Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of thirteen hunting, fishing, and firearm-related offenses. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction on five of the thirteen counts challenged by Defendant; (2) the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss two of the charges based on an accord and satisfaction that was offered to the court due to the lack of clarity regarding the validity of the accord and satisfaction offered; (3) Defendant was not prejudiced when he was not provided physical access to the actual fish in the State’s possession prior to trial; and (4) a misstatement of fact made by the State during its closing argument did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. McBreairty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kevin Strong and Defendants Rebecca Brakeley and Jonathan Bausman were all physicians licensed to practice medicine in Maine. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging that certain negative statements made by them on a credentials verification system’s questionnaires caused St. Mary’s Regional Medical Center to deny him staff privileges. Plaintiff asserted claims for defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship and sought punitive damages. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were entitled to absolute immunity for their statements pursuant to 24 Me. Rev. Stat. 2511. The superior court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendants’ answers to the questionnaires “constituted eligible reports by eligible reporters made for the purpose of assisting a board, authority, or committee in carrying out its statutory duties as a matter of law within the plain meaning of section 2511(3).” View "Strong v. Brakeley" on Justia Law

After entering conditional guilty pleas to several counts of an indictment and a bench trial on aggravating factors only, Defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class A) and one count of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgments of conviction, holding (1) in this case, the State was required to prove specific weights of actual heroin, not mixtures or compounds containing some amount of heroin; and (2) the State did not prove the weight of the actual heroin involved. Remanded. View "State v. Pinkham" on Justia Law

Benjamin Yap filed a complaint for protection from abuse against Alyssa Vinton on behalf of himself and the parties’ child. A temporary protection was granted awarding Yap temporary sole parental rights and responsibilities. Yap subsequently filed a complaint for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities. The court issued a protection from abuse order that shared parental rights and responsibilities and awarded Yap primary residence of the child. After a hearing for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities, Vinton submitted a proposed order for the court’s consideration. The court adopted, in its entirety and with one change, Vinton’s proposed parental rights order and findings of fact and conclusions of law. Yap appealed, contending that the judge erred by adopting the language of Vinton’s proposed order verbatim and by not exercising independent judgment. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court’s findings were not the result of careful judicial deliberation and the exercise of independent judgment. View "Yap v. Vinton" on Justia Law

Benjamin Yap filed a complaint for protection from abuse against Alyssa Vinton on behalf of himself and the parties’ child. A temporary protection was granted awarding Yap temporary sole parental rights and responsibilities. Yap subsequently filed a complaint for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities. The court issued a protection from abuse order that shared parental rights and responsibilities and awarded Yap primary residence of the child. After a hearing for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities, Vinton submitted a proposed order for the court’s consideration. The court adopted, in its entirety and with one change, Vinton’s proposed parental rights order and findings of fact and conclusions of law. Yap appealed, contending that the judge erred by adopting the language of Vinton’s proposed order verbatim and by not exercising independent judgment. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court’s findings were not the result of careful judicial deliberation and the exercise of independent judgment. View "Yap v. Vinton" on Justia Law

Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting (MFBH) is a Maine ballot question committee that was a proponent of November 2014 Ballot Question 1 concerning bear hunting and trapping. As early as September 2013, the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife used agency resources to communicate with the public in opposition to Question 1. MFBH filed a complaint against the Department alleging that the Department’s campaign activities constituted an ultra vires expenditure of public funds. In November 2014, Maine voters defeated the ballot question. The Department subsequently filed a motion to dismiss MFBH’s complaint on the grounds of mootness and standing. In March 2015, the superior court dismissed the complaint as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the case is moot and that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. View "Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting (MFBH) is a Maine ballot question committee that was a proponent of November 2014 Ballot Question 1 concerning bear hunting and trapping. As early as September 2013, the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife used agency resources to communicate with the public in opposition to Question 1. MFBH filed a complaint against the Department alleging that the Department’s campaign activities constituted an ultra vires expenditure of public funds. In November 2014, Maine voters defeated the ballot question. The Department subsequently filed a motion to dismiss MFBH’s complaint on the grounds of mootness and standing. In March 2015, the superior court dismissed the complaint as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the case is moot and that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. View "Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

On February 17, 2012, John Deschenes fell down stairs at Sanford City Hall. On August 13, 2012, 178 days after his fall, Deschenes appeared at City Hall and spoke to the Finance Assistant and the Finance Director regarding his fall and medical treatment. On September 1, 2012, 197 days after his accident, Deschenes provided the City Manager with written notice of a claim against the City based on his fall. On January 28, 2014, Deschenes filed a complaint with the superior court. The City moved for summary judgment, asserting that Deschenes’s written notice was sent after the Maine Tort Claims Act’s 180-day deadline for submitting a written notice of claim against a governmental entity. The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Deschenes failed to substantially comply with the notice requirement of the Act. Deschenes appealed, arguing that he substantially complied with the statute because the City was aware of his accident and was not prejudiced by his failure to file a written notice before the 180-day deadline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person cannot substantially comply with the Act if he provides only oral notice of his claim. View "Deschenes v. City of Sanford" on Justia Law

This case arose from disputes regarding the permissible uses of an easement that burdened the land owned by Charles Wardwell and benefitted and abutting parcel owned by John and Corie Duggins. Wardwell filed a complaint requesting that the superior court declare that the Dugginses’ activities exceeded the scope of the easement. The court declared in part that the scope of the easement included hunting and recreational activity. Wardwell then moved to amend the judgment by excluding the terms “hunting and recreation” from the declaration of the scope of the easement. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err by finding that hunting and recreation were uses contemplated by the parties to the original conveyance and in denying Wardwell’s motion to amend the judgment to exclude those uses from the scope of the easement. View "Wardwell v. Duggins" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal threatening. Before trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he had made after police officers stopped his vehicle, took his license and registration, and asked him to wait for a detective to arrive. The suppression court granted the motion in part but denied it as to the statements Defendant made before he was placed in handcuffs and arrested, holding that Defendant was not in custody until he was placed in handcuffs and that after he was handcuffed he did not waive his Miranda rights. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by declining to suppress the statements that he made to the detective before his formal arrest. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and vacated the suppression order in part, holding that Defendant was in custody when he responded to the detective’s questions and accusations, and because he was in custody when he made incriminating statements without the benefit of Miranda warnings, those statements were improperly admitted at trial. Remanded. View "State v. King" on Justia Law