Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
In re Forest G.
The district court entered judgment terminating Father’s parental rights to his child. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court need not reach Father’s argument that the district court violated his due process right by applying a rebuttable presumption of parental unfitness and improperly placing the burden of proof on him because the court also found an alternative form of parental unfitness; (2) the court’s affirmative findings supporting its parental unfitness determination were supported by the evidence; and (3) the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. View "In re Forest G." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
State v. Ames
Defendant pleaded guilty of burglary and theft by unauthorized taking or transfer. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made during a police interview while he was detained in county jail awaiting a court appearance for a probation violation on an unrelated charge because he was not provided with Miranda warnings prior to a custodial interview. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress because Defendant was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda when he was interviewed by detectives. View "State v. Ames" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
State v. Maine
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of arson. The conviction stemmed from a fire that largely destroyed a diner run by Defendant. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony concerning the cause of the fire. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not clearly err by admitting the expert opinion testimony concerning the cause of the fire; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Defendant’s acquaintance to testify about statements he made to Defendant about how to start house fires; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant intentionally set the fire. View "State v. Maine" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Midland Funding LLC v. Walton
Midland Funding LLC filed suit against Mark Walton alleging that he had entered into a credit card agreement with Barclays Bank Delaware, used the card to obtain extensions of credit, and failed to make payments on the account. Midland purchases debt from Barclays. Midland sought to collect an outstanding balance of $5,684.72. After a trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Midland in the amount of $5,684.72, plus costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) jurisdiction over this matter was properly established in the district court; and (2) the district court did not err in admitting documentation of the assignment of Walton’s debt from Barclays to Midland pursuant to the business record exception to the hearsay rule. View "Midland Funding LLC v. Walton" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Consumer Law
In re Logan M.
In June 2016, the district court entered two judgments terminating Mother’s parents rights as to Logan M. and Bryson L. and Father’s parental rights as to Bryson. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the parents were unable to protect the children from jeopardy and were unable to take responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs and that termination was in the best interest of each child. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) there was competent evidence in the record to support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of Mother’s and Father’s parental unfitness; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the best interest of the children. View "In re Logan M." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
Lalonde v. Central Maine Medical Center
Plaintiff filed suit against CMMC, seeking indemnification for expenses he incurred in defense of an administrative proceeding initiated by the Board of Licensure in Medicine. The Superior Court denied CMMC's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that section 2511 of the Main Health Security Act, 24 M.R.S. 2511, does not render CMMC immune from plaintiff's contractual claim for reimbursement. In this case, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because they state the elements of a cause of action and facts that would entitle plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Lalonde v. Central Maine Medical Center" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Contracts
In re Cameron B.
In 2014, when Cameron was almost one year old, the Department of Health and Human Services obtained a preliminary protection order placing the child in the Department’s custody. The district court made a finding of jeopardy as to both parents based on their substance abuse. In 2016, the Department filed a second petition to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father. After a hearing, the court terminated both parents’ parental rights to Cameron. Both parents appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in the best interest of the child. View "In re Cameron B." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
Dunwoody v. Dunwoody
In 2001, Steven Dunwoody and Janice Dunwoody were divorced. Steven was ordered to pay child support. Steven never paid child support, but the parties’ children received dependent benefits based on Steven’s disability. In 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a notice of debt. Steven then filed a motion seeking a modification of his child support obligation and a declaration that he did not owe any arrearages. The magistrate granted Steven’s motion to modify child support but denied his request for a declaration that he did not owe past support. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the magistrate did not err in determining that Steven owed a child support arrearage of $21,978; and (2) the magistrate did not err in determining that there was no legal or equitable theory that would be a defense to Janice’s attempt to collect on that debt. View "Dunwoody v. Dunwoody" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
Bank of America, N.A. v. Camire
FIA Card Services, N.A. initiated this action against John Camire to recover damages arising out of a debt incurred using a Bank of America (Bank) credit card. Camire filed a counterclaim pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Upon the motion of FIA Card Services, the trial court dismissed Camire’s counterclaim, concluding that FIA Card Services was exempt from liability pursuant to the FDCPA. The Bank was later substituted as the plaintiff. After a trial, the court entered a judgment in favor of the Bank in the amount of $11,573 plus costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the Bank but vacated the order dismissing Camire’s FDCPA counterclaim, holding (1) the trial court properly exercised its discretion in managing trial time, and no due process violation occurred; and (2) the trial court erred in concluding that FIA Card Services was exempt from the FDCPA as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Camire" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Consumer Law
Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Town of Cumberland
The Town of Cumberland applied for site plan review of a proposed development involving Broad Cove Reserve property that it owned. The Town of Cumberland Board of Adjustment and Appeals determined that the Town’s proposed development was permitted within the Low Density Residential district as a municipal use. The Estate of Merrill P. Robbins, which owned land abutting the Broad Cove Reserve property, appealed, arguing that the Town’s development was prohibited under the terms of the relevant ordinance. The superior court affirmed, concluding that the plain language of the ordinance supported the Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ determination. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the meaning of “municipal use” as used in the ordinance was unambiguous and that the Town’s proposed facility was allowed under the terms of the ordinance. View "Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Town of Cumberland" on Justia Law