Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Carol Reece applied for a coastal sand dune permit to create a vehicle access way to her property abutting a beach and to develop and lawn and walkway on the property. The Department of Environmental Protection granted the permit. Abutting landowner Jonathan Day and others appealed. The Board of Environmental Protection reached a de novo decision granting Reece’s application. The superior court vacated the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court’s judgment, holding that the Board’s interpretations of its own ambiguous rules do not conflict with the relevant statutes or with the rules, and the rules do not compel at the interpretation reached by the superior court. Remanded for entry of a judgment affirming the Board’s decision to grant Reece the permit. View "Day v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged three City of Saco decisions issued in connection with the construction of a car dealership by WWS Properties, LLC. Specifically at issue were (1) the City Planning Board’s and the Zoning Board of Appeals’ (ZBA) conclusions that each lacked jurisdiction to review the City Planner’s grant of an amendment to WWS’s approved site plan, and (2) the ZBA’s determination that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s appeal of the certificate of occupancy issued to WWS. The superior court affirmed the decisions of the Planning Board and ZBA. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Plaintiff’s appeal of the City Planner’s approval of the site plan amendment was properly before the Planning Board, and therefore, the Planning Board erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction; and (2) the ZBA had jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s appeal of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, and the ZBA erred in refusing to exercise that jurisdiction. Remanded. View "Desfosses v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

In 1973, the City of South Portland issued a variance to Kay Loring that brought her parcel of land, which was previously nonconforming, into dimensional conformity. For purposes of land use regulation, Loring’s 4,703 square foot lot became the equivalent of a conforming 5,000 square foot lot. In 2013, the City’s Building Inspector issued a building permit based on the 1973 variance that authorized Loring to construct a single-family house on her lot. Mary Campbell and others (collectively, Campbell), who owned nearby lots, appealed the issuance of the permit. The South Portland Board of Appeals affirmed the Building Inspector’s action, and the superior court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the 1973 variance was still in force when the building permit was issued, and the Building Inspector was authorized to act on Loring’s permit application; and (2) Campbell did not preserve her argument for municipal or judicial review that the building permit was not lawful because the proposed development would exceed the density restrictions for that zoning district. View "Campbell v. City of S. Portland" on Justia Law

George Stanley filed a complaint against the Town of Greene alleging that the Town was interfering with his flea market business on his property by denying him a license. The Town counterclaimed against Stanley, seeking injunctive relief and fines for Stanley’s continued operation of his unlicensed flea market in violation of a town Ordinance. The superior court ultimately granted the Town’s motions to dismiss Stanley’s complaint for for default judgment on its counterclaim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Stanley’s motion for a temporary restraining order; (2) denying Stanley’s motions to set aside the default or for relief from default judgment; (3) denying Stanley’s motion to continue; and (4) denying Stanley’s motion for reconsideration. View "Stanley v. Town of Greene" on Justia Law

Donald Paradis applied for and obtained a building permit to construct a two-car garage on property in the Town of Peru. After Paradis constructed the garage, the Town sent Paradis a notice of violation, stating that the garage violated multiple ordinance provisions. The Board of Appeals concluded that the appeal was properly denied. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the Board of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Paradis’s appeal, which deprived the courts of jurisdiction to consider it, as the notice of violation was not an appealable decision. Remanded. View "Paradis v. Town of Peru" on Justia Law

Wayne Perkins applied to the Ogunquit Planning Board seeking site plan review and design review approval to convert his garage into a lobster pound. The Board approved Perkins’s application without requiring Perkins to comply with certain mandatory provisions in the Ogunquit Zoning Ordinance and without making necessary factual findings. The Hartwells, abutting landowners, sought judicial review. The superior court vacated the Board’s approval of Perkins’s site plan review application. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not have the power to waive any of the mandatory provisions of the Ordinance in this case; and (2) there were inadequate factual findings from the Board regarding Perkins’s use of the property, and therefore, the cause must be remanded for further factual findings regarding the lobster pound’s proper use classification. View "Hartwell v. Town of Ogunquit" on Justia Law

The Town of Starks Planning Board approved an application for site plan approval to build and operate a cellular telephone tower in Starks. Harry and Cindy Brown appealed the decision. The Town of Starks Board of Appeals (SBA) denied the Browns’ appeal after determining that it was limited to reviewing the Planning Board’s decision in an appellate capacity. The Browns appealed the SBA’s decision to the superior court, arguing for the first time that the SBA should have reviewed the Planning Board’s decision de novo. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the Browns failed to challenge the SBA’s standard of review determination at the municipal level, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. View "Brown v. Town of Starks" on Justia Law

Wayne and Michelle McClellan applied for a conditional use permit to build a disc-golf course in the City of Saco on property abutting a campground owned by Fred Fitanides. The Saco Planning Board voted to grant conditional approval for the project and issued the conditional use permits. The Saco Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the Planning Board issued the permits in compliance with the City of Saco Zoning Ordinance; and (2) Fitanides was not prejudiced by any procedural irregularities in the administrative process. View "Fitanides v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was two adjacent beachfront lots - lot 113 and lot 114. In 1989, as a result of a merger clause in a zoning ordnance, the lots were merged into a single, nonconforming, grandfathered lot. Despite the merger clause’s prohibition of any separation of a merged lot that would result in an area that did not meet minimum lot-size requirements, the owner separated the lots and conveyed them to two different individuals. Carol Reece acquired lot 113. In 2013, Plaintiff, who owned property abutting lot 113, sought a declaratory judgment that lot 113 was not a grandfathered nonconforming lot. Reece subsequently acquired lot 114. The superior court granted summary judgment for Reece. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Reece’s recombination of lots 113 and 114 did not effect a resurrection of the grandfathered status that the lots had when they were previously merged. View "Day v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law

In May 2010, the Bar Harbor Appeals Board issued two decisions requiring the Bar Harbor Planning Board to approve a site plan for construction of a hotel on land abutting land owned by the Witham Family Limited Partnership in Bar Harbor. Witham filed a complaint challenging both decisions. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s judgment dismissing the complaint and remanded. Also in May 2010, on remand from the Appeals Board, the Planning Board issued a decision containing new findings and approving of the proposed site plan. No appeal was taken from this decision. In May 2012, the Planning Board approved of an amended site plan. Witham did not appeal from the May 2012 decision or the issuance of any building permits or other permits. In October 2013, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Business and Consumer Docket justice affirmed the Planning Board’s determinations. Witham appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot because Witham did not appeal from the Planning Board’s May 2010 decision approving the proposed site plan or the Planning Board’s May 2012 approval of an amended site plan and because the hotel was now fully operational. View "Witham Family Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law