Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In January 2012, after the death of John Gilbert, intestate probate proceedings were commenced. In November 2013, the probate court concluded that the relationship between Judith Gilbert, John’s widow, and Nathan Gilbert, John’s son from a prior relationship, had “risen to the level of causing concern” and ordered that it would supervise Judith’s distribution and settlement of the estate. In 2015, a court-appointed referee filed a report recommending a plan to distribute the estate. Judith objected to many of the report’s findings and recommendations. Nathan moved the court to adopt the report. The probate court did not hold a hearing regarding Judith’s objections and did not act on the report but, rather, continued to supervise Judith’s administration of the estate by entering orders. The Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded, holding that because the court had not held a hearing on Judith’s objections and acted on the report, the court erred by continuing to enter orders supervising the disposition of the estate. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Gilbert" on Justia Law

In 1997, Jeanne Reed died. In 2013, George Reed, Jeanne’s son, filed a petition for formal probate of his mother’s will. The county probate court denied the petition as time barred. In 2014, George and his brother, Lawrence, filed a petition for the partition of certain real property, the only remaining asset of their mother’s estate. The county probate court dismissed the petition, determining that it did not have subject matter to consider the petition because there was no open probate proceeding for Jeanne’s estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probate court correctly determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. View "In re Estate of Jeanne S. Reed" on Justia Law

Steven Lake murdered his wife, Amy, and their two children before committing suicide. George Lake, Steven’s father, was appointed as the personal representative of Steven’s Estate (“the Estate”). Thereafter, Ralph Bagley, Amy’s father and a personal representative of Amy’s estate, filed a creditors’ claim against the Estate, anticipating a wrongful death action on behalf of Amy’s estate against the Estate. Bagley then filed a demand for bond seeking a bond in the amount of $150,000. Nearly two years later, Bagley filed a petition to remove George as the personal representative, alleging that he should be removed because he failed to obtain a bond despite the earlier petition. The court entered an order requiring George to submit a personal surety bond in the amount of $75,000 within thirty days and denied Bagley’s petition for removal. Bagley subsequently filed a motion for contempt against George for failing to timely obtain the bond. The probate court granted the petition, removed George from his position as representative of the Estate, and awarded attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the probate court erred in proceeding on the motion for contempt because the motion did not satisfy the requirements of Me. R. Civ. P. 66. View "In re Estate of Steven L. Lake" on Justia Law

Fiduciary Trust Co. filed a complaint to determine the proper method of distributing the principal of a trust of which Manchester H. Wheeler Jr. was a beneficiary. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Fiduciary, concluding that the doctrine of res judicata did not control the construction of the disputed term of the trust. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Fiduciary because (1) res judicata did not preclude the application of paragraph 2 of the trust, which governed the distribution of principal upon the trust’s termination; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to the unambiguous terms of paragraph 2. View "Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

After almost five years of litigation, the probate court issued its final judgment in the formal testate proceeding concerning the estate of Mildred D. MacComb. James Richman appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected Richman’s brief and his amended brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. Richman asked that the Court reconsider the rejection of his amended brief and the dismissal of his appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court denied the motion for reconsideration, as Richman failed to comply with the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure and a direct order from the Court. View "In re Estate of MacComb" on Justia Law

Roland Gerrish created a trust consisting of certain property. The trust instrument provided that Julie and Shirley Gauthier would be the remainder beneficiaries upon Roland’s death. When Roland died, Shirley and Roland’s widow, Jacqueline, disputed the maintenance of property. Shirley filed a complaint for equitable partition against Jacqueline and the Gerrish Corporation and then requested an entry of default. The court issued default judgment and denied Jacqueline’s and the Corporation’s motion to join Julie as a necessary party. The superior court entered an order denying the motions to set aside the default and to join Julie, concluding that all necessary parties were joined, and granted the relief requested by Shirley. Jacqueline, the Corporation, and Julie appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred in concluding that all necessary parties were joined and in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before issuing the default judgment. Remanded. View "Gauthier v. Gerrish" on Justia Law

Thomas Cabatit was survived by two sons, Jerediah and Joseph, who were given equal shares of Thomas’s Estate after his death. In his will, Thomas designated his sister, Julibel, as the personal representative of his Estate. Julibel subsequently retained Steven Canders and Maine Legal Associates, P.A. (collectively, MLA) to represent her in probate of the Estate. Jerediah and Joseph later filed a petition to surcharge Julibel and remove her as personal representative, alleging mismanagement of the Estate. The probate court removed Julibel and designated Joseph as the successor personal representative. Thereafter, Joseph, in his capacities as a beneficiary and as the personal representative of the Estate, sued MLA, alleging that MLA breached duties it owed to the Estate and to Joseph as a beneficiary by giving Julibel improper advice. The superior court granted summary judgment for MLA, concluding that the scope of the attorney-client relationship did not include a duty to the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no attorney-client relationship existed between Joseph in his role as successor personal representative of the Estate and MLA; and (2) MLA did not owe a duty to Joseph as a nonclient. View "Estate of Cabatit v. Canders" on Justia Law

Margaret Gray died in 2007, leaving a will that devised her estate to her surviving children, Ernest Gray and Elizabeth Tasker. In 2011, Elizabeth filed a claim against the estate seeking reimbursement for payments she made to maintain her mother’s properties since 2007. The probate court ordered that the estate pay Elizabeth $45,419. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to apply 18-A Me. Rev. Stat. 3-803(b), the applicable statute of limitations. On remand, Elizabeth argued that the court should allow her claim against the estate based on a theory of unjust enrichment, which, she argued, would fall outside of the scope of the statute. The court concluded that Elizabeth’s claim was time-barred pursuant to section 3-803(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the time limitations established in section 3-803(b) for a claim against an estate apply to a claim for unjust enrichment, and therefore, Elizabeth’s claim was time-barred. View "In re Estate of Gray" on Justia Law

After Harold Forest Snow died, Linda Moulton, as personal representative, filed a civil action against Susan Snow, alleging that one of the transfers identified in Harold’s codicil was an improvident transfer and a product of undue influence. During discovery, the parties’ attorneys announced that they had settled the case. Neither side, however, would agree to sign the other’s proposed settlement documents. Linda subsequently filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The probate court granted Linda’s motion to enforce, finding that the record contained an “unequivocal stipulation by the parties’ attorneys that the matter was settled” and that the material terms of the agreement were clearly defined in the transcript. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was ample evidence that the parties intended to enter into an enforceable settlement agreement and that the terms placed on the record reflected all of the material terms of the contract; and (2) the probate court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to enforce the settlement agreement without holding a trial or an evidentiary hearing. View "In re Estate of Snow" on Justia Law

Ruth married Donald on the same day that she executed a will. Ruth died the following day. Donald was appointed personal representative, and the will was informally admitted to probate. Jennifer, Ruth’s daughter, filed a petition for a formal adjudication of intestacy and for her appointment as personal representative, alleging that Ruth lacked the capacity to execute the will. The probate court denied Jennifer’s petition and admitted the will to probate, concluding that Donald sustained his burden of showing due execution of the will and that Jennifer failed to prove the absence of testamentary capacity by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probate court did not err in its evidentiary rulings and did not err in finding that Ruth had the requisite testamentary capacity to execute a will. View "Estate of O'Brien-Hamel" on Justia Law