Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Fryeburg Academy, a private secondary school, applied to the Town of Fryeburg Planning Board for permits authorizing changes in the use of two parcels of leased land. Following a hearing, the Planning Board approved the Academy’s applications for both parcels. Specifically, the Town allowed the Academy to use one parcel of land (the Land Lot) as an outdoor classroom and to use a building on the second parcel of land (the House Lot) to house administrative offices. The Fryeburg Trust, which owns property abutting both lots, appealed. The superior court affirmed the Planning Board’s decision to grant the Land Lot permit but vacated the Planning Board’s decision to grant the House Lot. The Trust, the Academy, and the Town all appealed, challenging the interpretation of the definition of secondary school in Fryeburg’s Land Use Ordinance. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Planning Board, holding (1) the Academy’s proposed use of the Land Lot fit within the definition of secondary school; and (2) the proposed use of the House Lot was permissible under the Ordinance. View "Fryeburg Trust v. Town of Fryeburg" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owed parcels of real estate in the Town of Liberty that were accessed by a public road. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully requested that the Town repair the road. The Town Select Board subsequently voted that the “upper portion” of the road had been abandoned and that a public easement was retained over the abounded portion. Plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint seeking relief pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B - challenging the Town’s determination that the road had been abandoned - and seeking an award of damages. Plaintiffs then moved for leave to amend their complaint seeking to change the Rule 80B action to an action for a declaratory judgment. The superior court dismissed the complaint, determining that Plaintiffs' Rule 80B complaint was untimely and that they could not recover damages. The court further denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend, concluding that a Rule 80B action, rather than a declaratory judgment action, was the proper means to challenge the Town’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) vacated the order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend and remanded to allow the court to address the motion for leave to amend in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "Paul v. Town of Liberty" on Justia Law

In 2011, the district court issued a parental rights and responsibilities judgment pertaining to the minor child of Mother and Father. The judgment granted primary physical residence to Father and mode provisions for Mother’s continued contact with the child. After Father purposefully misled Mother about the child’s location and Mother was unable to see the child for over five months, Mother filed a motion to modify the order. The district court granted the motion and changed the child’s primary residence to being with Mother. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a modification of the parental rights and responsibilities order was in the child’s best interest. View "Clark v. Leeman" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of the franchise relationship between Ford Motor Company and Darling’s, an automobile dealer. In Ford I, the Maine Motor Vehicle Franchise Board entered an award of damages against Ford, concluding that Ford violated the Business Practices Between Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act (Dealers Act) by failing to provide Darling’s with proper notice of a franchise modification. The Business and Consumer Docket (BCD) affirmed the Board’s damages award. The Supreme Court affirmed most aspects of the judgment but held that the Board lacked jurisdiction to award damages for violations of the Dealers Act. On remand, after a jury trial, the BCD awarded Darling’s damages of $154,695 based on Ford’s violation of the statutory notice provision. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in part and vacated it part, holding (1) the court did not err by reducing Darling’s damages by the amounts it received under an incentive program; but (2) the court erred as a matter of law by limiting Darling’s recovery to a 270-day period. Remanded to the BCD for a new trial on the issue of damages. On remand, Ford is entitled to an offset of any damages awarded to Darling’s based on payments that Darling’s received pursuant to the incentive program. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Darling's" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of six counts of gross sexual assault and six counts of unlawful sexual contact. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of inculpatory statements he made during a police interview. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that the totality of the circumstances rendered Defendant’s incriminating statements involuntary as a matter of law, and therefore, the suppression court erred when it denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of those incriminating statements. Remanded for a new trial. View "Maine v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with terrorizing and criminal restraint with a dangerous weapon. Petitioner was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disease or defect and committed to the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Health and Human Services. A decade later, Petitioner filed a petition for discharge from custody. The superior court denied the petition for discharge after a hearing, finding that Petitioner remained afflicted with a mental disease or defect that rendered her dangerous to herself, to others, and to property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err by denying Petitioner’s petition for discharge because the evidence did not compel a finding that Petitioner may be discharged without likelihood that she will cause injury to herself or others due to a mental disease or defect. View "Beal v. State" on Justia Law

Bangor Hydro-Electric (BHE) and Maine Public Service Company (MPS) were regulated utilities engaged in the transmission and distribution of electric it. The companies merged to become Emera Maine during the pendency of this proceeding. BHE and MPS filed a petition for reorganization, under which Emera Maine’s parent company would increase its ownership interest in Algonquin Power & Utilities Corporation (APUC), a publicly-traded company that is in the electricity generation business. The petition was subject to approval by the Maine Public Utilities Commission because of the relationship that would result between Emera Maine, as a transmission and distribution entity, and APUC, a generator. The Commission approved the petition. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Commission’s order approving the petition, holding that the Commission misconstrued the governing statute in the Electric Industry Restructuring Act. On remand, the Commission once again approved the petition. On the second appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Commission’s order, holding that the Commission acted outside of its authority when it imposed conditions that would regulate APUC beyond what the Restructuring Act allows. Remanded with instructions to deny the petition. View "Houlton Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

James Levis filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and quiet title claiming title to a section of mudflat by adverse possession and by deed from his ex-wife. Levis named Gustav Konitzky, an abutting neighbor and boat-builder, as a party in interest. Default judgment was entered against the remaining defendants (the Cartland heirs), but the district court later set aside the default judgment. The court then granted summary judgment in favor of Konitzky. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment against the Cartland heirs and did not err in granting summary judgment in Konitzky’s favor on Levis’s quiet title action. View "Levis v. Konitzky" on Justia Law

Harris Management and JJR Associates filed a complaint against Paul Coulombe and two LLCs under his control (collectively, Defendants), alleging seven causes of action arising from allegations that Coulombe had misrepresented his commitment to hire Harris Management to manage a golf course, which Coulombe was preparing to purchase, in an effort to obtain nearby property from JJR Associates at a discount and to prevent Harris from purchasing the golf club. During discovery, the court entered an order providing that Coulombe must permit Harris to discover the communications among Coulombe, his counsel, and a third party, concluding that those communications were either not subject to the attorney-client privilege or were discoverable because the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment except with respect to one communication that the Court concluded the trial court must consider further on remand, holding that, with the exception of those pages, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the release of specific communications between Coulombe and his attorneys. View "Harris Management, Inc. v. Coulombe" on Justia Law

BCN Telecom, Inc. was assessed a state service provider tax on certain flat charges that BCN imposed on some business customers’ lines from 2008 to 2011. The charges were designed both to reimburse BCN for presubscribed interexchange carrier charges that it paid to access local telephone infrastructure and to generate profits. The Sales and Use Tax Division of Maine Revenue Services affirmed the assessment. The Maine Board of Tax Appeals affirmed. On judicial review, the superior court granted summary judgment in favor of BCN, concluding that BCN’s charges were not part of the “sale price” of telecommunications service and that, even if they were, they were exempt from taxation under Me. Rev. Stat. 36, 2557(34) because they were charges for interstate telecommunications services. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment entered by the superior court, holding (1) the amounts received by BCN were subject to the service provider tax as part of the sale price for telecommunications services; and (2) BCN failed to provide prima facie proof that the tax exemption for interstate telecommunications services applied as a matter of law to these charges. View "BCN Telecom, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law