Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to Skyler, Rosalee, and Austin, and Father’s parental rights to Rosalee and Austin pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (ii). The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents were unable to take responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs, that they were unable to protect the children from jeopardy and that those circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs, and that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that termination of Parents’ parental rights, with a permanency plan of adoption, was in each child’s best interest. View "In re Skyler F." on Justia Law

Arthur Murdock, a police officer, was attempting to cut across two eastbound lanes of traffic and into a parking lot when his police cruiser was struck by another vehicle traveling in the outside eastbound lane from behind where Martin Thorne’s car was stopped in traffic. Murdock filed a four-count complaint alleging, as relevant to this appeal, negligence claims against Thorne and underinsured motorist (UM) claims against his employer, the Maine department of Public Safety (DPS). The superior court granted summary judgment for DPS and Thorne. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because Murdock failed to make a prima facie showing that Thorne’s “wave-on” gesture was the proximate cause of his injuries, Thorne was entitled to summary judgment on Murdock’s negligence claim; and (2) because Murdock’s UM claim against DPS was predicated upon his negligence claim against Thorne, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of DPS. View "Murdock v. Thorne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2) and the denial of Father’s motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. On appeal, Father argued that the court deprived him of due process by terminating his parental rights even though he was not present at the final termination hearing and by failing to grant his motion for a new trial or provide him with an alternative opportunity to be heard when he later told the court that he had not attended the hearing due to transportation problems. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Father’s failure to explain how his participation in the trial would have affected the court’s determinations that he was parentally unfit and that termination was in the child’s best interest, and therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Father’s motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. View "In re Kaylianna C." on Justia Law

The district court did not err in finding jeopardy as to both Mother and Father and ordering that Child be placed in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4036(1)(F). The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that as to both parents, Child was in circumstances of jeopardy to her health and welfare. Mother did not challenge the finding of jeopardy as to her. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a dispositional order of custody is not appealable; and (2) the court’s finding that Child was more likely than not in circumstances of jeopardy in Father’s care was supported by competent record evidence. View "In re Kaliyah B." on Justia Law

The district court did not err in terminating Parents’ parental rights to their child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(B)(2). Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the district court’s factual findings that Parents were unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and those circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs were supported by competent evidence in the record and were therefore not clearly erroneous. In regard to Mother, it was not a violation of due process for the court to make an explicit finding concerning her parental unfitness in an amended order without first holding a new hearing because Mother fully participated in the hearing from which the facts underlying the court’s legal judgment were derived. View "In re Gabriel W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court declaring the ownership of and easement rights to certain property on Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that he owned title to certain lakefront property and that any easement rights Defendants once may have had to that property had been extinguished. The superior court concluded that, except for a limited area where a structure had been built, Defendants’ express easement to the property had not been extinguished where Plaintiff failed to prove Defendants’ abandonment of the easement and where Plaintiff failed to establish that he possessed the easement “under a claim of right.” The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the lower court, holding that Defendants’ express easement to the property had not been extinguished either by abandonment or by adverse possession. View "Dupuis v. Ellingwood" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the probate court denying Carol A. Boardman’s petition for a name change, holding that a person’s potential misunderstanding of another person’s marital status, without more, does not qualify as fraud that would preclude the grant of a name change petition. Boardman sought to change her name to “Currier,” which was the last name of her friend. The court denied the petition, concluding that the potential effect of the name change would be to give the public the impression she and her friend were a married couple, thus demonstrating a purpose of “defrauding another person or entity.” Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 1-701(f). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that Boardman met all the requirements for the change of her last name imposed by section 1-701. View "In re Carol A. Boardman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her children, Mackenzie P. and Antonio P. pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1), (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii). Specifically, the court held (1) given the findings, were were supported by competent evidence in the record, the district court did not err in finding at least one ground of parental unfitness and in determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights with a permanency plan of adoption was in the children’s best interests; and (2) because the court acted at Mother’s request to prevent any prejudice by excluding the testimony of a guardian ad litem at the termination hearing. View "In re Mackenzie P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to Lacie G. and Tyler S. pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2). Specifically, the court held (1) given the findings, which were supported by competent evidence in the record, the district court did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one ground of parental unfitness; and (2) the court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of Tyler and Lacie. View "In re Lacie G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a judgment entered in the district court ordering Plaintiff to pay Defendant’s legal fees and costs after dismissal of Plaintiff’s foreclosure action against Defendant with prejudice. The court held (1) the district court did not err when it concluded that it had the authority to award Defendant attorney fees and costs pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6101, and Plaintiff did not preserve for appeal its argument that it was not “the mortgagee” according to section 6101 and therefore that the statute could not apply; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in setting the amount of fees owed and by including in the attorney fees award fees Defendant incurred pursuing an appeal. View "Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Gregor" on Justia Law