Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pisgah Mountain, LLC applied to the Town of Clifton Planning Board for approval to construct and operate a wind energy project. Peter and Julie Beckford, who own land adjacent to the proposed development site, timely appealed the Board’s decision to the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA). The ZBA denied the appeal. Thereafter, the Beckfords filed a complaint in superior court pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B. Pisgah and the Town moved to dismiss the Beckfords’ complaint on the ground that it was filed outside of the forty-five-day appeal period. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the forty-five-day appeal period started when the ZBA issued its written findings and decision and not on the day the ZBA voted to deny the appeal. The court then vacated the Board’s decision to approve the permit. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the statutory appeal period commenced with the ZBA’s public vote, and therefore, the Beckfords’ Rule 80B appeal was untimely filed. View "Beckford v. Town of Clifton" on Justia Law

The Bank of Maine filed a complaint seeking foreclosure of Defendant’s primary residence. Defendant failed to file a timely answer, and the superior court later entered Defendant’s default. Defendant responded to the complaint and requested mediation on the date default was entered. The court granted summary judgment to the Bank and entered judgments of foreclosure that included legal fees. Defendant appealed, arguing that the time limit established by Me. R. Civ. P. 93 improperly limits a defendant’s substantive right to mediation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 93 is not an improper limitation of the substantive rights of litigants; and (2) because Defendant did not request mediation pursuant to Rule 93 in a timely manner, the court did abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for mediation. View "Bank of Maine v. Peterson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the boundary separating the parties’ parcels of land and the ownership of an eleven-acre triangular area of land. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking to quiet title to the disputed area and alleging claims of trespass and slander of title. Defendants counterclaimed. The trial court entered judgment (1) in favor of Plaintiff on her claims of adverse possession and acquiescence, on Plaintiff's common law trespass claim, and on all of Defendant’s counterclaims, and (2) in favor of Defendants on each of the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) determining that Plaintiff had established the elements of adverse possession; (2) rejecting Plaintiff’s slander of title claim and statutory trespass claim pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 7551-B; and (3) refusing to award treble damages pursuant to 14 Me. Rev. Stat. 7552(4)(B). View "Harvey v. Furrow" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the boundary between land owned by the parties to this case and an area of land with disputed ownership. Christopher and Diana Grondin filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment establishing the common boundary between their property and the property owned by Susan Hanscom. Hanscom filed a counterclaim also seeking a declaratory judgment as to the common boundary and alternatively seeking title to the disputed area through the doctrines of acquiescence and adverse possession. The superior court declared that the properties’ boundaries were as indicated on a certain survey, concluded that Hanscom had not gained title by acquiescence, and found only partially in Hanscom’s favor on her claim of adverse possession. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Marchese survey was sound in law and fact, and the superior court was free to accept its findings; (2) the superior court did not err in determining that Hanscom had not obtained title to the disputed area by acquiescence; and (3) the superior court did not err in finding that Hanscom had sustained her adverse possession claim only in part. View "Grondin v. Hanscom" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a private road that provided access to sixteen parcels of property. In 2003, residents who lived along the road formed a road association pursuant to the Private Ways Act. At the association’s first meeting, a road commissioner was elected, and all of the attendees, including Defendant, signed a Road Maintenance Agreement agreeing to divide maintenance costs of the road. Defendant never paid any of the bills he received from the association. In 2009, the road commissioner filed a claim against Defendant seeking payment of assessments dating back to 2005. The district court entered judgment for the commissioner. Defendant appealed. A jury returned a verdict in the commissioner’s favor, and the court entered judgment in the amount of $6,000. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the association was not eligible to make assessments for the years in question because it failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Private Ways Act. View "Sunshine v. Brett" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was 110 parcels of property owned by ninety-five separate owners that directly abutted Goose Rocks Beach. In 2009, Beachfront Owners sued the Town of Kennebunkport and all others who claimed any title or right to use the Beach seeking a declaratory judgment affirming his or her ownership and exclusive right to use the portion of the Beach abutting his or her parcel down to the mean low-water mark. The Town counterclaimed alleging its ownership of the Beach and the public’s right to use the Beach. The superior court ultimately awarded the public a recreational easement over both the intertidal and dry sand portions of the Beach. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred in awarding the Town a prescriptive easement over the Beach and deciding that the public has a right to engage in ocean-based activities in the intertidal zone pursuant to the public trust doctrine. Remanded. View "Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport" on Justia Law

Testa’s, Inc. and Jack and Sherri Coopersmith owned property on the westerly side of Main Street in Bar Harbor. The Coopersmiths owned two contiguous parcels that abutted Testa’s parking lot. In 1978, Testa’s granted the Coopersmiths predecessors-in-title an appurtenant easement over its property. In 2010, Testa’s sued the Coopersmiths seeking a declaratory judgment that the Coopersmiths did not have a right of way over its property. The trial court found that the 1978 agreement was enforceable and created an easement and, alternatively, that the Coopersmiths had a prescriptive easement over Testa’s property. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the parties’ prescriptive-easement arguments, holding that the trial court properly concluded that the 1978 agreement was enforceable against Testa’s and granted an appurtenant easement. View "Testa's, Inc. v. Coopersmith" on Justia Law

32 Thomas Street, LLC applied to the Portland City Council for conditional rezoning of its property in Portland’s West End. The City Council ultimately approved the conditional zoning agreement (CZA) for the reuse and rehabilitation of the property. The superior court determined that the rezoning did not comply with the City’s comprehensive plan and state statutes limiting conditional rezoning. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with direction to affirm the decision of the City Council, holding that the record before the City Council supported its legislative determination that the CZA was consistent with the comprehensive plan and therefore did not violate relevant state statutes. View "Remmel v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

In 2004, Charles Adams conveyed a portion of his parcel of property to himself and his sister, Dorothy Adams, as joint tenants. Dorothy subsequently executed a promissory note to American Bankers Conduit and conveyed a mortgage on her interest in the property as security on the note. Dorothy defaulted on the loan in 2008. In 2012, U.S. Bank sought to place an equitable lien on Charles’s interest in the property. After a trial, the superior court entered a judgment on the merits in favor of Charles. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for entry of dismissal, holding that because the complaint was not timely filed the action should have been dismissed pursuant to 14 Me. Rev. Stat. 752. Remanded. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Trustee v. Adams" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from two suits. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman (KRZ) filed suit alleging that Raisin Memorial Trust fraudulently transferred property to Samsara Memorial Trust. Samsara sued KRZ alleging slander of title and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The superior court entered a judgment awarding damages to KRZ, concluding that the transfer of property from Raisin to Samsara was a fraudulent transfer. The trusts appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for a determination of damages with respect to the trusts, holding (1) the trusts’ argument that the justice who presided over their case violated the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct because he did not recuse himself from the case or disclose to the parties that he had formerly served on the superior court with an individual who is now an attorney at KRZ was without merit; and (2) the court erred in awarding damages in the amount of $340,000 against the trusts pursuant to Maine’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. View "Samsara Memorial Trust v. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman" on Justia Law