Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This dispute centered around the status of Steele Road. The Fred D. Gay Revocable Trust claimed title by deed or by adverse possession to a triangular piece of property (the triangle) bordering Steele Road and to a fee interest in the road. The Dubes and Whitneys claimed title by deed to the triangle and a fee interest in the road. The Trust filed a complaint against the Dubes and Whitneys, alleging trespass and nuisance, among other claims. The Dubes and Whitneys counterclaimed. The superior court entered partial judgment finding (1) Steele Road was a public road classified as a town way that had not been abandoned by the public; (2) the Dubes and Whitneys held record title to the triangle; but (3) the Trust owned the triangle by adverse possession. It also determined that the Dube and Whitney counterclaims were moot and entered final judgment in favor of the Dubes and Whitneys on all remaining undecided claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err by (1) concluding that the road was a town way and had not been abandoned; and (2) concluding that the Trust was the triangle's current owner by adverse possession. View "Gay v. Dube" on Justia Law

Chuck Starbird submitted an application for a building permit for the construction of a home on a lot abutting a public easement portion of a road in the Town of Minot. The Town denied the application. The Board of Appeals ultimately granted Starbird's appeal, concluding that the parcel had a private right-of-way because the the term "right-of-way," as used in section 4-501.8 of the Town's Land Use Code, included a public easement. The superior court affirmed but remanded to the Board for further factual findings on whether Starbird's application met all of the factors listed in section 4-501.8(A)-(G). The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court but vacated the portion of the court's judgment remanding the matter, holding (1) the unique circumstances of the matter caused the interlocutory appeal to fall within the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule; and (2) the Board did not err by granting Starbird's appeal of the denial of his application. View "Town of Minot v. Starbird" on Justia Law

Christopher McCormick filed a complaint against Lawrence Crane alleging breach of warranty because the warranty deed by which Crane and his wife conveyed oceanfront property to McCormick inaccurately specified the location of an easement across the land. The superior court granted McCormick's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the alleged confusion about the easement's boundaries did not disrupt McCormick's possessory rights in a way that constituted a functional eviction from a portion of his property, McCormick failed to state a claim for relief based on the breach of the covenant of warranty; and (2 )because the deed from the Cranes fully disclosed the existence of an easement that provided certain nearby parcels with ocean access, McCormick failed to state a claim for breach of the warranty of freedom from encumbrances. View "McCormick v. Crane" on Justia Law

The Town of Westport Island issued a building permit to George Richardson to build a single-family residence on his property. Abutting landowner Deirdre Dunlop filed a notice of appeal, and the Westport Island board of appeals (Board) affirmed the issuance of the permit. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the building permit, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Board's finding that Richardon's property met minimum lot-size requirement for construction of a residential dwelling; and (2) the Board correctly determined that Richardson's road lot could be included in his property's acreage calculation. View "Dunlop v. Town of Westport Island " on Justia Law

Robert Laux and Cynthia Moran-Laux (collectively Laux) appealed, and Ralph Harrington cross-appealed, from a judgment of the superior court declaring the continued existence and location of a road easement in favor of Harrington over Laux's property and awarding Harrington nominal damages for Laux's interference with the use of the easement. Laux asserted that a 1990 quitclaim deed given by Harrington's predecessor-in-title to Laux's predecessor-in-title extinguished the easement, or, alternatively, that construction on the site of its original entry point resulted in its abandonment. Harrington contended that the court erred in excluding certain evidence at trial, resulting in its miscalculation of his damages and failure to award punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding, inter alia, that the superior court did not err in (1) finding that the 1990 quitclaim deed was not intended to release Harrington's easement over the land now owned by the Lauxes; (2) concluding that Harrington did not abandon his easement; (3) calculating damages; and (4) finding that Laux's conduct did not rise to the level of actual ill will or outrageousness required to award punitive damages. View "Laux v. Harrington " on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between the Mattesons and the Batchelders over fee ownership of less than one acre of land on a stream and the location of a deeded right-of-way on property owned by the Mattesons. The superior court (1) concluded that the Mattesons owned the disputed parcel of land; and (2) reformed the deed to locate the easement along a field road that crossed that Mattesons' property, concluding that the deed description of the right-of-way was ambiguous. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the superior court did not err in finding that the Mattesons obtained the property in dispute, which was included in the deed's property description; and (2) the court erred in reforming the deed to reflect a new location of the easement along the field road where there was no mutual mistake of fact that anything other than the shoreline was the boundary, as described in the deed. Remanded. View "Matteson v. Batchelder" on Justia Law

