Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Dorothy Leighton failed to pay taxes on her property and the Town of Blue Hill recorded a tax collector's lien certificate on the property, the Town filed a complaint against Leighton for forcible entry and detainer (FED), seeking possession of the property and costs. The district court entered judgment in Leighton's favor. The superior court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to issue a writ of possession in favor of the Town. On appeal, Leighton contended that the Town was required, as a matter of law, to prove that it held current title to the property in the FED action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Town produced evidence that it held title superior to Leighton by virtue of the statutorily-foreclosed tax lien mortgage on the property, the Town presented sufficient evidence that it was entitled to possession of the property. View "Town of Blue Hill v. Leighton" on Justia Law

Janelle Gabay defaulted on a promissory note secured by a mortgage of her real property. HSBC Bank USA, the holder of the mortgage, filed a complaint for foreclosure and sale against Gabay. The district court granted HSBC's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that entry of judgment as a matter of law was precluded where (1) HSBC's statement of material facts failed to properly present proof of ownership of the mortgage note; (2) HSBC's statement of material facts did not contain an adequate description of the mortgaged premises including a street address; (3) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the order of priority and amounts due to other parties-in-interest; and (4) the amount of costs due as part of the amount due on the mortgage was not included in the summary judgment record as required. Remanded. View "HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a 2005 divorce judgment, the court awarded Christiane McAllister possession of the couple's marital home and monthly spousal support that would cover the house expenses until October 2009. Christiane was required to refinance the house in her name no later than November 1, 2009, or, alternatively, sell the house. The first $63,000 of any remaining proceeds was to go to Christiane in lieu of alimony. Christiane filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment on October 29, 2009, asserting that she could not pay her normal living expenses after spousal support terminated because of a drop on the value of the house. The court modified the divorce judgment, ordering Russell McAllister to pay support for an additional 36 months. Russell appealed, arguing that the court (1) made an error of law by modifying a division of marital property, (2) abused its discretion in modifying spousal support based on a substantial change in circumstances, and (3) abused its discretion by granting relief pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Christiane was entitled to relief on the basis of a substantial change in circumstances, and that the grant of relief pursuant to 60(b)(6) was harmless error. View "McAllister v. McAllister" on Justia Law

In district court, appellants were held liable for violating the Town of Levantâs Article 1010 land use ordinance by allowing a third partyâs mobile home to be moved onto and remain on their land after receiving multiple notices of the violation. At issue was whether appellants could be held responsible for a violation caused by a third party and whether there was evidence that they played a role in leaving the mobile home on their property. The Court affirmed, holding that (1) under the four-factor analysis outlined in Town of Boothbay v. Jenness, the landowners were responsible for land use violations committed on their property, and (2) there was sufficient evidence that the appellants had notice of the violation and the ability and opportunity to correct the violation but failed to do so.

Petitioners Dana and Robin Murphy appealed a judgment entered in favor of Respondent HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. (HSBC), which allowed HSBC to foreclose on and sell the Murphyâs house. The Murphys contended that the court erred by granting HSBC summary judgment when there were numerous errors that primarily concerned HSBCâs evidence of its ownership of the note and mortgage to their house. In particular, the Murphys challenged the trustworthiness of multiple affidavits filed by HSBC in support of its motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the affidavits submitted by HSBC were âinherently untrustworthyâ and the business records attached to them were not admissible at trial. The Court held that the trial court erred by granting a summary judgment in this case, and remanded the case for further proceedings.