Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Richard and Ann Cayer filed a petition to secede from the Town of Madawaska. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted and the Governor approved a bill changing the Legislature’s practice for receiving and considering secession petitions. The Town determined that the amended statute governing legislature consideration applied to the Cayers’ petition, and the Madawaska Board of Select People declined the Cayers’ requests to schedule an advisory referendum on the Cayers’ petition. The Cayers sought review of the Town’s denial of their request to schedule an advisory referendum and sought a declaratory judgment that the repealed version of the secession statute applied to their petition. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Town and found the Cayers’ challenge to the Town’s explicit refusal to take any action untimely. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in determining that the appeal was untimely; (2) the Town’s actions provided no basis for a civil rights claim or a declaratory judgment action; and (3) an action for a writ of mandamus provided no alternative cause of action. View "Cayer v. Town of Madawaska" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs received a loan from JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. that was secured by a mortgage on their real property in Portland. When Plaintiffs finished paying off the mortgage, Chase executed a written mortgage release and recorded the document. The registry of deeds returned the recorded mortgage release to Chase, which retained the actual document and mailed a copy of the document to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed this action claiming that Chase violated Me. Rev. Stat. 551, 33, which governs the discharge of a mortgage, by failing to mail them the original mortgage release document. The business and consumer docket dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, concluding that mailing a copy of the recorded document accomplishes the purposes of the statute. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court erred when it dismissed the action because Plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to state a claim that Chase violated section 551. View "Sabina v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

After her divorce from Robert Ballou was final, Gina Childs sought a protection from abuse order against Ballou. A protection order was entered upon the parties’ agreement without a finding of abuse. The district court later granted Childs a two-year extension of the protection from abuse order. Ballou appealed, raising multiple issues. The Supreme Court discerned no error in the district court’s order and wrote only to address Ballou’s argument that the court-ordered restrictions on Ballou’s communications with Childs violated his Firth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in prohibiting Ballou from having any direct or indirect contact with Childs and requiring that rights of contact with the parties’ child be arranged and facilitated by a third party. View "Childs v. Ballou" on Justia Law

Four days before they were married, Sharon and Ronald Blanchard executed a premarital agreement, which governed the equitable distribution of property and the award of spousal support. Twenty-six years later, Sharon filed for divorce. The district court gave full force and effect to the premarital agreement and entered a judgment of divorce. Sharon appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the premarital agreement was valid. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the facts of this case support the conclusion that the agreement was not invalid or unconscionable; and (2) Sharon’s remaining arguments on appeal were without merit. View "Blanchard v. Blanchard" on Justia Law

David Savell filed a complaint against Michael Duddy and the law firm of Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman (KRZ) founded upon his assertion that an attorney-client relationship existed between himself and Duddy. Among other claims, Savell alleged claims for attorney malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The court granted Duddy and KRZ’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Savell failed to demonstrate an attorney-client relationship between himself and Duddy. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) an attorney-client relationship did not exist between Savell and Duddy; and (2) Duddy did not owe Savell a duty of care as a nonclient. View "Savell v. Duddy" on Justia Law

Harold Burbank was the owner of an interest in a coastal property that was owned in joint tenancy by fourteen owners (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs, the owners of a cluster of properties neighboring the Burbank property, filed a complaint asserting that they had acquired an easement over a portion of the Burbank property. After a trial, the trial court granted a prescriptive easement and ordered partition by sale of the property. Burbank appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed and ordered sanctions against Burbank, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it granted a prescriptive easement and ordered partition by sale of the property; (2) the remainder of Burbank’s arguments were either improperly raised, meritless, or both; and (3) Burbank should be sanctioned for his repeated misconduct in prosecuting this appeal. View "Lincoln v. Burbank" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to his child. After a hearing, the district court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of unfitness and found that termination was in the best interest of the child. Father appealed, arguing that the court erroneously terminated his parental rights based only on the fact of his incarceration. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence supported the court’s findings that Father could not protect his child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child in a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs. View "In re Alijah K." on Justia Law

Drilling Blasting Rock Specialists, Inc. (DBRS) filed a complaint against Paul Rheaume, asserting that Rheaume should be held personally liable for intentionally and negligently misrepresenting that there were no encumbrances on property DBRS purchased. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Rheaume, concluding that DBRS’s negligent and intentional misrepresentation claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the trial court (1) correctly granted summary judgment against DBRS on the negligent misrepresentation claim; but (2) erred in granting summary judgment on the intentional misrepresentation claim, as there exists a factual dispute regard the commencement of the limitations period applicable to this claim. Remanded. View "Drilling & Blasting Rock Specialists, Inc. v. Rheaume" on Justia Law

Kyle Dietrich and Hilary Dietrich were divorced in 2011 pursuant to a judgment that granted the parties shared parental rights and responsibilities of their three children and did not order either party to pay child support. The court subsequently entered an amended judgment ordering Kyle to pay child support of $177 per week, beginning in 2012. In 2015, a magistrate entered an amended judgment and a final child support order directing Kyle to pay child support of $305 per week. Kyle filed an objection to the magistrate’s order, which the district court denied as untimely filed. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Kyle’s appeal, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Kyle’s objection was untimely filed. View "Dietrich v. Dietrich" on Justia Law

After Barbara Frost died, her half-sister, Nancy Gamash, initiated a will contest, asserting that Frost’s will was a product of undue influence. In conjunction with that contest, Gamash sought a declaratory judgment that a note and mortgage held by Bank of America, N.A. (BANA) encumbering property of Frost’s estate were invalid. The probate court entered summary judgment in favor of BANA, concluding that the note and mortgage, as well as advances on BANA’s mortgage, were valid obligations of Frost’s estate. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment in part and vacated it in part, holding (1) judgment was correctly entered in BANA’s favor as to the validity of the note and mortgage; but (2) summary judgment on the issue of the validity of certain mortgage advances should have been entered in favor of Gamash. View "In re Estate of Frost" on Justia Law