The town planning board (Board) granted a dredge-and-fill permit for two culverts on property owned by the Berdeens. Scott Marquis, who owned property abutting the Berdeens' property, (1) appealed the Board's decision, and (2) filed an appeal with the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), which the ZBA denied. Marquis's main contention was that an illegal subdivision had been created on the Berdeens' property, which he claimed the Board should have addressed in determining whether to approve the application for the dredge-and-fill permit. The superior court consolidated Marquis's appeals and remanded them. In their decisions, the Board and the ZBA each determined that the Berdeens' property did not qualify as a subdivision pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 4401(4) and local law. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the Board's decision to grant a dredge-and-fill permit; (2) vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with instructions to vacate the Board's and ZBA's decisions applying the subdivision law because those determinations were not ripe for review; and (3) instructed the superior court to dismiss the appeal of the ZBA decision as premature. View "Marquis v. Town of Kennebunk" on Justia Law

Fannie Mae instituted foreclosure proceedings against Nicolle Bradbury for residential property she owed in Maine. Fannie Mae named GMAC Mortgage, the loan servicer, as a party-in-interest. During a deposition, a GMAC employee testified that he did not read the affidavits he signed or execute the affidavits before a notary. Fannie Mae subsequently filed a motion for a protective order to prevent the public disclosure of the deposition, which the district court denied. The district court ultimately dismissed without prejudice the complaint after finding Fannie Mae submitted a bad faith affidavit for purposes of summary judgment. As sanctions, the court ordered Fannie Mae to pay Bradbury for the attorney fees and costs she incurred in demonstrating the bad faith of the affidavit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) declining to find GMAC in contempt even though the affidavit was executed by a GMAC employee; and (2) failing to award Bradbury attorney fees and costs in defending against the motion for a protective order. View "Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Bradbury" on Justia Law

Hannaford Brothers applied for a site plan review permit to construct a grocery store and drive-through pharmacy. The town's Planning Board voted to grant the permit. The Biziers and other concerned citizens directly appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board. The Biziers appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record amply supported the Board's findings that the project was harmonious and in good scale with the natural terrain and surrounding development of the area in accordance with the town's zoning ordinance; and (2) the Board did not err in failing to conclude that Hannaford's plan to modify the dimensions of a landowner's property would create an illegal back lot, and the dimensions of the landowner's resulting lot did not bar the issuance of the site plan review permit to Hannaford. View "Bizier v. Town of Turner" on Justia Law

Appellees in McCormick v. LaChance (McCormick I) brought a motion for reconsideration, seeking reconsideration of a portion of the Supreme Court's opinion in McCormick I. In McCormick I, Appellant appealed the judgment of the superior court granting Appellees summary judgment in an action regarding location of an easement. The Supreme Court affirmed. In the instant action, Appellees contended that because the only issue presented for decision in McCormick I was whether the prior owner of Appellant's land could, by deed referencing a plan, relocate an easement on the face of the earth, the Court should not have addressed an issue of whether actions that Appellant had taken on the face of the earth could have accomplished a relocation of a previously existing easement benefiting Appellees. The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration and revised its opinion, concluding that in addressing Appellant's attempts to relocate the easement by his actions on the ground after receipt of the deed, the Court misapprehended the issues and addressed matters not presented to the trial court in the summary judgment proceeding and, thus, not properly preserved and presented to the Court for consideration on appeal. View "McCormick v. LaChance" on Justia Law