Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A divorce judgment was entered providing for the shared primary residence of Mother and Father’s child. The district court subsequently modified the judgment, which created a more complicated schedule of contact. Due to the frequent transitions between parental homes and tensions between her parents, the child became depressed. By the time she was almost eight years old, the child had a serious breakdown. While Mother’s and Father’s post-divorce motions were pending, the court ordered a less complex schedule. At the conclusion of the trial on the motions, the district court ordered that a similar schedule become part of the parties’ modified divorce judgment. The resulting judgment established primary residence of the child with Mother. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the court’s determination that establishing primary residence with Mother and modifying the schedule of contact was in the child’s best interest. View "Little v. Wallace" on Justia Law

In January 2012, after the death of John Gilbert, intestate probate proceedings were commenced. In November 2013, the probate court concluded that the relationship between Judith Gilbert, John’s widow, and Nathan Gilbert, John’s son from a prior relationship, had “risen to the level of causing concern” and ordered that it would supervise Judith’s distribution and settlement of the estate. In 2015, a court-appointed referee filed a report recommending a plan to distribute the estate. Judith objected to many of the report’s findings and recommendations. Nathan moved the court to adopt the report. The probate court did not hold a hearing regarding Judith’s objections and did not act on the report but, rather, continued to supervise Judith’s administration of the estate by entering orders. The Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded, holding that because the court had not held a hearing on Judith’s objections and acted on the report, the court erred by continuing to enter orders supervising the disposition of the estate. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Gilbert" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an application for disability retirement benefits alleging that she was unable to perform her job with the Maine Department of Transportation because of her numerous disabilities. The Maine Public Employees Retirement System Board of Trustees denied benefits after considering Plaintiff’s medical records. Plaintiff appealed, challenging only the denial of benefits as to her fibromyalgia. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the medical board’s reports were a proper part of the evidentiary record; and (2) the record did not compel a finding that Plaintiff met her burden of proving that her fibromyalgia caused functional limitations that made it impossible for her to do her job. View "Behr v. Maine Pub. Employees Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

In 1997, Jeanne Reed died. In 2013, George Reed, Jeanne’s son, filed a petition for formal probate of his mother’s will. The county probate court denied the petition as time barred. In 2014, George and his brother, Lawrence, filed a petition for the partition of certain real property, the only remaining asset of their mother’s estate. The county probate court dismissed the petition, determining that it did not have subject matter to consider the petition because there was no open probate proceeding for Jeanne’s estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probate court correctly determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. View "In re Estate of Jeanne S. Reed" on Justia Law

Grant worked for Bath Iron Works from 1964-1970, and again from 1978-1994. During Grant’s first period of employment, asbestos was a common component of the insulation and other materials used at Bath, including for the construction and renovation of ships. Grant worked in a variety of positions, including as a ship cleaner. Cleaning included sweeping up debris— sometimes including asbestos. In 2011, Grant died of lung cancer, caused by exposure to asbestos. The trial court rejected, on summary judgment, Grant’s estate’s complaint, alleging negligence, violation of 14 M.R.S. 221 (defective or unreasonably dangerous goods), and loss of consortium. The complaint named 15 defendants, including Bath’s suppliers. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The trial court required the estate to show “[t]hat the defendant’s asbestos-containing product was at the site where the plaintiff worked or was present, and that the plaintiff was in proximity to that product at the time it was being used.” The estate was unable to produce evidence to establish a prima facie case that any of the named defendants’ products were a proximate cause of the injuries View "Grant v. Foster Wheeler, LLC" on Justia Law

Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. 252(1)(A), a referee held hearings and issued a report, finding: The parties were married in France, in 2006. Their child was born in 2008. A protection order had issued, based on findings that Karamanoglu had abused Gourlaouen and the child. The child’s therapist and the guardian ad litem agreed that it was in the child’s best interest to have unsupervised visitation with Karamanoglu, who had entered counseling. The report recommended shared parental rights and responsibilities, including shared primary residence and care. The parties jointly own properties in Primelin, France; Freeport; and Yarmouth. The parties had entered into a standard French marriage contract, which is valid and enforceable, and had supplemented that contract. The referee recommended: Karamanoglu’s and Gourlaouen’s shares of the equity in the Yarmouth property to be $3.1 million and $1.4 million respectively; that the Yarmouth and Freeport properties be set aside to Karamanoglu; that Gourlaouen be awarded the Primelin property; that Karamanoglu pay $1 million to Gourlaouen; and that Karamanoglu pay Gourlaouen spousal support of $3,800 per month for five years. The court adopted the reports. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated with respect to co-parenting counseling, the child's medical and mental health treatment, and mandatory pre-filing mediation, and found error in the analysis of the parties’ interests in the Primelin property. View "Karamanoglu v. Gourlaouen" on Justia Law

