Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Town of Starks Planning Board approved an application for site plan approval to build and operate a cellular telephone tower in Starks. Harry and Cindy Brown appealed the decision. The Town of Starks Board of Appeals (SBA) denied the Browns’ appeal after determining that it was limited to reviewing the Planning Board’s decision in an appellate capacity. The Browns appealed the SBA’s decision to the superior court, arguing for the first time that the SBA should have reviewed the Planning Board’s decision de novo. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the Browns failed to challenge the SBA’s standard of review determination at the municipal level, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. View "Brown v. Town of Starks" on Justia Law

Wayne and Michelle McClellan applied for a conditional use permit to build a disc-golf course in the City of Saco on property abutting a campground owned by Fred Fitanides. The Saco Planning Board voted to grant conditional approval for the project and issued the conditional use permits. The Saco Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the Planning Board issued the permits in compliance with the City of Saco Zoning Ordinance; and (2) Fitanides was not prejudiced by any procedural irregularities in the administrative process. View "Fitanides v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was two adjacent beachfront lots - lot 113 and lot 114. In 1989, as a result of a merger clause in a zoning ordnance, the lots were merged into a single, nonconforming, grandfathered lot. Despite the merger clause’s prohibition of any separation of a merged lot that would result in an area that did not meet minimum lot-size requirements, the owner separated the lots and conveyed them to two different individuals. Carol Reece acquired lot 113. In 2013, Plaintiff, who owned property abutting lot 113, sought a declaratory judgment that lot 113 was not a grandfathered nonconforming lot. Reece subsequently acquired lot 114. The superior court granted summary judgment for Reece. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Reece’s recombination of lots 113 and 114 did not effect a resurrection of the grandfathered status that the lots had when they were previously merged. View "Day v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law

In May 2010, the Bar Harbor Appeals Board issued two decisions requiring the Bar Harbor Planning Board to approve a site plan for construction of a hotel on land abutting land owned by the Witham Family Limited Partnership in Bar Harbor. Witham filed a complaint challenging both decisions. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s judgment dismissing the complaint and remanded. Also in May 2010, on remand from the Appeals Board, the Planning Board issued a decision containing new findings and approving of the proposed site plan. No appeal was taken from this decision. In May 2012, the Planning Board approved of an amended site plan. Witham did not appeal from the May 2012 decision or the issuance of any building permits or other permits. In October 2013, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Business and Consumer Docket justice affirmed the Planning Board’s determinations. Witham appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot because Witham did not appeal from the Planning Board’s May 2010 decision approving the proposed site plan or the Planning Board’s May 2012 approval of an amended site plan and because the hotel was now fully operational. View "Witham Family Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

Pisgah Mountain, LLC applied to the Town of Clifton Planning Board for approval to construct and operate a wind energy project. Peter and Julie Beckford, who own land adjacent to the proposed development site, timely appealed the Board’s decision to the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA). The ZBA denied the appeal. Thereafter, the Beckfords filed a complaint in superior court pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B. Pisgah and the Town moved to dismiss the Beckfords’ complaint on the ground that it was filed outside of the forty-five-day appeal period. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the forty-five-day appeal period started when the ZBA issued its written findings and decision and not on the day the ZBA voted to deny the appeal. The court then vacated the Board’s decision to approve the permit. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the statutory appeal period commenced with the ZBA’s public vote, and therefore, the Beckfords’ Rule 80B appeal was untimely filed. View "Beckford v. Town of Clifton" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Town of Arundel reissued a conditional use permit to Dubois Livestock, Inc. In 2012, the Town’s code enforcement officer issued to Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) upheld the code enforcement officer’s notice of violation because Dubois admitted to violating the conditions of the 2011 permit. Dubois appealed, arguing that the Town did not have the authority to regulate Dubois’s operation because the Town of Arundel Land Use Ordinance was preempted by state law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state law does not preempt the Ordinance, and therefore, the Town’s action taken pursuant to the Ordinance in issuing Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit was not ultra vires or beyond the Town’s jurisdiction. View "Dubois Livestock, Inc. v. Town of Arundel" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska filed an amended land use citation and complaint against Richard and Ann Cayer for violations of a shoreland zoning ordinance. The Cayers filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the land use citation was a retaliatory effort by the Town to punish them for exercising their right to petition local government. The trial court denied the special motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, except possibly in extraordinary circumstances not presented in this case, the anti-SLAPP statute cannot be invoked to thwart a local government enforcement action commenced to address the defendants’ alleged violations of law. View "Town of Madawaska v. Cayer" on Justia Law

32 Thomas Street, LLC applied to the Portland City Council for conditional rezoning of its property in Portland’s West End. The City Council ultimately approved the conditional zoning agreement (CZA) for the reuse and rehabilitation of the property. The superior court determined that the rezoning did not comply with the City’s comprehensive plan and state statutes limiting conditional rezoning. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with direction to affirm the decision of the City Council, holding that the record before the City Council supported its legislative determination that the CZA was consistent with the comprehensive plan and therefore did not violate relevant state statutes. View "Remmel v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Bangor Planning Board approved Harvey Sprague’s application to open and operate a quarry in Bangor’s rural residence and agricultural district. Sharon Cassidy sought judicial review of the Board’s decision, listing as one of the grounds for her appeal the Board’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law to accompany its approval letter. The superior court accepted the findings of the Board retroactively and granted Cassidy forty days to consider the findings and file an amended brief in support of her appeal. Cassidy then filed this appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because it was interlocutory and did not fall within any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule.View "Cassidy v. City of Bangor" on Justia Law

Pike Industries operated a quarry in the City of Westbrook. Smiling Hill Farm owned property and operated businesses near Pike’s quarry. After the City concluded that Pike did not have a grandfathered right to quarry and attempted to rezone the property and end Pike’s quarrying operations, Pike filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the City from enforcing its zoning ordinances. The City and Pike subsequently entered into a consent decree that allowed Pike to continue its quarrying operations subject and established a set of governing performance standards. Smiling Hill appealed. In Pike I, the Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the parties to formalize the performance standards. The parties then entered into a second consent decree. Smiling Hill appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decree conformed to the requirements laid out in Pike I; and (2) the decree did not result in a forfeiture of the City’s enforcement power or an illegal contract zone. View "Pike Indus., Inc. v. City of Westbrook" on Justia Law