Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellees in McCormick v. LaChance (McCormick I) brought a motion for reconsideration, seeking reconsideration of a portion of the Supreme Court's opinion in McCormick I. In McCormick I, Appellant appealed the judgment of the superior court granting Appellees summary judgment in an action regarding location of an easement. The Supreme Court affirmed. In the instant action, Appellees contended that because the only issue presented for decision in McCormick I was whether the prior owner of Appellant's land could, by deed referencing a plan, relocate an easement on the face of the earth, the Court should not have addressed an issue of whether actions that Appellant had taken on the face of the earth could have accomplished a relocation of a previously existing easement benefiting Appellees. The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration and revised its opinion, concluding that in addressing Appellant's attempts to relocate the easement by his actions on the ground after receipt of the deed, the Court misapprehended the issues and addressed matters not presented to the trial court in the summary judgment proceeding and, thus, not properly preserved and presented to the Court for consideration on appeal. View "McCormick v. LaChance" on Justia Law

Wife initiated a divorce from Husband. After a trial and after applying the parties' premarital agreement to the evidence presented to divide the parties' real and personal property, the court ordered Husband to pay Wife $145,000. The court then ordered Wife to pay Husband $300,000 to achieve an equitable distribution. Wife appealed. Wife subsequently moved the district court to enforce the preliminary injunction, claiming Husband removed her from his health insurance policy in violation of the injunction. The trial court denied Wife's motion. Wife appealed this judgment and consolidated her appeals. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's action with respect to Wife's motion for a preliminary injunction as the parties' premarital agreement unequivocally barred the awarding of spousal support, and therefore, neither spouse could be required to provide the other with health insurance; and (2) affirmed most of the divorce judgment but vacated the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding Husband $300,000 to create an equitable division of the marital estate because there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that $300,000 of the assets awarded to Wife were marital property. Remanded. View "Laqualia v. Laqualia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two individuals, purchased a parcel of land bisected by a railroad track. Maine Central Railroad Company denied Plaintiffs' request to install utility lines across the railroad track for residential access. Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action, requesting that the court declare a perpetual right-of-way appurtenant to their property over the property of Maine Central. After the case was remanded, the superior court found that an implied quasi-easement existed over the Railroad's land but concluded that (1) the quasi-easement's use was limited to its historical use as a farm crossing, and (2) therefore, the scope of the easement did not include the right to install utility services or use as residential access. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court correctly determined the scope of Plaintiffs' implied quasi-easement by limiting it to its originally-intended purposes. View "Connolly v. Maine Central R.R. Co." on Justia Law

The Belangers rented a trailer from John Mulholland. The Belangers informed Mulholland about problems with their running water and toilet, but no repairs were made. When the Belangers were eventually evicted from their trailer, they had lived there without running water for nine months and without a functioning toilet for five months. The Belangers sued Mulholland for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The trial court ruled in favor of the Belangers and awarded the Belangers five months' rent. The Belangers appealed, contending that they were entitled to damages for an additional four-month period when they lacked running water but still had a functioning toilet. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as modified, holding that the Belangers were entitled to damages for an additional four months because, by itself, the lack of running water in the Belangers' trailer for four months rendered the trailer unfit for human habitation. View "Belanger v. Mulholland" on Justia Law

Edgar and Sheryl Peters owned a parcel of land that abutted and was uphill from oceanfront property owned by Richard O'Leary. After a series of disputes with the Peterses, O'Leary planted a row of at least seventy-four trees near the parties' boundary, which obstructed ocean views from the Peterses' newly constructed home. The Peterses sued O'Leary. The superior court found that O'Leary had created a nuisance pursuant to Maine's spite fence statute and the common law and granted injunctive relief to the Peterses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that O'Leary created a nuisance pursuant to the spite fence statute because (1) the plantings created a structure in the nature of a fence, and (2) the evidence was adequate to support a finding that O'Leary maintained the structure for the purpose of annoying the Peterses. View "Peters v. O'Leary" on Justia Law

After Dorothy Leighton failed to pay taxes on her property and the Town of Blue Hill recorded a tax collector's lien certificate on the property, the Town filed a complaint against Leighton for forcible entry and detainer (FED), seeking possession of the property and costs. The district court entered judgment in Leighton's favor. The superior court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to issue a writ of possession in favor of the Town. On appeal, Leighton contended that the Town was required, as a matter of law, to prove that it held current title to the property in the FED action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Town produced evidence that it held title superior to Leighton by virtue of the statutorily-foreclosed tax lien mortgage on the property, the Town presented sufficient evidence that it was entitled to possession of the property. View "Town of Blue Hill v. Leighton" on Justia Law

Janelle Gabay defaulted on a promissory note secured by a mortgage of her real property. HSBC Bank USA, the holder of the mortgage, filed a complaint for foreclosure and sale against Gabay. The district court granted HSBC's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that entry of judgment as a matter of law was precluded where (1) HSBC's statement of material facts failed to properly present proof of ownership of the mortgage note; (2) HSBC's statement of material facts did not contain an adequate description of the mortgaged premises including a street address; (3) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the order of priority and amounts due to other parties-in-interest; and (4) the amount of costs due as part of the amount due on the mortgage was not included in the summary judgment record as required. Remanded. View "HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a 2005 divorce judgment, the court awarded Christiane McAllister possession of the couple's marital home and monthly spousal support that would cover the house expenses until October 2009. Christiane was required to refinance the house in her name no later than November 1, 2009, or, alternatively, sell the house. The first $63,000 of any remaining proceeds was to go to Christiane in lieu of alimony. Christiane filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment on October 29, 2009, asserting that she could not pay her normal living expenses after spousal support terminated because of a drop on the value of the house. The court modified the divorce judgment, ordering Russell McAllister to pay support for an additional 36 months. Russell appealed, arguing that the court (1) made an error of law by modifying a division of marital property, (2) abused its discretion in modifying spousal support based on a substantial change in circumstances, and (3) abused its discretion by granting relief pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Christiane was entitled to relief on the basis of a substantial change in circumstances, and that the grant of relief pursuant to 60(b)(6) was harmless error. View "McAllister v. McAllister" on Justia Law

In district court, appellants were held liable for violating the Town of Levantâs Article 1010 land use ordinance by allowing a third partyâs mobile home to be moved onto and remain on their land after receiving multiple notices of the violation. At issue was whether appellants could be held responsible for a violation caused by a third party and whether there was evidence that they played a role in leaving the mobile home on their property. The Court affirmed, holding that (1) under the four-factor analysis outlined in Town of Boothbay v. Jenness, the landowners were responsible for land use violations committed on their property, and (2) there was sufficient evidence that the appellants had notice of the violation and the ability and opportunity to correct the violation but failed to do so.

Petitioners Dana and Robin Murphy appealed a judgment entered in favor of Respondent HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. (HSBC), which allowed HSBC to foreclose on and sell the Murphyâs house. The Murphys contended that the court erred by granting HSBC summary judgment when there were numerous errors that primarily concerned HSBCâs evidence of its ownership of the note and mortgage to their house. In particular, the Murphys challenged the trustworthiness of multiple affidavits filed by HSBC in support of its motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the affidavits submitted by HSBC were âinherently untrustworthyâ and the business records attached to them were not admissible at trial. The Court held that the trial court erred by granting a summary judgment in this case, and remanded the case for further proceedings.