Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Richard Hurlbert, Audrey McGlashan, and Hurlbert-McGlashan, LLC (collectively, Hurlbert) had record title to property abutting Andrew and Melinda Weinstein's (collectively, Weinstein) property. This action arose from the parties' dispute about ownership of certain property. The superior court declared that Weinstein held title to the disputed land through adverse possession. Hurlbert appealed, arguing that the trial court erred because Weinstein failed to satisfy his burden of establishing the required elements of an adverse possession claim. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the judgment, holding that Weinstein's use of the property was not sufficiently hostile and notorious to put the true owner on notice that the land in question was actually, visibly, and exclusively held by Hurlbert in antagonistic purpose. View "Weinstein v. Hurlbert" on Justia Law

Appellant's mother (Miller) opened a checking account with Bank. Appellant alleged that Miller added him as joint owner of the account with right of survivorship. After Miller died, Appellant withdrew all of the funds in the account. Miller's Estate brought an action against Appellant, alleging that the funds Appellant had withdrawn from the account belonged to the Estate. The probate court determined that Miller was the sole owner of the checking account and that the funds Appellant had withdrawn were the property of the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later sued the Bank, seeking damages for breach of contract and negligence for failing to retain the records that would show his ownership of the account. Appellant also sought punitive damages. The superior court dismissed the action based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, concluding that the precise issue of ownership was common to both proceedings. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed as to the breach of contract and punitive damages claims; but (2) vacated as to the negligence claim, holding that Appellant's negligence claim against the Bank was not barred by collateral estoppel, as the probate court did not adjudicate the factual issues related to this claim. View "Gray v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the City of Saco's approval of a contract zoning agreement for property purchased by Estates at Bay View, LLC. Several nearby property owners (collectively, the Neighbors) filed a five-count complaint in the superior court challenging the legality of the contract zoning agreement and the Saco Planning Board's subsequent approval of a subdivision and site plan for the property. The superior court granted the City's motion to dismiss three of the counts, granted summary judgment in favor of the City and Bay View on one of the counts, and affirmed the decision of the Board on the final count. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no merit in the Neighbors' arguments regarding all of their claims except the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City; and (2) the superior court did not err in granting summary judgment to the City and Bay View, as the contract zone agreement met the requirements of Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 4352(8)(C). View "Golder v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

Several lot owners appealed from a judgment entered in the superior court finding that they were not entitled to form a road association pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 23, 3101 and were bound by certain restrictive covenants to pay an annual maintenance fee to Pine Springs Road and Water, LLC (PSRW) for subdivision road maintenance. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court, holding (1) the lot owners were authorized to establish a statutory road association pursuant to section 3101; and (2) the lot owners were not obligated to pay PSRW or its predecessor an annual road maintenance fee under the restrictive covenants. Remanded. View "Goudreau v. Pine Springs Rd. & Water, LLC" on Justia Law

Judith Kehl and Port of Call, LLC filed a motion to modify an order of prejudgment attachment and attachment on trustee process that had been entered in favor of Centrix Bank and Trust, following a contested hearing, ten months earlier. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching its merits, concluding that the final judgment rule barred the appeal because (1) Appellants' motion raised arguments that should have, and could have, been raised before the attachment order was issued and on direct appeal from that order, and therefore, Appellants waived any rights by failing to challenge the attachment order through proper procedural avenues; and (2) no exception to the final judgment rule applied in this case. View "Centrix Bank & Trust v. Kehl" on Justia Law

J. Russell Tarason sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment declaring that he held an easement over a portion of Wesson Realty's property. The superior court concluded that Tarason did not hold an easement over a portion of Wesson Realty's property because the 1925 deed that created the easement conveyed only a life estate in a right-of-way that terminated upon the death of the original grantee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the superior court erred in concluding that section 772 of the Short Form Deeds Act did not apply to this case, the court properly concluded that the language of the 1925 deed demonstrated a clear intention to create an easement in gross that terminated upon the death of the original grantee rather than to create an appurtenant easement. View "Tarason v. Wesson Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

Robert Stanton filed a complaint against Michael Strong alleging nuisance and trespass and requesting injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and punitive damages. Stanton requested that the superior court permanently enjoin Strong from engaging in any act that obstructed Stanton's access to his property from any point along an easement over property owned by Strong. After a nonjury trial, the court issued a judgment finding for Stanton on his trespass claim and granting Stanton's request for a permanent injunction. Strong appealed the portion of the judgment granting the permanent injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts as found by the trial court supported the permanent injunction, and the court did not abuse its discretion in making its determination. View "Stanton v. Strong" on Justia Law

In this property dispute, Robert Spickler (Robert) filed claims for declaratory judgment and to quiet title, and Adah Ginn (Adah) filed a claim for adverse possession. After a jury made findings of fact, the superior court entered judgment awarding ownership of the property to Robert. The court declared that, between Adah's and Robert's competing deeds to the same property, Robert was the rightful owner of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed after reaffirming and applying Hill v. McNichol, a case issued more than a century ago, to the instant case, holding that the superior court did not err in concluding that Robert was the owner of the disputed property as against Adah. View "Spickler v. Ginn" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2007, the City of Lewiston assessed stormwater fees on Robert Gladu's property, which contained a small shopping mall and parking lot, pursuant to the City's stormwater ordinance. The ordinance at issue created the Stormwater Management Utility and gave it the authority to assess and collect fees for stormwater management system and facilities. Gladu did not pay the fees, and in 2010, the City filed a civil complaint alleging that Gladu owed the City for unpaid stormwater fees. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. In his motion, Gladu argued that the stormwater assessment was a tax, not a fee, and that the Utility was not authorized to impose a tax. The superior court granted the City's motion and denied Gladu's motion and ordered that Gladu pay the delinquent stormwater fees, interest, attorney fees, collection costs, and a penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the test set forth in Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court, the stormwater assessment is a fee and not a tax; and (2) the superior court did not err in awarding a civil penalty, attorney fees, and other costs. View "City of Lewiston v. Gladu" on Justia Law

The Land Use Regulation Commission (LURC) and Plum Creek Timberlands, LLC and Plum Creek Land Company (collectively, Plum Creek) appealed from a judgment entered in the business and consumer docket vacating LURC's approval of a rezoning petition and concept plan submitted by Plum Creek for land it owned in the Moosehead Lake region. LURC and Plum Creek contended that the court erred by concluding that LURC violated its procedural rules by failing to hold an additional evidentiary hearing on amendments to Plum Creek's petition. Forest Ecology Network, RESTORE: The North Woods, and the Natural Resources Council of Maine cross-appealed, arguing primarily that LURC erred in approving the petition because several aspects of the concept plan conflicted with statutory requirements. The Nature Conservancy and Forest Society of Maine intervened. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for the entry of a judgment affirming LURC's decision, holding that LURC did not violate its procedural rules and did not otherwise err by approving the rezoning petition and concept plan. View "Forest Ecology Network v. Land Use Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law