Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court that reversed and modified the decision of the tax assessor of the Town of Vinalhaven denying Hurricane Island Foundation a local property tax exemption under Me. Rev. Stat. 36, 652(1)(B), holding that the Town's tax assessor correctly denied the tax exemption.In denying the Foundation's application, the Town's tax assessor concluded that the Foundation failed to meet the standard for a "literary and scientific" institution under the statute. The superior court twice remanded the case. For both the second and the third time, the assessor denied the tax exemption to the Foundation. The superior court modified the decision to designate the Foundation as tax exempt, concluding that there was an error of law in the assessor's decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded for the court to enter a judgment declaring that the Foundation was not exempt, holding that the Foundation failed to show it was a "scientific" institution. View "Hurricane Island Foundation v. Town of Vinalhaven" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the Town of Ogunquit Board of Appeals concluding that good cause existed for this appeal brought by Appellant pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B challenging the issuance of building permits by the Town's code enforcement officer (CEO) to 477 Shore Road LLC, holding that the Board erred.At issue was the issuance of building permits to the LLC of construction relating to six single-family dwelling units. Appellant, who owned property abutting the LLC's parcel, filed a complaint requesting an injunction, a writ of mandamus, and a declaratory judgment. The complaint was denied. While Appellant's appeal was pending (Tominsky I), the CEO issued a certificate of occupancy for one of the dwelling units. Appellant appealed the issuance of the certificate, but the Board voted not to hear the appeal. Appellant then filed a second complaint containing multiple counts against the Town and the LLC (Tominsky II). The superior court denied Appellant's appeal in Tominsky I and dismissed the appeal in Tominsky II. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in Tominsky I and affirmed the judgment in Tominksy II, holding (1) the appeal in Tominsky I before the Board was untimely; and (2) the appeal in Tominsky II failed to allege a viable claim for relief. View "Tominsky v. Town of Ogunquit" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of divorce entered by the district court as to the disposition of certain property and the dissolution of Cole G. Bridges Wild Blueberry LLC, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to order the dissolution of the LLC and erred in setting aside certain property to Cole Bridges.In 2020, Candy Littell filed for divorce from Bridges. The district court granted the divorce. On appeal, Bridges argued that the district court erred in evaluating and classifying a Cessna airplane and lacked jurisdiction to dissolve the LLC. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part and remanded the case, holding (1) the court did not have jurisdiction over the LLC and thus could not order its dissolution; and (2) the court erred in its classification and valuation of the Cessna airplane. View "Littell v. Bridges" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court answered a certified question as follows: no warranty is implied by the use of the term "Warranty Deed" to describe an instrument which "grants...real property with the buildings and improvements thereon...being the same premises conveyed to GRANTOR" by prior deed.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified to the Supreme Judicial Court the question of whether, under Maine law, any warranty was implied by use of the term "Warranty Deed" to describe the instrument at issue and, if so, which warranty or warranties were implied. The Supreme Judicial Court answered the question in the negative, concluding that no warranty was implied by the use of the term "Warranty Deed" to describe an instrument that "grants...real property with the buildings and improvements thereon...being the same premises conveyed to GRANTOR" by prior deed. View "Kneizys v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment entered by the superior court determining ownership and land use rights in intertidal land bordering Penobscot Bay, holding that the disputed land belonged to Jeffrey Mabee and Judith Grace under the plain language of the relevant deeds.Nordic Aquafarms Inc. negotiated an agreement with Richard and Janet Eckrote to bury industrial pipes in the intertidal land located between the Eckrotes' upland property and Penobscot Bay. During the ensuing trial, the City bought the Eckrotes' property and was granted intervenor status. Mabee and Grace jointly owned property near the Eckrotes' property and claimed that they owned not only the intertidal land abutting their own upland property but also the intertidal land abutting the upland properties of the Eckrotes. The superior court concluded that Mabee and Grace failed to establish title to the intertidal land abutting the Eckrotes' upland properties. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the governing deed conveying land did not include the intertidal land that was eventually conveyed to Mabee and Grace; and (2) Mabee and Grace held an enforceable servitude over the Eckrotes' upland. View "Mabee v. Nordic Aquafarms, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's action for breach of contract and awarding Defendant attorney fees, holding that the district court abused its discretion.The parties in this case formerly lived together at a Saco residence. When they closed on the property the parties entered a contract where, in exchange for Plaintiff assuming responsibility for the down payment, Defendant agreed to assume a greater share of other expenses. Defendant later moved out of the property and filed a partition action, denying the existence of a contract. Plaintiff brought this action alleging breach of contract. On the same day, Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate the parties' partition, and contract claims. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss and awarded her attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion by failing to consolidate the two actions; and (2) because Defendant never pleaded abatement, the district court erred in applying the remedy sua sponte. View "Indorf v. Keep" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the business and consumer docket entered in favor of Plaintiffs vacating the Bureau of Parks and Lands' lease of public reserved land to NECEC Transmission LLC and Central Maine Power Co. (CMP) for construction of a high-capacity transmission line, holding that the Bureau acted within its constitutional and statutory authority in granting the lease.CMP appealed and Plaintiffs cross-appealed the trial court's decision not to address the substantive question of whether the Bureau had the constitutional authority to lease to the public reserved land. Plaintiffs later moved to dismiss the appeals on the ground that a citizen's initiative rendered the appeals moot. The Supreme Judicial Court denied the motion to dismiss and vacated the judgment below, holding (1) retroactive application of section 1 of the Initiative did not violate the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, and therefore, the lease was not voided by the initiative; and (2) the record established that the Bureau acted within its constitutional and statutory authority in granting the lease. View "Black v. Bureau of Parks & Lands" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of foreclosure and order of sale entered by the district court in favor of Plaintiffs on their complaint for residential foreclosure, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish each statutory requirement for summary judgment of foreclosure as outlined in Me. R. Civ. P. 56(j).When a case is in the Foreclosure Division Program, as was the instant case, one statutory requirement that must be established by the movant is completion of mediation. On appeal, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs did not prove that mediation was completed, as required by statute, and that vacatur was required. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding that summary judgment was error because it was apparent from the court record that mediation had not been completed. View "Janusz v. Bacon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court affirming the order of the Saco River Corridor Commission denying Appellant's application to build a privacy fence along a portion of his property, holding that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record.The Commission denied Appellant's application on the grounds that a privacy fence along a portion of his property would unreasonably despoil the scenic, rural, and open space character of the Saco River Corridor. On appeal, Appellant argued (1) the Commission's "scenic view" rule, 94-412 C.M.R. ch. 103, 2(G)(3), is unconstitutionally void for vagueness and conflicts with the Saco River Corridor Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 38, 951-959; and (2) the Commission's decision to deny the permit was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the "scenic view" rule does not conflict with the Act, nor is it unconstitutionally void for vagueness; and (2) the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence. View "Ouellette v. Saco River Corridor Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Town of Boothbay Harbor's Board of Appeals (BOA) denying 29 McKown, LLC's administrative appeal from a code enforcement officer's (CEO) decision to life a stop work order he had issued to Harbor Crossing during the construction of the building, holding that 29 McKown was deprived of administrative due process.In this case concerning a real estate office building constructed by Harbor Crossing in Boothbay Harbor, 29 McKown sought review of the denial of its McKown's appeal. The superior court affirmed the BOA's decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order below, holding (1) 29 McKown was deprived of administrative due process; and (2) the CEO did not issue a judicially-reviewable decision in lifting the stop work order. View "29 McKown LLC v. Town of Boothbay Harbor" on Justia Law