Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At jury selection for Frisbee’s trial on charges of unlawful sexual contact, Frisbee’s attorney saw a former client, who had no connection to the matter, in the courtroom. The spectator had spent 11 months in prison for threats against Frisbee’s attorney and his family. In addition, both the judge and the State’s Attorney had previously prosecuted the spectator, who had just been released from prison for criminal threatening involving potential juror 116, later empaneled on the case. The spectator was glaring, making gestures, and smirking. The court instructed the marshals to remove the spectator. Jury selection continued without incident. During trial the spectator reappeared, closer to juror 116. The court ordered a recess and discussed the matter with the State and Frisbee’s attorney, who reported that the spectator had been seen with a weapon. The court directed security to take the spectator through security screening and interviewed juror 116, who stated that she was “very distracted.” The court excluded the spectator from the trial. The next day, the court learned that the spectator had been in the building and had approached jurors, asking them to take a copy of a book that he had written. Frisbee’s attorney requested that the jury be sequestered. The court questioned each juror; all except juror 116 stated that they had not been distracted and all of stated that the spectator in no way would affect their ability to be fair and impartial. The court denied the request. Later, the court and the parties learned that the spectator had left his notebook at the courthouse, with a threatening statement. Frisbee unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Frisbee’s conviction and sentence, finding that he had received a fair trial. View "State of Maine v. Frisbee" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Services filed child protection petitions regarding three boys, alleging that the children were in jeopardy due to mother's failure to protect them from physical abuse by her husband, and that she had deprived them of an adequate education. The court found that husband, who is not the father of any of the children, struck Sean with a wooden spoon after Sean did not say that he had vomited before reaching the bathroom. The assault caused a scratch “between [Sean’s] scrotum and anus.” The court determined that modifying Sean’s parents’ existing parental rights judgment would protect him. The amended judgment awarded shared parental rights and responsibilities, except that primary residence and “all decision-making authority concerning educational and medical decisions” were awarded to Sean’s father. The court ordered that neither parent use or permit physical discipline. While the mother’s appeal was pending, the court, by agreement among the Department, mother, and the twins’ father, determined that an order modifying the twins’ parents’ existing parental rights judgment would protect the twins from jeopardy. Both petitions were dismissed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and clarifying that Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure do not prohibit a trial court, pending disposition of an appeal from a jeopardy order, from acting under 22 M.R.S. 4036(1-A) to dismiss a protection petition. View "In re Nicholas S." on Justia Law

In 2009 Priscilla’s birth parents consented to termination of their parental rights. Her maternal grandmother adopted Priscilla, then six-years-old. Despite the consent, the court explicitly found that the parents were unfit and that termination was in the best interest of the child.The court noted that any continued contact with the child was unlikely unless the relationship between the parents and the grandmother improved considerably. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. In 2014, the parents petitioned to annul the adoption, arguing that it was obtained by fraud or duress, 18-A M.R.S. 9-315(a)(1). The court excluded evidence of statements allegedly made during settlement discussions before the termination hearing, regarding the possibility of continued limited contact with Priscilla. The court granted the grandmother judgment, finding that the evidence did not prove that without consent, there would not have been a termination. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. While M.R. Evid. 408(a)(2) did not bar admission of the statements, which were not offered to prove the validity or amount of the claim about which the parties were negotiating, any error in excluding them was harmless, as was excluding evidence of the mother and grandmother’s past relationship. In 2009, the court informed the parents that any expectations created during settlement discussions regarding future contact might not be fulfilled. The termination was based on a finding that the statutory requirements for termination had been met. View "Adoption of Priscilla D." on Justia Law

After 26 years of marriage, including six years legally separated, McLeod, who resides in Shanghai, and Macul, who resides in Malaysia, divorced in 2012. In consideration of an unequal division of property, Macul was awarded $5,000 per month in support for 120 months, not to be extended. At the time, McLeod’s income was $376,728, and Macul had only investment income of $7,698. In 2014, McLeod moved to modify the award, alleging a substantial change in circumstances because his employment was going to be terminated in June 2014. The court granted McLeod’s motion, concluding that his one-time severance package was not “income from an ongoing source,” 19-A M.R.S. 2001(5)(A). McLeod acquired new employment three months after his termination, but at a 40 percent reduction in pay with no benefits. Macul had “significant job skills, but has made no effort to become gainfully employed.” Because Macul had been employed in hospital administration and had training as an English language teacher, the court found, “[s]he could earn $30,000 to $50,000 if she tried.” The court ordered complete termination of spousal support, retroactive to July 2014. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated. The lower court erred in its “substantial change” analysis by failing to consider McLeod’s severance payment and should not have reconsidered evidence of factors that existed at the time of the divorce. Its “modification” determination should have considered other factors. View "McLeod v. Macul" on Justia Law

Kelley and Gordius had a romantic relationship for 10 years before they married in May 2012. Gordius’s child was born in July 2011, while the two were together but unmarried. Although they had been living together for several years, Pennartz is the child’s biological father. Before Gordius and Kelley were married, a court determined Pennartz’s paternity, awarded shared parental rights and responsibilities, and granted Gordius primary residence of the child and Pennartz weekly contact. While Gordius and Kelley lived together before their October 2013 breakup, Kelley was very close to and supportive of Gordius’s child. When Gordius filed for divorce, Kelley moved to modify the parental rights and responsibilities order, claiming status as a de facto parent. The court consolidated the divorce and that motion, preliminarily granted Kelley de facto parent status, and awarded him the right to have contact with the child. In its final order, the court stated that it “remains convinced . . . that Mr. Kelley has undertaken a permanent, equivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life . . . and that Mr. Kelley’s exclusion from [the child’s] life will hurt the child,” but concluded that Kelley failed to establish his status as a de facto parent because the “circumstances cannot be deemed exceptional.” The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated, noting that key factual findings were in conflict. View "Gordius v. Kelley" on Justia Law

