Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, a divorce decree issued pursuant to the agreement of Husband and Wife requiring Husband to pay Wife monthly spousal support of $3,000 until he turned sixty years old. Federal law went into effect shortly before the entry of the divorce judgment, pursuant to which Husband’s mandatory retirement age increased from age sixty to sixty-five. Husband continued working after turning sixty. Wife filed a motion to modify spousal support, arguing that, at the time the divorce judgment was entered, she expected that Husband would not work beyond age sixty. The district court granted the motion based on its determination that the modification was warranted by a substantial change in circumstances after the divorce decree was issued. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the spousal support provisions of the divorce judgment so as to maintain the previous amount of Husband’s spousal support obligation until he turns sixty-five years old. View "Savage v. Savage" on Justia Law

After acquiring a parcel of oceanfront property, Osprey Landing, LLC purchased a title insurance policy from First American Title Insurance Company. In connection with litigation with neighboring landowners, the subject property’s previous owner executed affidavits and a deposition that Osprey claimed created the risk of a future public prescriptive easement claim adverse to Osprey’s title. Osprey sent a request to First American invoking title insurance coverage asking First American to take some action to either perfect osprey’s title or compensate Osprey for this perceived title defect. First American declined, and Osprey filed suit to enforce First American’s purported duty to defend and indemnify Osprey. The superior court granted First American’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Miller’s statements did not create a “triggering event” requiring First American to take any action, and no obligation was imposed on First American under these circumstances to preemptively indemnify Osprey. View "Osprey Landing, LLC v. First American Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Two days after the birth of Child, the district court granted a preliminary protection order as against both Mother and Father, and Child was placed in foster care. The Department of Health and Human Services later filed a petition for termination of parental rights. After a contested hearing on the petition as to Mother, the court issued a judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights, finding that Mother was unable to protect Child from jeopardy and was unable to take responsibility for him and would not be able to do either within a time reasonably calculated to meet his needs. The court further found that termination was in Child’s best interest. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court’s findings and ultimate best interest determination were supported by the record and did not reflect an abuse of discretion. View "In re Kenneth S." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with operating under the influence. After a trial, the court concluded that the jury was genuinely deadlocked and sua sponte declared a mistrial due to manifest necessity. Defendant then moved to dismiss the criminal complaint against him on double jeopardy grounds and on the grounds that the prosecutor had committed misconduct. The court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions did not bar a second prosecution and that there had been no prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial due to a genuinely deadlocked jury; and (2) Defendant’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were unfounded. View "State v. Jandreau" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Defendant conceded that he had committed the offense of operating a vehicle with an expired registration. The trial court trial court adjudicated Defendant to have committed the traffic infraction of failing to register his vehicle for a period of between thirty and 150 days after his previous registration had expired. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s request for a jury trial; and (2) there was no error in the trial court’s handling of Defendant’s various requests for accommodation for his claimed disabilities. View "State v. Chase" on Justia Law

David Bordetsky filed a complaint for foreclosure against JAK Realty Trust, alleging that Gregory O’Halloran, as trustee of the Trust, executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage on property located in Benton and that the Trust had defaulted on the note. After a nonjury trial, the court issued a judgment in favor of the Trust, concluding that Bordetsky was required to, but did not, comply with the requirements for a notice of default and right to cure contained in Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the requirements for a notice of default and right to cure contained in section 6111 did not apply to Bordetsky’s foreclosure action against the Trust. Remanded. View "Bordetsky v. JAK Realty Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employed by Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. when their employment was terminated as part of a reduction in force. The reduction in force affected more older employees than younger employees. Plaintiffs filed complaints with the Maine Human Rights Commission alleging age discrimination in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). A Commission investor applied the “business necessity” framework to analyze Plaintiffs’ allegations before recommending that the Commission find reasonable grounds to believe that Shaw’s had impermissibly discriminated based on age pursuant to a disparate impact theory. The Commission voted unanimously to adopt the investigator’s analysis and recommendations. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint alleging unlawful employment discrimination based on age pursuant to the MHRA. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of what framework of proof applies to a claim of disparate impact age discrimination brought pursuant to the MHRA. The Supreme Court answered that a claim for disparate impact age discrimination pursuant to the MHRA is evaluated according to the “business necessity” standard, rather than the “reasonable factor other than age” standard or some other standard. View "Scamman v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murdering a sixteen-year-old girl. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. This appeal concerned Appellant’s second petition for postconviction review, which asserted sixteen grounds. The first five grounds asserted that the attorney who represented Appellant in his first petition for postconviction review was ineffective in several respects. The trial court dismissed those grounds, concluding (1) Maine law does not permit a second petition to challenge the effectiveness of counsel who represented a petition in a prior petition; and (2) the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan was not retroactive and, therefore, had no effect on Appellant’s first petition, which was denied before Martinez was decided. The court then denied the remainder of Appellant’s petition after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Martinez did not provide Appellant with the right to challenge the effectiveness of postconviction counsel in a subsequent postconviction review petition. View "Reese v. State" on Justia Law

Wife filed for divorce from Husband after six years of marriage on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The district court entered a divorce judgment dividing the parties’ property, awarding child support to Wife, denying spousal support in favor of Wife, and denying Wife’s request for attorney fees. Wife filed several post-judgment motions, without success. On appeal, Wife took a “buckshot approach,” arguing numerous substantive and procedural issues in the apparent effort that “something will stick.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that any potentially meritorious points on appeal, if any exist, have been listed in the fog of insubstantial and unsupportable objections to the trial process and the trial court’s decision. View "Millay v. McKay" on Justia Law

Husband initiated divorce proceedings from Wife in Sweden. Wife objected to the proceedings, asserting that the Swedish court did not have personal jurisdiction over her. The Swedish court subsequently stayed the action for a six-month “reconsideration period.” While the Swedish action was in the reconsideration period, Wife initiated a divorce action in Maine. Husband moved to dismiss the complaint for forum non conveniens. The district court denied Husband’s motion. Thereafter, the Swedish court entered a divorce judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. The Maine court then dismissed Wife’s complaint on the grounds that the Swedish judgment was a complete bar to Wife’s divorce action. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed the Maine court’s judgment to the extent it dismissed the portion of Wife’s complaint seeking dissolution of her marriage; but (2) vacated the judgment insofar as it dismissed Wife’s remaining claims for spousal support, division of marital property, and reasonable attorney fees, holding that it was premature for the district court to address these issues where the Swedish court had yet to address them. View "Lynch v. Lynch" on Justia Law