Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In June 2016, the district court entered two judgments terminating Mother’s parents rights as to Logan M. and Bryson L. and Father’s parental rights as to Bryson. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the parents were unable to protect the children from jeopardy and were unable to take responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs and that termination was in the best interest of each child. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) there was competent evidence in the record to support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of Mother’s and Father’s parental unfitness; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the best interest of the children. View "In re Logan M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against CMMC, seeking indemnification for expenses he incurred in defense of an administrative proceeding initiated by the Board of Licensure in Medicine. The Superior Court denied CMMC's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that section 2511 of the Main Health Security Act, 24 M.R.S. 2511, does not render CMMC immune from plaintiff's contractual claim for reimbursement. In this case, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because they state the elements of a cause of action and facts that would entitle plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Lalonde v. Central Maine Medical Center" on Justia Law

In 2014, when Cameron was almost one year old, the Department of Health and Human Services obtained a preliminary protection order placing the child in the Department’s custody. The district court made a finding of jeopardy as to both parents based on their substance abuse. In 2016, the Department filed a second petition to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father. After a hearing, the court terminated both parents’ parental rights to Cameron. Both parents appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in the best interest of the child. View "In re Cameron B." on Justia Law

In 2001, Steven Dunwoody and Janice Dunwoody were divorced. Steven was ordered to pay child support. Steven never paid child support, but the parties’ children received dependent benefits based on Steven’s disability. In 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a notice of debt. Steven then filed a motion seeking a modification of his child support obligation and a declaration that he did not owe any arrearages. The magistrate granted Steven’s motion to modify child support but denied his request for a declaration that he did not owe past support. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the magistrate did not err in determining that Steven owed a child support arrearage of $21,978; and (2) the magistrate did not err in determining that there was no legal or equitable theory that would be a defense to Janice’s attempt to collect on that debt. View "Dunwoody v. Dunwoody" on Justia Law

FIA Card Services, N.A. initiated this action against John Camire to recover damages arising out of a debt incurred using a Bank of America (Bank) credit card. Camire filed a counterclaim pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Upon the motion of FIA Card Services, the trial court dismissed Camire’s counterclaim, concluding that FIA Card Services was exempt from liability pursuant to the FDCPA. The Bank was later substituted as the plaintiff. After a trial, the court entered a judgment in favor of the Bank in the amount of $11,573 plus costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the Bank but vacated the order dismissing Camire’s FDCPA counterclaim, holding (1) the trial court properly exercised its discretion in managing trial time, and no due process violation occurred; and (2) the trial court erred in concluding that FIA Card Services was exempt from the FDCPA as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Camire" on Justia Law

The Town of Cumberland applied for site plan review of a proposed development involving Broad Cove Reserve property that it owned. The Town of Cumberland Board of Adjustment and Appeals determined that the Town’s proposed development was permitted within the Low Density Residential district as a municipal use. The Estate of Merrill P. Robbins, which owned land abutting the Broad Cove Reserve property, appealed, arguing that the Town’s development was prohibited under the terms of the relevant ordinance. The superior court affirmed, concluding that the plain language of the ordinance supported the Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ determination. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the meaning of “municipal use” as used in the ordinance was unambiguous and that the Town’s proposed facility was allowed under the terms of the ordinance. View "Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Town of Cumberland" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff gave birth to a son, she filed a complaint against Merck & Co., Inc. and the United States, alleging that a community health center physician negligently failed to insert into her arm an implant manufactured by Merck that was designed to prevent pregnancy as a result of Merck’s defective applicator. The federal court certified questions of state law to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The Court answered (1) the protection of Maine’s Wrongful Birth statute extends to Merck as a drug manufacturer and distributor; and (2) pursuant to the Wrongful Birth statute, Plaintiff may not recover any damages on her claims against either defendant because of the nature of the procedure she underwent. View "Doherty v. Merck & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Town of Cumberland applied for site plan review of a proposed development involving Broad Cove Reserve property that it owned. The Town of Cumberland Board of Adjustment and Appeals determined that the Town’s proposed development was permitted within the Low Density Residential district as a municipal use. The Estate of Merrill P. Robbins, which owned land abutting the Broad Cove Reserve property, appealed, arguing that the Town’s development was prohibited under the terms of the relevant ordinance. The superior court affirmed, concluding that the plain language of the ordinance supported the Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the meaning of “municipal use” as used in the ordinance was unambiguous and that the Town’s proposed facility was allowed under the terms of the ordinance. View "Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Town of Cumberland" on Justia Law

Gloria Carignan, whose property was bordered by Willow Street - a paper street - filed a complaint against Paul Dumas and Robert Richard, an alleged contractor for Dumas, asserting six causes of action relating to Richard’s use of Willow Street to access Dumas’s parcel of land. Carignan later amended her complaint to seek declaratory judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Carignan and denied summary judgment for Dumas. Dumas appealed, arguing that the court erred in interpreting a provision of the Paper Streets Act to apply retrospectively. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and therefore vacated the entry of summary judgment for Carignan and the denial of summary judgment for Dumas, holding that the court erred in its application of sections 3031 and 3032 of the Paper Streets Act and its finding that Dumas had abandoned any easement to which he might be entitled. Remanded. View "Carignan v. Dumas" on Justia Law

Jessica Lisio and Tammy Thorndike, who lives as a man, began a relationship in 2005 when Lisio’s son, Caden, was one year old. In 2009, Arianna was born to Lisio, who was artificially inseminated. That same year, Lisio and Thorndike registered as domestic partners. In 2012, Thorndike moved out. In 2014, Thorndike filed a complaint for a determination of paternity and parental rights and responsibilities. Thorndike subsequently moved to amend his complaint to allege de facto parenthood. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Thorndike was a de facto parent and then entered a parental rights and responsibilities order that provided for the children’s primary residence to be with Lisio and for the children to have contact with Thorndike on a gradually increasing schedule. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in finding that Thorndike was the de facto parent of Caden and Arianna. View "Thorndike v. Lisio" on Justia Law