A daughter was born to Carey and Knight in 2010. The child was hospitalized with a serious illness when she was about a month old. Knight ended his relationship with Carey and removed himself from his daughter’s life. Carey moved into Kilborn’s home when the child was two months old; they married weeks later, including an informal “adoption” ceremony. They held the child out as Kilborn’s “adopted” daughter. Kilbourn actively participated in the child’s life, including providing day-to-day care. The couple discussed formal adoption, but he understood that Knight was unwilling or unable to consent. Kilborn and Carey had two children together. The children were raised as full siblings.Carey’s daughter refers to Kilborn as “daddy.” Kilborn's parents have acted as grandparents to all three children. In 2014, Kilborn sought a divorce and requested that he be declared the de facto father of Carey’s daughter. Carey opposed Kilborn’s request and denied him access to the child, though he had visitation with his biological children. She attempted to reintroduce Knight into the child’s life. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child’s life would be substantially and negatively affected by Kilborn’s absence and that Kilborn had satisfied his burden of showing that he is the child’s de facto parent. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, noting that the Maine Parentage Act, 19-A M.R.S. 1831-1938, will soon take effect and mirrors precedent. View "Kilborn v. Carey" on Justia Law

The father of Woodard’s child died seven months after the child’s birth. There is no evidence that Woodard is an unfit parent. Dorr, the mother of the deceased father, sought court-ordered visitation with Woodard’s child, alleging a sufficient existing relationship between herself and the child, or, in the alternative, that she had made a sufficient effort to establish a relationship, 19-A M.R.S. 1803(1)(B), (C). Before the child’s birth, Dorr attended a baby shower. Dorr was in the hospital on the evening that the child was born—September 3, 2012. Dorr had additional, unspecified contact with the child until Dorr’s son died and Woodard ceased contact with Dorr. Mediation was unsuccessful. Woodard moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Act infringes on her fundamental right to govern the care, custody, and control of her child, and is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. The court dismissed Dorr’s petition, finding that the affidavit did not establish a sufficient existing relationship with the child or a sufficient effort to establish such a relationship, and did not make an initial showing of “urgent reasons” that would justify infringement on the mother’s rights. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, finding that Dorr lacked standing, given the lack of “urgent reasons.” View "Dorr v. Woodard" on Justia Law

In 2014, Hailey’s mother petitioned the Cumberland County Probate Court for Hailey’s paternal grandparents to be appointed as guardians so that Hailey could attend school in Freeport. She withdrew the petition weeks later, stating that the arrangement was “for an educational purpose that [was] no longer needed.” .Weeks later, the grandparents petitioned to have themselves appointed as guardians of the child, stating that the child needed a safe and supportive environment and had threatened to run away from her mother’s house. The child began to live with her grandparents in January 2015. The child’s father consented to the guardianship, but her mother did not. The court heard testimony from the child, then 15 years old; her parents; and a clinician who had provided treatment services to the child and her mother, and entered a judgment finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother had created a living situation that was at least temporarily intolerable for the child and that a guardianship with the grandparents was in the child’s best interest; mother had shown an inability to meet the child’s needs that threatened the child. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting challenges to the court’s findings and to the award of a full, rather than limited, guardianship, with no arrangement for transition back to mother’s home. View "Guardianship of Hailey M." on Justia Law

Brown, a 95-year-old resident of North Yarmouth, lives on his farm and keeps bees. Karen helped Brown and also raised her own bees and harvested honey there. Brown's family was concerned about Karen’s influence over Brown and her inclusion in his will. Brown’s grandson called Karen to tell her that “things were going to change.” Karen became concerned about valuable harvested honey that she had stored at Brown’s farm. Brown’s family members and Karen and her husband, Merrill, met at the farm. Brown’s daughter called 9-1-1. Merrill and Kelley, Brown’s son-in-law, had a confrontation on the driveway. Merrill tried to push Kelley but stumbled backward, then pulled out a handgun and shot Kelley three times. Kelley died at the hospital from his wounds. Merrill was convicted of murder, 17-A M.R.S. 201(1)(A). The court sentenced Kimball to 25 years’ imprisonment. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in declining to give a jury instruction addressing the affirmative defense of adequate provocation; admitting evidence that Merrill had been drinking on the day at issue; and limiting evidence concerning the relationships between Kimball’s family members and the victim’s family members. View "Maine v. Kimball" on Justia Law

Terrence E. Pinkham appealed the Superior Court's award of $41,500 as just compensation for the MDOT's taking of a portion of his property by eminent domain for a road improvement project. The court agreed with Pinkham's contention that the Superior Court erred by ruling that the MDOT was not required to provide in discovery those portions of its appraiser’s report appraising other properties taken for the project pursuant to 23 M.R.S. 63. In this case, the interests of justice require that Pinkham be given the opportunity to review that information in discovery - within the constraints of any protective provisions to preclude its public disclosure pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 26 - and to seek its admission at a new trial. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pinkham v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law