Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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Testa’s, Inc. and Jack and Sherri Coopersmith owned property on the westerly side of Main Street in Bar Harbor. The Coopersmiths owned two contiguous parcels that abutted Testa’s parking lot. In 1978, Testa’s granted the Coopersmiths predecessors-in-title an appurtenant easement over its property. In 2010, Testa’s sued the Coopersmiths seeking a declaratory judgment that the Coopersmiths did not have a right of way over its property. The trial court found that the 1978 agreement was enforceable and created an easement and, alternatively, that the Coopersmiths had a prescriptive easement over Testa’s property. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the parties’ prescriptive-easement arguments, holding that the trial court properly concluded that the 1978 agreement was enforceable against Testa’s and granted an appurtenant easement. View "Testa's, Inc. v. Coopersmith" on Justia Law

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32 Thomas Street, LLC applied to the Portland City Council for conditional rezoning of its property in Portland’s West End. The City Council ultimately approved the conditional zoning agreement (CZA) for the reuse and rehabilitation of the property. The superior court determined that the rezoning did not comply with the City’s comprehensive plan and state statutes limiting conditional rezoning. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with direction to affirm the decision of the City Council, holding that the record before the City Council supported its legislative determination that the CZA was consistent with the comprehensive plan and therefore did not violate relevant state statutes. View "Remmel v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

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In 2004, Charles Adams conveyed a portion of his parcel of property to himself and his sister, Dorothy Adams, as joint tenants. Dorothy subsequently executed a promissory note to American Bankers Conduit and conveyed a mortgage on her interest in the property as security on the note. Dorothy defaulted on the loan in 2008. In 2012, U.S. Bank sought to place an equitable lien on Charles’s interest in the property. After a trial, the superior court entered a judgment on the merits in favor of Charles. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for entry of dismissal, holding that because the complaint was not timely filed the action should have been dismissed pursuant to 14 Me. Rev. Stat. 752. Remanded. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Trustee v. Adams" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from two suits. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman (KRZ) filed suit alleging that Raisin Memorial Trust fraudulently transferred property to Samsara Memorial Trust. Samsara sued KRZ alleging slander of title and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The superior court entered a judgment awarding damages to KRZ, concluding that the transfer of property from Raisin to Samsara was a fraudulent transfer. The trusts appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for a determination of damages with respect to the trusts, holding (1) the trusts’ argument that the justice who presided over their case violated the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct because he did not recuse himself from the case or disclose to the parties that he had formerly served on the superior court with an individual who is now an attorney at KRZ was without merit; and (2) the court erred in awarding damages in the amount of $340,000 against the trusts pursuant to Maine’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. View "Samsara Memorial Trust v. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman" on Justia Law

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The Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection granted Janis Walsh and Paul Walsh a permit to construct a pier on their property. Thereafter, Marjorie Getz and David Tourangeau appealed the Commissioner’s order to the Board of Environmental Protection and filed a petition to revoke the Walshes’ permit. The Board summarily dismissed as untimely Getz and Tourangeau’s appeal, and the Commissioner dismissed Getz and Tourangeau’s petition to revoke the permit. Tourangeau and Getz petitioned for judicial review of the administrative decisions. The superior court dismissed the petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not err in concluding that Getz and Tourangeau were not “abutters” entitled to notice of the Walshes’ permit application, and the superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply a good cause exception to extend the time for appeal from the Commissioner’s decision granting the Walshes’ permit application; and (2) the superior court did not err in dismissing Tourangeau and Getz’s appeal from the Commissioner’s dismissal of their petition for revocation, as the Legislature has given the Commissioner sole discretion to decide whether to revoke permits. View "Getz v. Walsh" on Justia Law

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The Francis Small Heritage Trust, Inc. owned eleven parcels of land in the Town of Limington. The Trust requested tax abatement on its properties for the tax years 2009-2010, arguing that the properties should be granted tax-exempt status. The Town denied the Trust’s petitions. The State Board of Property Tax Review denied the Trust’s appeals, concluding that the Trust was not entitled to a tax exemption pursuant to 36 Me. Rev. Stat. 652(1)(A),(C) because its activities were “not restricted solely to benevolent and charitable purposes.” The superior court vacated the Board’s ruling, concluding that the Trust was entitled to a tax exemption as a benevolent and charitable institution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the Trust was entitled to a charitable exemption as a charitable and benevolent organization. View "Francis Small Heritage Trust, Inc. v. Town of Limington" on Justia Law

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U.S. Bank National Association (the Bank) filed an amended complaint for residential foreclosure against Thomas Manning. The case progressed through its pretrial stages. Eventually, the superior court dismissed the Bank’s foreclosure complaint with prejudice as a sanction for the Bank’s failure to comply with the court’s discovery order. The Bank appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint under the circumstances and that the court erred at several points as the case proceeded through its procedural steps. The Supreme Court agreed with the Bank and vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the order dismissing the Bank’s complaint with prejudice was an abuse of the court’s discretion. View "U.S. Bank N.A. v. Manning" on Justia Law

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The Cote Corporation filed a mechanic’s lien against real property owned by Kelley Earthworks, Inc. Cote subsequently brought a complaint to enforce the lien against Kelley. Kelley did not respond to the complaint or to Cote’s motion for summary judgment. The superior court entered Kelley’s default and then entered judgment for Cote, plus interest and attorney fees, and ordered that the property be sold to satisfy the judgment. Kelley appeared ten days after the judgment was entered on the docket and filed motions to set aside its default and for relief from the judgment. The court declined to set aside the default but did strike its order to sell the real property, instead awarding Cote a money judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred in striking the provision of its order requiring a sale of the property. Remanded for entry of an order for the sale of at least a portion of Kelley’s land. View "The Cote Corp. v. Kelley Earthworks, Inc." on Justia Law

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Scott Greenleaf executed a promissory note to Residential Mortgage Services, Inc. (RMS). That same day, Greenleaf signed a mortgage on property securing that debt. The mortgage listed RMS as the lender of the debt and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the nominee for the lender. MERS subsequently assigned its interest in the mortgage and note to Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP (BAC). BAC then merged with Bank of America, N.A. (Bank). Five years later, the Bank instituted foreclosure proceedings against Greenleaf. The district court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of the Bank. Greenleaf appealed, arguing that the Bank lacked standing to foreclose on the property. The Supreme Court agreed with Greenleaf and vacated the judgment, holding (1) the Bank proved its status as the holder of the note but failed to establish its ownership of Greenleaf’s mortgage; and (2) because the Bank failed to satisfy two of the Higgins foreclosure requirements, the Bank was not entitled to a judgment of foreclosure in any event. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf" on Justia Law

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In 2009, David and Debra Sawyer defaulted on a mortgage held by U.S. Bank N.A. In 2012, the Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure. At the time the complaint was filed, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A. had taken over as loan servicer. Four court-ordered mediations subsequently took place, during which time the Sawyers attempted to negotiate a modification with Chase. The mediations were unsuccessful, largely due to Chase’s repeated delays and requests to submit documentation that the Sawyers had already submitted. At a show cause hearing, the superior court subsequently dismissed the Bank’s complaint with prejudice, concluding that the Bank was not prepared to proceed at the hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sanction was not excessive under the circumstances, and (2) there was evidence that the Sawyers were prejudiced by the Bank’s failure to participate in the mediation process in good faith. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Sawyer" on Justia Law