Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a divorce judgment, the district court awarded Mother the right to provide the parties’ minor child’s primary residence. Mother moved to modify the terms of the divorce judgment and later moved to enforce the divorce judgment. The court denied Mother’s motion to enforce the divorce but did modify the terms of the divorce judgment. Mother appealed, arguing that the court erred in interpreting the divorce judgment concerning her authority to take the child on an annual trip to Brazil and violated her fundamental right to parent by modifying the divorce judgment to award the parental grandparents contact with the child. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) because the divorce judgment unambiguously provided for the child’s annual travel to Brazil, the denial of the motion to enforce the judgment and the court’s modification of that provision were error; and (2) before a court may grant a third party contact with a child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A 1653(2)(B), the third party must file both a motion to intervene in the matter and his or her own motion seeking such contact, and these requirements were not met as to the paternal grandparents in this case. Remanded. View "Curtis v. Medeiros" on Justia Law

The district court terminated Father’s parental rights to his child, determining that Father was parentally unfit within the meaning of the child protection statutes and that termination was in the child’s best interest. Father appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s determinations. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence supported the court’s ultimate finding of parental unfitness; and (2) given the evidence in the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in the child’s best interest. View "In re Carlos C." on Justia Law

Friends of the Motherhouse, a nonprofit corporation and two individuals (collectively, Friends) filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Portland City Council’s rezoning of a parcel owned by Sea Coast at Baxter Woods Associates, LLC and Motherhouse Associates LP (collectively, Sea Coast) was invalid. Sea Coast successfully moved to intervene and then moved for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Sea Coast. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its broad legislative authority, and therefore, the superior court did not err in finding that Sea Coast was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Friends of the Motherhouse v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

Melody Boulette and Richard Boulette were divorced pursuant to a judgment that granted the parties shared parental rights and responsibilities and shared residence with respect to their two sons. Richard subsequently moved to modify the divorce judgment, seeking primary residence of the children. While that motion was pending, Melody sought and received a temporary protection from abuse order. The district court subsequently entered a final protection from abuse order barring Richard from having contact with Melody or the children subject to a future family court action. Thereafter, following a hearing, the district court issued an amended protection from abuse order that reinstated the contact schedule created by the parties’ divorce judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) dismissed Richard’s appeal of the temporary protection from abuse order and the final protection from abuse order, as these appeals were untimely; and (2) affirmed the judgment amending the final protection from abuse order. View "Boulette v. Boulette" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of gross sexual assault, one count of unlawful sexual contact, and one count of visual sexual aggression against a child. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it admitted testimony of the victim’s aunt and grandmother concerning the victim’s state of mind. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the victim’s aunt and grandmother to testify about the victim’s out-of-court statements describing her then-existing state of mind. View "State v. Watson" on Justia Law

Arundel Valley, LLC, the developer of a facility for a butter manufacturer, filed a complaint against Branch River Plastics, Inc., a manufacturer and distributor of insulated roofing panels, alleging, inter alia, defects in roofing panels that Branch River had manufactured and supplied to Arundel Valley for a construction project. A jury found in Arundel Valley’s favor on its claims that Branch River breached implied warranties by supplying defective roofing panels. Branch River filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in declining to adjudicate whether Branch River had disclaimed implied warranties. Remanded. View "Arundel Valley, LLC v. Branch River Plastics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fryeburg Academy, a private secondary school, applied to the Town of Fryeburg Planning Board for permits authorizing changes in the use of two parcels of leased land. Following a hearing, the Planning Board approved the Academy’s applications for both parcels. Specifically, the Town allowed the Academy to use one parcel of land (the Land Lot) as an outdoor classroom and to use a building on the second parcel of land (the House Lot) to house administrative offices. The Fryeburg Trust, which owns property abutting both lots, appealed. The superior court affirmed the Planning Board’s decision to grant the Land Lot permit but vacated the Planning Board’s decision to grant the House Lot. The Trust, the Academy, and the Town all appealed, challenging the interpretation of the definition of secondary school in Fryeburg’s Land Use Ordinance. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Planning Board, holding (1) the Academy’s proposed use of the Land Lot fit within the definition of secondary school; and (2) the proposed use of the House Lot was permissible under the Ordinance. View "Fryeburg Trust v. Town of Fryeburg" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owed parcels of real estate in the Town of Liberty that were accessed by a public road. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully requested that the Town repair the road. The Town Select Board subsequently voted that the “upper portion” of the road had been abandoned and that a public easement was retained over the abounded portion. Plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint seeking relief pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B - challenging the Town’s determination that the road had been abandoned - and seeking an award of damages. Plaintiffs then moved for leave to amend their complaint seeking to change the Rule 80B action to an action for a declaratory judgment. The superior court dismissed the complaint, determining that Plaintiffs' Rule 80B complaint was untimely and that they could not recover damages. The court further denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend, concluding that a Rule 80B action, rather than a declaratory judgment action, was the proper means to challenge the Town’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) vacated the order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend and remanded to allow the court to address the motion for leave to amend in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "Paul v. Town of Liberty" on Justia Law

In 2011, the district court issued a parental rights and responsibilities judgment pertaining to the minor child of Mother and Father. The judgment granted primary physical residence to Father and mode provisions for Mother’s continued contact with the child. After Father purposefully misled Mother about the child’s location and Mother was unable to see the child for over five months, Mother filed a motion to modify the order. The district court granted the motion and changed the child’s primary residence to being with Mother. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a modification of the parental rights and responsibilities order was in the child’s best interest. View "Clark v. Leeman" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of the franchise relationship between Ford Motor Company and Darling’s, an automobile dealer. In Ford I, the Maine Motor Vehicle Franchise Board entered an award of damages against Ford, concluding that Ford violated the Business Practices Between Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act (Dealers Act) by failing to provide Darling’s with proper notice of a franchise modification. The Business and Consumer Docket (BCD) affirmed the Board’s damages award. The Supreme Court affirmed most aspects of the judgment but held that the Board lacked jurisdiction to award damages for violations of the Dealers Act. On remand, after a jury trial, the BCD awarded Darling’s damages of $154,695 based on Ford’s violation of the statutory notice provision. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in part and vacated it part, holding (1) the court did not err by reducing Darling’s damages by the amounts it received under an incentive program; but (2) the court erred as a matter of law by limiting Darling’s recovery to a 270-day period. Remanded to the BCD for a new trial on the issue of damages. On remand, Ford is entitled to an offset of any damages awarded to Darling’s based on payments that Darling’s received pursuant to the incentive program. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Darling's" on Justia Law