Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs purchased property from Charles Johnson. During the pendency of the sale of the property, Johnson misrepresented the condition of the property and failed to disclose its prior use as a junkyard. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Johnson alleging various causes of action and seeking damages for loss of investment, undisclosed physical problems with the property, and emotional distress. While he owned the disputed property, Johnson maintained a homeowners insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate refused to defend or indemnify Johnson on Plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs and Johnson subsequently reached an agreement resolving the underlying complaint, and the superior court entered a judgment against Johnson for $330,000. Plaintiffs then initiated a reach and apply action against Allstate. The trial court granted summary judgment for Johnson, determining that the policy did not cover the damages Plaintiffs suffered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' damages did not constitute covered "bodily injury" or "property damage" pursuant to the Allstate homeowners insurance policy. View "Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendants installed video surveillance cameras at the entrance to an easement crossing their property. Members of a subdivision who benefitted from the easement (Plaintiffs) filed an action for a declaratory judgment and to enjoin Defendants from obstructing their easement rights. Plaintiffs relied on a 2006 settlement to support their position that Defendants were prohibited from installing the cameras. The trial court concluded that Defendants' video surveillance cameras constituted an unreasonable interference with the easement. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the 2006 settlement was relevant evidence to the reasonableness of the cameras, although it was not binding as between the parties to this suit, and the trial court did not err by considering that agreement because its terms provided evidence of the need for injunctive relief; and (2) the placement of the video cameras at issue here did not unreasonably interfere with the access easement benefitting Plaintiffs, nor did the cameras violate the non-disturbance clause in the settlement. Remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Defendants on the video camera issue. View "Flaherty v. Muther" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Town Landing Road, which was bordered to the west by property owned by the Bayberry Cove Childrens' Land Trust (Trust) and bordered to the east by property owned by Paul and Pauline West. After a dispute about with the Town about access to the road, the Trust filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment as to the ownership of the road, which the Wests later joined. The trial court declared that the Trust and Wests owned Town Landing Road free and clear of any interests claimed by the Town on behalf of the public in general. The Town appealed, arguing that the court erred in rejecting its contention that it acquired a public way by prescriptive use. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Town failed to sustain its burden to prove continuous use of the road for the required period. View "Bayberry Cove Childrens' Land Trust v. Town of Steuben" on Justia Law

The Scarborough Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) granted a setback variance to property owners in the Higgins Beach neighborhood of Scarborough. The property abutted land owned by Summerwind Cottage, LLC. Peter and Libby Cassat owned the land directly across the street. The superior court affirmed the decision of the ZBA. Summerwind Cottage and the Cassats appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in relying on the Official Shoreland Zoning Map to conclude that the property was in the buildable Shoreland Overlay District and in concluding that the property met the requirements for a variance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Summerwind's arguments failed to establish that the ZBA erred in relying on the Official Shoreland Zoning Map in determining that the property was in the buildable Shoreland Overlay District; and (2) there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ZBA's decision to grant the ordinance. View "Summerwind Cottage, LLC v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska foreclosed on Jeffrey and Jeanne Stoops' property after the Stoops failed to pay municipal taxes. The Town then conveyed the property to Richard and Betty Nelson by municipal quitclaim deed. The Stoopses subsequently filed a complaint against Richard Nelson seeking to quiet title to the property and asking the court to declare the respective rights of the parties to the property. The superior court granted the Nelsons' motion for summary judgment. The Stoopses appealed, arguing (1) the Town failed to give the Stoopses proper notice of the pending foreclosure in violation of their due process rights, and (2) the Town failed to adhere strictly to the requirements of the statutorily outlined steps a municipality must take to foreclose on a municipal tax lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Town complied with the requirements of the statutory scheme and gave the Stoopses sufficient notice, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Nelsons. View "Stoops v. Nelson" on Justia Law

This was the second appeal of a matter involving six subdivision lot owners and their attempt to form a road association. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court held that the lot owners were authorized by statute to begin the process of forming the road association. On remand, the superior court issued an order requiring the parties to submit a proposed judgment. The resulting proposal asked the court to clarify what the word "majority" as used in 23 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 3101(5) meant. The court answered that the word "majority" as used in section 3101(5) required only a majority vote of those owners physically present at the meeting and those present by proxy and did not require a majority of all lot owners whether present or not. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in declaring that "a majority vote" as used in section 3101(5) meant a majority vote of lot owners actually present or represented by proxy at a properly called road association meeting. View "Goudreau v. Pine Springs Rd. & Water, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an owner of a condominium unit, filed a complaint, individually and derivatively on behalf of the condominium association (Association), against the Association and four members of its board of directors (Board), claiming that Defendants had refused effectively to enforce the condominium's smoking ban. The business and consumer docket dismissed the counts of the complaint related to the smoking ban for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in (1) finding that Plaintiff did not have a right to bring a shareholder derivative action under either the Maine Condominium Act or the Maine Nonprofit Corporation Act; (2) dismissing Plaintiff's individual claims related to the smoking ban; and (3) denying Plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint following the partial dismissal of his amended complaint. View "America v. Sunspray Condo. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Bank brought an action against Defendant for foreclosure on a residential mortgage. In this case, Bank was a holder entitled to enforce the mortgage note and currently had possession of the note, which was endorsed in blank, and therefore had the power to enforce the note. After mediation, Bank moved for summary judgment. Before acting on the motion, the superior court reported a question to the Supreme Court, which the Court accepted. The question was: "What is the proof that is required for a party to prove 'ownership' of the mortgage note and mortgage for purposes of foreclosure?" The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in a foreclosure action must identify the owner or economic beneficiary of the note and provide certain other evidence as described in 14 Me. Rev. Stat. 6321. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Cloutier" on Justia Law

In 2010, Hebron Academy requested a tax abatement from the Town for the 2009 tax year. Because the Academy did not file the abatement request before the statutory deadline, the Town denied the request. The Board of Assessment Review denied the request on the same ground. The Academy subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that its properties were exempt from taxation and that the Town must reimburse it for real estate taxes it paid on its exempt properties for the prior three years. The superior court declared that the Academy was entitled to the exemption for most of its property but that res judicata precluded the court from relieving it of its obligation to pay the 2009 taxes at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hebron Academy, as a literary and scientific institution, was entitled to a tax exemption for its real estate "owned and occupied or used solely for [its] own purpose"; and (2) the trial court correctly concluded that res judicata precluded the declaratory judgment from applying to the 2009 tax year because an administrative adjudication had been rendered on the merits of the case. View "Hebron Academy, Inc. v. Town of Hebron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased title insurance for a condominium unit she had recently purchased. Plaintiff's neighbor subsequently initiated a lawsuit against Plaintiff alleging that Plaintiff's property was subject to a view easement. Plaintiff tendered the complaint to her title insurance company (Insurer) requesting a defense pursuant to her title insurance policy. Commonwealth denied Plaintiff's request based on certain exclusions in the policy. Plaintiff sued Insurer alleging a breach of contract and requesting a declaratory judgment that Insurer had a duty to defend Plaintiff against her neighbor's complaint. The superior court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment, finding that the policy specifically excluded the view easement from coverage. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that due to the broad nature of the duty to defend and the law's requirement that insurance-policy interpretation be focused on the insured, Insurer had a duty to defend Plaintiff in the underlying litigation. View "Cox v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law