Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court declaring that Marie and Peter Adams had a right to trim, cut, or remove branches or limbs of the oak tree on adjacent property owned by Alan and Gail Atkins, holding that the superior court did not err.Alan Atkins filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Adamses had no right to cut down any portion of the Atkinses' oak tree. The Adamses counterclaimed, requesting a declaratory judgment stating the opposite. The superior court ruled in favor of the Adamses, concluding that the Adamses were entitled to cut or remove branches of the Atkinses' oak tree that encroached onto the Adamses' property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the common law dictates that property owners have the right to cut any part of a non-boundary tree that encroaches onto their property, regardless of how their actions affect the tree. View "Atkins v. Adams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court denying Appellants' Me. R. Civ,. P. 80B petition for review of government action and affirming the decision of the Portland Planning Board to approve 37 Montreal LLC's application to construct a multi-unit residential building, holding that the Planning Board did not err in approving the application.On appeal, Appellants argued that the proposed development failed to meet the City of Portland's Code of Ordinance's height, setback, and design-review requirements, and therefore, the Planning Board erred in approving the application. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the matter to the Planning Board for findings of fact, holding that judicial review was impossible because the Planning Board's decision did not contain any of the required findings. View "Murray v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

In the underlying matter involving a longstanding dispute between two condominium owners (Owners) and the Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association and Compass Harbor Village, LLC (collectively, Compass Harbor) the Supreme Court dismissed this instant appeal from orders of the business and consumer docket, holding that the appeal was interlocutory.The district court entered a judgment awarding Owners damages and attorney fees against Compass Harbor, and the Supreme Court affirmed in part. The instant action involved a complaint brought against Compass Harbor and Owners seeking to enforce the judgment. Here, Owners appealed from orders granting motions to dismiss filed by some of the defendants. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory, holding that the orders did not dispose of all claims against all defendants, and therefore, the interlocutory appeal must be dismissed. View "Maples v. Compass Harbor Village Condominium Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Key Bank National Association's complaint for foreclosure because the debtor or the debtor's estate was a necessary party and was not participating in the action, holding that neither the debtor nor the debtor's estate was a necessary party to the action.The debtor borrowed money from KeyBank and executed a promissory note for the loan. After the debtor died intestate the property at issue passed by operation of law to the debtor's wife as a surviving joint tenant. After the note went into default the wife conveyed the property to a third party. Thereafter, embank filed a complaint for foreclosure of the property against the debtor's wife and estate, as well as third party. The trial court dismissed the action without prejudice, holding that either the debtor or his estate must be named as a necessary party to the foreclosure action. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the dismissal, holding that because a foreclosure does not include a claim for a deficiency judgment and is therefore solely in rem in nature any mortgagor or successor in interest is a necessary party but a deceased debtor is not. View "KeyBank National Ass'n v. Keniston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court that reversed and modified the decision of the tax assessor of the Town of Vinalhaven denying Hurricane Island Foundation a local property tax exemption under Me. Rev. Stat. 36, 652(1)(B), holding that the Town's tax assessor correctly denied the tax exemption.In denying the Foundation's application, the Town's tax assessor concluded that the Foundation failed to meet the standard for a "literary and scientific" institution under the statute. The superior court twice remanded the case. For both the second and the third time, the assessor denied the tax exemption to the Foundation. The superior court modified the decision to designate the Foundation as tax exempt, concluding that there was an error of law in the assessor's decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded for the court to enter a judgment declaring that the Foundation was not exempt, holding that the Foundation failed to show it was a "scientific" institution. View "Hurricane Island Foundation v. Town of Vinalhaven" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the Town of Ogunquit Board of Appeals concluding that good cause existed for this appeal brought by Appellant pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B challenging the issuance of building permits by the Town's code enforcement officer (CEO) to 477 Shore Road LLC, holding that the Board erred.At issue was the issuance of building permits to the LLC of construction relating to six single-family dwelling units. Appellant, who owned property abutting the LLC's parcel, filed a complaint requesting an injunction, a writ of mandamus, and a declaratory judgment. The complaint was denied. While Appellant's appeal was pending (Tominsky I), the CEO issued a certificate of occupancy for one of the dwelling units. Appellant appealed the issuance of the certificate, but the Board voted not to hear the appeal. Appellant then filed a second complaint containing multiple counts against the Town and the LLC (Tominsky II). The superior court denied Appellant's appeal in Tominsky I and dismissed the appeal in Tominsky II. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in Tominsky I and affirmed the judgment in Tominksy II, holding (1) the appeal in Tominsky I before the Board was untimely; and (2) the appeal in Tominsky II failed to allege a viable claim for relief. View "Tominsky v. Town of Ogunquit" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of divorce entered by the district court as to the disposition of certain property and the dissolution of Cole G. Bridges Wild Blueberry LLC, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to order the dissolution of the LLC and erred in setting aside certain property to Cole Bridges.In 2020, Candy Littell filed for divorce from Bridges. The district court granted the divorce. On appeal, Bridges argued that the district court erred in evaluating and classifying a Cessna airplane and lacked jurisdiction to dissolve the LLC. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part and remanded the case, holding (1) the court did not have jurisdiction over the LLC and thus could not order its dissolution; and (2) the court erred in its classification and valuation of the Cessna airplane. View "Littell v. Bridges" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court answered a certified question as follows: no warranty is implied by the use of the term "Warranty Deed" to describe an instrument which "grants...real property with the buildings and improvements thereon...being the same premises conveyed to GRANTOR" by prior deed.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified to the Supreme Judicial Court the question of whether, under Maine law, any warranty was implied by use of the term "Warranty Deed" to describe the instrument at issue and, if so, which warranty or warranties were implied. The Supreme Judicial Court answered the question in the negative, concluding that no warranty was implied by the use of the term "Warranty Deed" to describe an instrument that "grants...real property with the buildings and improvements thereon...being the same premises conveyed to GRANTOR" by prior deed. View "Kneizys v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment entered by the superior court determining ownership and land use rights in intertidal land bordering Penobscot Bay, holding that the disputed land belonged to Jeffrey Mabee and Judith Grace under the plain language of the relevant deeds.Nordic Aquafarms Inc. negotiated an agreement with Richard and Janet Eckrote to bury industrial pipes in the intertidal land located between the Eckrotes' upland property and Penobscot Bay. During the ensuing trial, the City bought the Eckrotes' property and was granted intervenor status. Mabee and Grace jointly owned property near the Eckrotes' property and claimed that they owned not only the intertidal land abutting their own upland property but also the intertidal land abutting the upland properties of the Eckrotes. The superior court concluded that Mabee and Grace failed to establish title to the intertidal land abutting the Eckrotes' upland properties. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the governing deed conveying land did not include the intertidal land that was eventually conveyed to Mabee and Grace; and (2) Mabee and Grace held an enforceable servitude over the Eckrotes' upland. View "Mabee v. Nordic Aquafarms, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's action for breach of contract and awarding Defendant attorney fees, holding that the district court abused its discretion.The parties in this case formerly lived together at a Saco residence. When they closed on the property the parties entered a contract where, in exchange for Plaintiff assuming responsibility for the down payment, Defendant agreed to assume a greater share of other expenses. Defendant later moved out of the property and filed a partition action, denying the existence of a contract. Plaintiff brought this action alleging breach of contract. On the same day, Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate the parties' partition, and contract claims. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss and awarded her attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion by failing to consolidate the two actions; and (2) because Defendant never pleaded abatement, the district court erred in applying the remedy sua sponte. View "Indorf v. Keep" on Justia Law