricky and Monica Conant as Rodney Pooler’s successors-in-interest, alleging that they were in contempt of the consent order by blocking Plaintiff’s access to their driveway. The court denied the motion for contempt, finding that the consent order did not recognize an easement over the Conants’ lot. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) vacated the judgment as to the determination that Plaintiff did not have a deeded easement, as the contempt motion did not call for the court to determine separately whether Plaintiff had a deeded easement; and (2) otherwise affirmed the denial of the motion for contempt, holding that the court did not err in concluding that any right that Plaintiff had to use the Conants’ driveway did not flow from the consent order. View "Beckerman v. Pooler" on Justia Law

The dispute in this case involved the continuing existence, scope, and extent of easements over two roads leading to the beach or ocean in Kennebunk. In the Supreme Court’s opinion issued on the first appeal, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was vacated in part and remanded for consideration of issues the court had not reached related to the continued existence or abandonment of the easements. On remanded, instead of presenting evidence or testimony for trial, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Helen Rose and Nathaniel Merrill on their claim for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that because there were several genuine issues of material fact in dispute in this case, summary judgment was not appropriate. Remanded. View "Rose v. Parsons" on Justia Law

When Mason Station, LLC failed to pay assessed property taxes on multiple properties in the Town of Wiscasset, the Town filed a complaint against Mason Station for taxes owed on those properties and on certain personal property. Mason Station failed to timely file an answer, and the clerk entered a default and default judgment against Mason Station. Nearly eighteen months after the judgment was entered, Mason Station moved to set aside the default and for relief from default judgment, alleging that several days before the entry of the default judgment in favor of the Town, the Town had obtained ownership of the properties for which taxes were owed through automatic foreclosure and that the foreclosed properties had an assessed value in excess of the total amount owed on the judgment. The trial court declined to grant Mason Station relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the motions to set aside default and for relief from judgment, as Mason Station offered no good excuse for failing to file a timely answer to the Town’s complaint and failed to perform its duty to take legal steps to protect its own interests in the original litigation. View "Town of Wiscasset v. Mason Station, LLC" on Justia Law

Robert and Carol Rice filed a complaint against their neighbors, James and Carol Cook, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract regarding the parties’ shared boundary line and seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Cooks counterclaimed, seeking similar relief. After a jury-waived trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the Cooks and granted injunctive relief and monetary damages. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in (1) finding that the parties never reached an agreement regarding their common boundary line; (2) finding that the Rices’ fences were “unnecessarily high” or “unreasonably interfered” with the Cooks’ use and enjoyment of their property pursuant to a common law theory of nuisance; and (3) enjoining the Rices from building a fence of any height along a portion of their boundary with the Cooks based on its determination that the Rices built their fences with the intent to annoy the Cooks and to interfere with the Cooks’ use of their property. View "Rice v. Cook" on Justia Law

Wayne and Michelle McClellan applied for a conditional use permit to build a disc-golf course in the City of Saco on property abutting a campground owned by Fred Fitanides. The Saco Planning Board voted to grant conditional approval for the project and issued the conditional use permits. The Saco Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the Planning Board issued the permits in compliance with the City of Saco Zoning Ordinance; and (2) Fitanides was not prejudiced by any procedural irregularities in the administrative process. View "Fitanides v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

The superior court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion or committed legal or factual error in several respects. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant’s appeal, holding that because Defendant’s filings to the Court complied with neither the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure nor the Court’s specific orders to him, Defendant failed to comply with Me. R. App. P. 8, which appellants must adhere to in order to receive proper appellate review. View "Major v. Chiang" on Justia Law

In this bankruptcy case, Bank of America obtained a junior foreclosure judgment and received the Debtor’s equity of redemption for a senior mortgage. Bank of America did not sell this interest within the specified time period, nor did it appear in the senior foreclosure to assert its interest in redeeming the senior mortgage within the redemption period. Peoples United Bank, the holder of the senior mortgage, then filed a foreclosure complaint. Bank of America and the Debtor failed to appear in the action and were defaulted. Thereafter, Peoples United was granted a foreclosure judgment. Bank of America was not named as a distributee in the resulting judgment. Bank of America subsequently purchased Peoples United’s interest in the Debtor’s senior mortgage debt, and Peoples United postponed the foreclosure sale. Bank of America successfully moved to substitute itself in place of Peoples United as the plaintiff in the senior foreclosure. The Trustee then moved to sell the premises free of liens, interests, and encumbrances. Bank of America objected. The bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of Bank of America. The federal district court disagreed with the bankruptcy court and certified an unsettled state law question to the Maine Supreme Court. The Court answered that Bank of America, who failed to appear in the senior foreclosure and was not named as a distributee in the resulting judgment, did not have any rights to the excess proceeds from that foreclosure sale. View "Bankruptcy Estate of Everest v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law