Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, who was injured when the car she was driving was rear-ended by an underinsured motorist, claimed uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage and medical payments coverage under two State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company policies. An arbitration panel found that the accident caused Plaintiff $378,000 in damages, $125,000 of which were identified as medical costs. The parties' dispute regarding the extent of coverage available to Plaintiff proceeded to trial. The superior court determined that only one of the State Farm policies covered Plaintiff, deferred to the arbitration award as to Plaintiffs' actual damages, established the amount owed by State Farm, and reduced the arbitration award accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the superior court correctly determined that only one of the policies covered Plaintiff, but (2) the court’s decision regarding the amount due under that policy was in error. Remanded. View "Graf v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In Petrin v. Town of Scarborough, the Supreme Judicial Court, in considering challenges to increases in municipal property taxes for parcels located in neighborhoods in the Town of Scarborough, concluded that the Town’s practice of undervaluing separate but abutting lots held in common ownership resulted in discriminatory tax treatment. In this separate action, the Court addressed similar challenges brought by owners of residential waterfront properties located in an area of Scarborough not at issue in Petrin. Plaintiffs appealed a judgment determining that they did not have standing to pursue one of their challenges but otherwise affirming the Scarborough Board of Assessment Review’s denial of their tax abatement petitions. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to pursue their challenges; (2) the Board did not err in concluding that a partial revaluation conducted by the Town was proper; but (3) the Board erred by denying Plaintiffs’ requests for abatement based on the Town’s practice of undervaluing abutting lots, which resulted in discriminatory assessments. View "Angell Family 2012 Prouts Neck Trusts v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested in New Hampshire on a domestic violence charge and released that day on bail, subject to certain no-contact conditions. Thereafter, Defendant allegedly assaulted the victim in Maine. Defendant was charged by complaint in Maine with, inter alia, violation of a protective order. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the violation of a protective order count, asserting that the no-contact bail conditions ordered by the New Hampshire bail commissioner were not “similar” to a protective order for purposes of Maine statutes governing protection from abuse. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the State appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that, on this record, the Court could not adequately address the issues raised by the parties. View "State v. Hederson" on Justia Law

In 2006, Mark Amero and Maria Amero divorced. The district court entered a divorce judgment that ordered Mark to pay Maria general spousal support. The award was subject to the condition that it terminate upon Maria’s remarriage or cohabitation with an adult partner. In 2015, Mark filed a motion to modify the spousal support award on the grounds that Maria was cohabiting with an adult partner. The trial court found that Maria was cohabiting with an adult partner and ordered determination of the spousal support award pursuant to the divorce judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence supporting the court’s finding of cohabitation, and the finding of cohabitation provided a sufficient basis for the district court’s decision to terminate the support award. View "Amero v. Amero" on Justia Law

Bank brought this foreclosure action against Mortgagor. Mortgagor filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Bank’s notices of right to cure were deficient because they did not satisfy the requirements of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111(1-A). The court concluded that the notice of right to cure did not comply with statutory requirements and dismissed the complaint without prejudice so that Bank could send notice in compliance with section 6111. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint but remanded with instructions to correct the order so that it provides for a dismissal with prejudice, holding that the court erred by stating that the dismissal was without prejudice because the dismissal was an adjudication on the merits, and therefore, it was with prejudice. View "U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Mackenzie" on Justia Law

Susan Berube was terminated from her employment with the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for having alcohol on her breath while meeting with a client. The Maine State Employees Association, SEIU Local 1989 (MSEA) initiated the grievance process, which included an arbitration proceeding, on Berube’s behalf. The arbitrator entered an award reinstating Berube to her employment position. The State and the DHHS filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award. The superior court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to vacate the arbitration award, holding that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by determining that the grievance was arbitrable because the arbitration request was filed after the deadline established in the collective bargaining agreement. View "State v. Maine State Employees Ass’n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of theft by misapplication of property, one count of conspiracy to commit intentional evasion of tax, and three counts of failure to collect, account for, or pay over withholding tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions on the charges of theft by misapplication and failing to collect, account for, or pay over withholding taxes; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of country club memberships purchased by a company Defendant owned and used exclusively with his wife. View "State v. Kendall" on Justia Law

Catherine Brochu and Richard McLeod were married in 1970 and had two children. In 1977, the parties executed a separation agreement setting forth McLeod’s child and spousal support obligations. McLeod, who was in the United States Marine Corps, went into hiding after executing the separation agreement. From 1977 to the time of this case, McLeod never made a child or spousal support payment. In 1979, the court issued a divorce judgment incorporating the settlement agreement. After locating McLeod in 2014, Brochu filed a motion to enforce the nearly forty years’ overdue support payments. McLeod moved to dismiss the complaint based on the affirmative defense of laches. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of dismissal to the extent that the court’s conclusions are founded upon the application of the doctrine of laches, holding (1) the doctrine of laches may be asserted as a defense to spousal support arrearages but is inapplicable to child support arrearages; and (2) the court did not properly apply the doctrine of laches to the spousal support arrearages in this case. View "Brochu v. McLeod" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of five counts of unlawful sexual contact and one count of visual sexual aggression against a child. At trial, the court did not require the jury to find one element of the crime - that the victim as younger than twelve when the sexual contact occurred - in order to deliver a guilty verdict. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it did not need to determine when the offenses occurred. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the trial court erred by not instructing the jury of the necessity of finding that the crimes were committed before the victim’s twelfth birthday; and (2) it cannot be concluded that it was highly probable that the error did not affect the jury’s verdict. Remanded. View "State v. Westgate" on Justia Law

Jon Haddow, an attorney, represented and Frank and Beverly Pawlendzio in personal bankruptcy proceedings. Following the proceedings, the Pawlendzios filed a complaint against Haddow, asserting claims of legal malpractice and seeking damages for economic loss and extreme emotional distress. The Pawlendzios based their claims on the fact that, contrary to Haddow’s advice, loans made to them by friends and relatives lost their protected status as a result of the bankruptcy proceedings. The superior court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Haddow. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Pawlendzios failed to produce expert-based evidence that Haddow breached his duty owed to the Pawlendzios. View "Pawlendzio v. Haddow" on Justia Law