Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pisgah Mountain, LLC applied to the Town of Clifton Planning Board for approval to construct and operate a wind energy project. Peter and Julie Beckford, who own land adjacent to the proposed development site, timely appealed the Board’s decision to the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA). The ZBA denied the appeal. Thereafter, the Beckfords filed a complaint in superior court pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B. Pisgah and the Town moved to dismiss the Beckfords’ complaint on the ground that it was filed outside of the forty-five-day appeal period. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the forty-five-day appeal period started when the ZBA issued its written findings and decision and not on the day the ZBA voted to deny the appeal. The court then vacated the Board’s decision to approve the permit. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the statutory appeal period commenced with the ZBA’s public vote, and therefore, the Beckfords’ Rule 80B appeal was untimely filed. View "Beckford v. Town of Clifton" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Town of Arundel reissued a conditional use permit to Dubois Livestock, Inc. In 2012, the Town’s code enforcement officer issued to Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) upheld the code enforcement officer’s notice of violation because Dubois admitted to violating the conditions of the 2011 permit. Dubois appealed, arguing that the Town did not have the authority to regulate Dubois’s operation because the Town of Arundel Land Use Ordinance was preempted by state law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state law does not preempt the Ordinance, and therefore, the Town’s action taken pursuant to the Ordinance in issuing Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit was not ultra vires or beyond the Town’s jurisdiction. View "Dubois Livestock, Inc. v. Town of Arundel" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska filed an amended land use citation and complaint against Richard and Ann Cayer for violations of a shoreland zoning ordinance. The Cayers filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the land use citation was a retaliatory effort by the Town to punish them for exercising their right to petition local government. The trial court denied the special motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, except possibly in extraordinary circumstances not presented in this case, the anti-SLAPP statute cannot be invoked to thwart a local government enforcement action commenced to address the defendants’ alleged violations of law. View "Town of Madawaska v. Cayer" on Justia Law

32 Thomas Street, LLC applied to the Portland City Council for conditional rezoning of its property in Portland’s West End. The City Council ultimately approved the conditional zoning agreement (CZA) for the reuse and rehabilitation of the property. The superior court determined that the rezoning did not comply with the City’s comprehensive plan and state statutes limiting conditional rezoning. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with direction to affirm the decision of the City Council, holding that the record before the City Council supported its legislative determination that the CZA was consistent with the comprehensive plan and therefore did not violate relevant state statutes. View "Remmel v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Bangor Planning Board approved Harvey Sprague’s application to open and operate a quarry in Bangor’s rural residence and agricultural district. Sharon Cassidy sought judicial review of the Board’s decision, listing as one of the grounds for her appeal the Board’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law to accompany its approval letter. The superior court accepted the findings of the Board retroactively and granted Cassidy forty days to consider the findings and file an amended brief in support of her appeal. Cassidy then filed this appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because it was interlocutory and did not fall within any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule.View "Cassidy v. City of Bangor" on Justia Law

Pike Industries operated a quarry in the City of Westbrook. Smiling Hill Farm owned property and operated businesses near Pike’s quarry. After the City concluded that Pike did not have a grandfathered right to quarry and attempted to rezone the property and end Pike’s quarrying operations, Pike filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the City from enforcing its zoning ordinances. The City and Pike subsequently entered into a consent decree that allowed Pike to continue its quarrying operations subject and established a set of governing performance standards. Smiling Hill appealed. In Pike I, the Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the parties to formalize the performance standards. The parties then entered into a second consent decree. Smiling Hill appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decree conformed to the requirements laid out in Pike I; and (2) the decree did not result in a forfeiture of the City’s enforcement power or an illegal contract zone. View "Pike Indus., Inc. v. City of Westbrook" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned property near but not on Sebago Lake. Defendants owned shorefront property on the lake. Through their deeds, Plaintiffs acquired an easement consisting of a right-of-way over lot 40A, a strip of land situated between Defendants' lots. In 2007, the lot was conveyed to Defendants. Before the conveyance, Plaintiffs obtained a permit for the construction of a dock extending from the lot to the lake. In 2010, the Town's code enforcement officer rescinded the permit and ordered the dock to be removed. The Town's zoning board upheld the enforcement officer's decision. Plaintiffs filed suit, challenging the zoning board's decision and Defendants' fee simple title to the lot and seeking a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to maintain a dock on the lot. Ultimately, the superior court found Defendants held fee simple title to the lot and that the easement held by Plaintiffs did not grant them a right to maintain the dock. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the deed in Defendants' chains of title unambiguously excepted the lot from a prior conveyance and that deeds in Plaintiffs' chains of title were ambiguous as to whether the dock was allowed. Remanded. View "Sleeper v. Loring" on Justia Law

Shellie and Robert Symonds executed a lease agreement granting AT&T Mobility the right to use a portion of their property to build a wireless communication tower. The town planning board approved AT&T's application seeking approval for the project. William Horton and others appealed, and the town zoning board of appeals (ZBA) upheld the planning board's approval of AT&T's application. Horton appealed, arguing that the lease agreement created a new lot that did not meet the minimum space and setback requirements of the town's zoning ordinances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lease did not create a new lot and that the setback requirements of the relevant zoning ordinance were satisfied. View "Horton v. Town of Casco" on Justia Law

The district court ordered Defendant to pay a civil penalty and attorney fees and to remove three unregistered, uninspected vehicles from his property after finding that he maintained an automobile graveyard on his property in violation of Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 3753. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not misconstrue the applicable law in determining that the vehicles on Defendant's property did not meet the definition of "antique auto"; (2) did not clearly err in finding that one of the vehicles on Defendant's property was not a tractor used solely for logging purposes; (3) did not err by accepting Defendant's interrogatory answers into evidence and finding that his truck was an "altered vehicle"; and (4) did not abuse its discretion in declining to award additional attorney fees to the Town of China. View "Town of China v. Althenn" on Justia Law

The City Council authorized the City Manager to sell a parcel of oceanfront property known as "the Boat School." Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the sale agreement was invalid due to the City's failure to advertise in accordance with its charter, and moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent the sale of the property. Defendants counterclaimed against Plaintiffs for slander of title and tortious interference with a contract. Plaintiffs filed a special motion to dismiss the counterclaims of Defendants pursuant to Maine's anti-SLAPP statute because Defendants' counterclaims were based on Plaintiffs' petitioning activity. The district court (1) declined to address the merits of Plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss because it was filed after the sixty-day period provided by the statute; (2) granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' complaint; (3) granted in part and denied in part summary judgment for Plaintiffs on Defendants' counterclaims. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the merits of Plaintiffs' untimely special motion. View "Bradbury v. City of Eastport" on Justia Law