Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

21 Seabran, LLC applied for two permits necessary to renovate a garage on a lakefront parcel. The Town of Naples Code Enforcement Officer denied the permits, concluding that the parcel would have insufficient shore frontage to comply with state and local law. The Town of Naples Board of Appeals denied 21 Seabran’s appeal, concluding that the proposed renovation would add to the parcel a second “residential dwelling unit” for purposes of the Town of Naples Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, which would render the parcel noncompliant. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the Board’s determination that the proposed structure was a residential dwelling unit was erroneous; and (2) the Board’s conclusion that the parcel failed to comply with the minimum lot size law and rules was erroneous. View "21 Seabran, LLC v. Town of Naples" on Justia Law

Friends of the Motherhouse, a nonprofit corporation and two individuals (collectively, Friends) filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Portland City Council’s rezoning of a parcel owned by Sea Coast at Baxter Woods Associates, LLC and Motherhouse Associates LP (collectively, Sea Coast) was invalid. Sea Coast successfully moved to intervene and then moved for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Sea Coast. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its broad legislative authority, and therefore, the superior court did not err in finding that Sea Coast was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Friends of the Motherhouse v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The trust sought a building permit, to replace a dilapidated 1950s minesweeper deckhouse on the Owls Head property with a new, larger single-family residence. The existing structure is located partly within a 75-foot setback zone from the Atlantic Ocean; it contains a wetland of special significance that would necessitate a Maine Department of Environmental Protection permit before building. The new structure would be located partly within the setback zone, but farther from the ocean, with an addition lying completely outside of the setback zone and not encroaching on the wetland. The Planning Board approved the plan, finding that under the Town’s Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, "this is a nonconforming structure and it may be re-located, further away from the ocean, but not into the wetland ... to the greatest extent practical." The Board of Appeals reversed. The Superior Court agreed, finding the Board should not have considered the proposed addition before determining whether the relocation of the existing structure “conforms to all setback requirement[s] to the greatest practical extent.” The proper analysis would have been to first consider how the existing structure could be relocated to conform and to then consider whether an addition outside of the setback area could be constructed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court remanded, agreeing with the BOA and lower court, and finding that the Board applied the wrong ordinance section in considering the permit application. View "Osprey Family Trust v. Town of Owls Head." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court considered when a municipal agency’s decision constitutes a final action subject to immediate judicial review. The owner of the Camden Harbour Inn applied to the Town of Camden for authorization to increase the number of guest rooms and parking spaces for the Inn and to reduce the number of seats at the Inn’s restaurant. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) granted a special exception permit subject to conditions and allowed the Inn to proceed to the Planning Board for site plan review. Susan Bryant, an abutter, appealed the ZBA’s decision to the superior court before site plan review could occur. The superior court affirmed the ZBA’s decision. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for dismissal of Bryant’s complaint, holding that, while the Town’s Zoning Ordinance expressly provided for Bryant’s appeal from the grant of the preliminary special permit, the ZBA’s decision was not a final action subject to appellate review in the courts because additional process was required by the Town’s Ordinance before a final decision on the Inn’s proposed changes is reached. View "Bryant v. Town of Camden" on Justia Law

Carol Reece applied for a coastal sand dune permit to create a vehicle access way to her property abutting a beach and to develop and lawn and walkway on the property. The Department of Environmental Protection granted the permit. Abutting landowner Jonathan Day and others appealed. The Board of Environmental Protection reached a de novo decision granting Reece’s application. The superior court vacated the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court’s judgment, holding that the Board’s interpretations of its own ambiguous rules do not conflict with the relevant statutes or with the rules, and the rules do not compel at the interpretation reached by the superior court. Remanded for entry of a judgment affirming the Board’s decision to grant Reece the permit. View "Day v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged three City of Saco decisions issued in connection with the construction of a car dealership by WWS Properties, LLC. Specifically at issue were (1) the City Planning Board’s and the Zoning Board of Appeals’ (ZBA) conclusions that each lacked jurisdiction to review the City Planner’s grant of an amendment to WWS’s approved site plan, and (2) the ZBA’s determination that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s appeal of the certificate of occupancy issued to WWS. The superior court affirmed the decisions of the Planning Board and ZBA. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Plaintiff’s appeal of the City Planner’s approval of the site plan amendment was properly before the Planning Board, and therefore, the Planning Board erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction; and (2) the ZBA had jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s appeal of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, and the ZBA erred in refusing to exercise that jurisdiction. Remanded. View "Desfosses v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

In 1973, the City of South Portland issued a variance to Kay Loring that brought her parcel of land, which was previously nonconforming, into dimensional conformity. For purposes of land use regulation, Loring’s 4,703 square foot lot became the equivalent of a conforming 5,000 square foot lot. In 2013, the City’s Building Inspector issued a building permit based on the 1973 variance that authorized Loring to construct a single-family house on her lot. Mary Campbell and others (collectively, Campbell), who owned nearby lots, appealed the issuance of the permit. The South Portland Board of Appeals affirmed the Building Inspector’s action, and the superior court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the 1973 variance was still in force when the building permit was issued, and the Building Inspector was authorized to act on Loring’s permit application; and (2) Campbell did not preserve her argument for municipal or judicial review that the building permit was not lawful because the proposed development would exceed the density restrictions for that zoning district. View "Campbell v. City of S. Portland" on Justia Law

George Stanley filed a complaint against the Town of Greene alleging that the Town was interfering with his flea market business on his property by denying him a license. The Town counterclaimed against Stanley, seeking injunctive relief and fines for Stanley’s continued operation of his unlicensed flea market in violation of a town Ordinance. The superior court ultimately granted the Town’s motions to dismiss Stanley’s complaint for for default judgment on its counterclaim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Stanley’s motion for a temporary restraining order; (2) denying Stanley’s motions to set aside the default or for relief from default judgment; (3) denying Stanley’s motion to continue; and (4) denying Stanley’s motion for reconsideration. View "Stanley v. Town of Greene" on Justia Law

Donald Paradis applied for and obtained a building permit to construct a two-car garage on property in the Town of Peru. After Paradis constructed the garage, the Town sent Paradis a notice of violation, stating that the garage violated multiple ordinance provisions. The Board of Appeals concluded that the appeal was properly denied. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the Board of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Paradis’s appeal, which deprived the courts of jurisdiction to consider it, as the notice of violation was not an appealable decision. Remanded. View "Paradis v. Town of Peru" on Justia Law

Wayne Perkins applied to the Ogunquit Planning Board seeking site plan review and design review approval to convert his garage into a lobster pound. The Board approved Perkins’s application without requiring Perkins to comply with certain mandatory provisions in the Ogunquit Zoning Ordinance and without making necessary factual findings. The Hartwells, abutting landowners, sought judicial review. The superior court vacated the Board’s approval of Perkins’s site plan review application. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not have the power to waive any of the mandatory provisions of the Ordinance in this case; and (2) there were inadequate factual findings from the Board regarding Perkins’s use of the property, and therefore, the cause must be remanded for further factual findings regarding the lobster pound’s proper use classification. View "Hartwell v. Town of Ogunquit" on Justia Law