Richard and Armande's 1999 divorce judgment ordered Richard to pay Armande $2,500 per month until Armande’s death or remarriage, “subject to review upon a significant change in the circumstances of either party, including a substantial change in [Richard’s] income, currently $108,000.” Eight years later, Richard moved to modify his support obligation on the ground that his impending retirement would result in a reduction in his income. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the court amended the divorce judgment in 2008 by substituting a new provision: “[Richard] shall pay [Armande] spousal support in the amount of $2,500 per month, until the death or remarriage of [Armande], or until such time that [Armande] permanently establishes residence in a nursing home or other assisted care living facility. Spousal support shall then terminate.” Richard’s financial statement dated April 2008, reported total income of $66,360 annually, from “Pensions/Annuities,” following his retirement. In 2014, none of the terminating contingencies having occurred, Richard again moved to modify his support obligation. The court concluded that the 2008 modification left intact a provision that support was subject to review upon a significant change in the circumstances of either party and “that the [$]108,000 was the benchmark.” Citing 19-A M.R.S. 951-A(4), the court reduced Richard’s spousal support obligation to $1,250 per month. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated and remanded for further findings using Richard’s 2008 income as the benchmark. View "Marston v. Marston" on Justia Law

Five suits filed against Nisbet, the owner of an apartment building where several people died in a 2014 fire, make claims for wrongful death, alleging that the property was in a state of general disrepair with no working smoke detectors, a second means of egress (a back staircase) was impassable, the building contained an illegal third-floor apartment, the property violated fire codes, and Nisbet allowed the storage of combustible materials on the property. With its complaint, filed several weeks before the others, the Estate of Summers requested, and the court granted, attachment and trustee process against Nisbet, on an ex parte basis, in the amount of $1.7 million. Nisbet did not challenge the attachment. The other estates then moved for attachment and trustee process. Nisbet did not oppose those requests, but they had not yet been granted when the other estates successfully moved to dissolve the Estate of Summers’s attachment order on grounds that the required showing to obtain the attachment on an ex parte basis had not been made.The court simultaneously granted attachments in favor of all five estates. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order to the extent that it dissolved the attachment issued after ex parte process and declined to effectuate that attachment as of its original date of entry. View "Estate of Summers v. Nisbet" on Justia Law

During the course of an argument at the victim's Chelsea home, Dupont scratched the victim’s face and neck with her fingernails, leaving wounds on his cheek. Dupont was convicted of assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. 207(1)(A) and sentenced to 20 days in jail, with a fine of $300. Dupont sought a new trial, asserting that the victim had “committed perjury” and that “[n]o rational jury could have convicted [her] of Assault in this matter after hearing that testimony.” She later added: “The Defendant did not get the opportunity for a fair, open and public trial as the courtroom doors were locked at some point during the trial.” Dupont did not submit an affidavit, nor did she offer any testimony at the motion hearing. The court denied Dupont’s motion. Dupont filed a “Motion to Reconsider” and submitted the trial transcript showing that the court stated, just before closing arguments and jury instructions, “Bring the jury in, please. And if we could have the doors in the back of the Courtroom closed as well so that no one is interrupted during either the closings or the instructions.” Dupont also submitted the affidavit of an attorney stating that he attempted to enter the courtroom at some point during that afternoon, but the door was locked. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld denial of the motion, noting the lack of any supporting record. View "State of Maine v. Dupont" on Justia Law

The trust sought a building permit, to replace a dilapidated 1950s minesweeper deckhouse on the Owls Head property with a new, larger single-family residence. The existing structure is located partly within a 75-foot setback zone from the Atlantic Ocean; it contains a wetland of special significance that would necessitate a Maine Department of Environmental Protection permit before building. The new structure would be located partly within the setback zone, but farther from the ocean, with an addition lying completely outside of the setback zone and not encroaching on the wetland. The Planning Board approved the plan, finding that under the Town’s Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, "this is a nonconforming structure and it may be re-located, further away from the ocean, but not into the wetland ... to the greatest extent practical." The Board of Appeals reversed. The Superior Court agreed, finding the Board should not have considered the proposed addition before determining whether the relocation of the existing structure “conforms to all setback requirement[s] to the greatest practical extent.” The proper analysis would have been to first consider how the existing structure could be relocated to conform and to then consider whether an addition outside of the setback area could be constructed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court remanded, agreeing with the BOA and lower court, and finding that the Board applied the wrong ordinance section in considering the permit application. View "Osprey Family Trust v. Town of Owls Head." on Justia Law