Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of murder and one count of arson. The jury also found Defendant’s co-defendant guilty of three counts of murder and one count of arson. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err when it instructed the jury on the defense of duress for the arson charge only and not for the murder counts; (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for relief from prejudicial joinder with his co-defendant; (3) did not abuse its discretion when it permitted a witness to testify about guns she observed in a motel room during a meeting with Defendant and his co-defendant; (4) did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion to suppress cell phone records used to locate Defendant; and (5) did not err when it allowed testimony that insinuated Defendant “harmed people over drug debts.” View "State v. Sexton" on Justia Law

Amy Canney’s minor child, Nicholai, was bitten by a dog kept by Eric Burns, a neighbor who performed on-call maintenance work on properties owned by Strathglass Holdings, Inc. Canney filed a complaint on behalf of Nicholai against Strathglass, claiming that Burns was at all pertinent times the agent, servant or employee of Strathglass and was maintaining the property for the benefit of Strathglass. The superior court granted summary judgment for Strathglass, concluding that Burns was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the dog bite. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) neither Burns’s acts or omissions nor Nicholai’s presence on his premises were related to Burns’s employment or agency with Strathglass, and therefore, summary judgment on Canney’s respondent superior claims was proper; and (2) Canney’s complaint failed to allege a theory of direct liability against Strathglass, and she offered no evidence that would support a direct claim of negligence against Strathglass. View "Canney v. Strathglass Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of manslaughter. The court sentenced Defendant to twelve years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to establish that his actions were voluntary and met the statutory definition of criminal negligence. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the court’s express finding that Defendant acted in a way that meets the definition of culpable negligence was supported by competent evidence in the record; and (2) the trial court found all the facts necessary to support its judgment given that those inferred findings were supported by evidence in the record. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Edward Harshman instituted divorce proceedings against Sheila Harshman. Sheila counterclaimed for divorce. The court (1) adopted the parties’ agreement as to parental rights and contact, therefore awarding Sheila sole parental rights to the parties’ children; (2) divided the parties’ assets and debts; and (3) calculated Edward’s child support and spousal support obligations. Edward appealed from the divorce judgment, challenging the court’s exclusion of certain evidence at trial and the court’s calculation of the parties’ respective incomes for child support and spousal support purposes. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the court’s exclusion of the evidence and in calculating each spouses’ income. View "Harshman v. Harshman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of fourteen criminal offenses, including four counts of aggravated attempted murder. The trial court imposed multiple life sentences in addition to multiple lesser sentences, all to be served concurrently. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction review, asserting several grounds for relief, including ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The court denied the petition, concluding that no error by appellate counsel was sufficiently prejudicial to justify any relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief under Strickland v. Washington. View "Fortune v. State" on Justia Law

Mother and Father, who were never married, were the parents of two minor children. Mother filed a complaint seeking a determination of parental rights and responsibilities. The court ultimately awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities and primary residence to Mother with rights of contact to Father. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not commit clear error in its factual findings or abuse its discretion in its ultimate conclusion; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Father to participate in a psychological examination before having any contact with his children. View "Vibert v. Dimoulas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of gross sexual assault, two counts of aggravated assault, and other charges. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court (1) did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial by denying his motion for sanctions and a continuance based on the State’s late disclosure of the victim’s medical records; (2) did not violate Defendant’s right of confrontation when it admitted a recorded interview of the victim; and (3) did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial by precluding him from calling two late disclosed witnesses not included on the witness list described to the jury. View "State v. Gagne" on Justia Law

Three individuals were passengers in a vehicle driven by Kristina Lowe. Lowe negligently caused the vehicle to crash, and Rebecca Mason and Logan Dam died from injuries they sustained. At the time of the accident, Lowe was a resident at the home of her mother, Melissa Stanley. Stanley had a personal auto insurance policy issued by Amica that provided for $300,000 in liability coverage. The Estates brought wrongful death actions against Lowe, and the parties stipulated to the entry of judgments against Lowe in favor of the Estates in the amount of one million dollars. The Estates then filed reach-and-apply actions against Amica seeking to apply insurance money from Stanley’s policy to the judgments against Lowe. The superior court concluded that the Estates could not reach and apply insurance money from Stanley’s policy toward satisfaction of the judgments against Lowe because the “regular use” exclusion in the policy applied to preclude coverage for Lowe’s negligent use of the car. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the regular use exclusion in Stanley’s policy applied to preclude coverage in this case. View "Estate of Mason v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2014, the City Council of South Portland enacted an ordinance prohibiting the bulk loading of cure oil on marine tank vessels in South Portland. In 2015, the Portland Pipeline Corporation and American Waterways Operators (PPLC) sued the City of South Portland and its Code Enforcement Officer in federal court, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The complaint requested only nonmonetary relief. The City notified the Maine Municipal Association Property & Casualty Pool (Pool), which provides liability coverage to the City and its public officials, of the lawsuit and requested a defense, which the Pool declined to provide. The City then brought this action alleging breach of the duty to defend. The superior court granted summary judgment for the Pool, concluding that the Pool had no duty to defend because the complaint requested only declaratory and injunctive relief, not damages, and therefore, there was no potential that the City could be liable for damages within the scope of coverage. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that the Pool had no duty to defend because any potential damages would be excluded from coverage. View "City of South Portland v. Maine Municipal Association Property & Casualty Pool" on Justia Law

Aleshia Diviney was injured when she slipped and fell on ice outside of her dormitory, located on the University of Southern Maine (USM) Gorham campus. Diviney filed a complaint alleging premises liability against USM, the University of Maine System (UMS), and the State. UMS moved for summary judgment, asserting untimely notice. The superior court granted summary judgment for UMS, concluding that Diviney did not file notice satisfying the statutory requirements until after the 180-day deadline had passed and that Diviney could not show “good cause” to excuse her failure to timely file notice. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the grant of summary judgment was proper because the question of “good cause” did not present genuine issues of material fact, and the court properly applied the language of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 8107 to the facts in the record. View "Diviney v. University of Maine System" on Justia Law