Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff applied for abatement of real property taxes that the Town of Lebanon assessed against her property for the tax years 2011 through 2013. The Town denied the application on the basis that the taxes had been paid. After a de novo hearing, the York County Commissioners ultimately denied Plaintiff’s application for abatement for tax years 2011 and 2012 and remanded the matter for further action with respect to tax year 2013. The superior court affirmed the decision of the Commissioners with respect to the 2011 and 2012 tax years. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to supply the Court with a complete and defined record of the evidence and arguments presented to the Commissioners, the Court could not review Plaintiff’s argument that the Commissioners were compelled to authorize an abatement. View "Penkul v. Town of Lebanon" on Justia Law

Kevin and Lisa Dube divorced pursuant to a final divorce judgment granting Lisa and Kevin shared parental rights and responsibilities of the parties’ daughter. Kevin appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment as to the spousal and child support awards and otherwise affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in setting Kevin’s rights of contact with his daughter; but (2) erred in finding that Kevin earns $175,000 per year, a finding underpinning both the spousal and the child support awards. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Dube v. Dube" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of failing to label an observation stand. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State was equitably estopped from prosecuting him because, when he purchased his hunting license, he was given a magazine endorsed by the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife (IF&W) that misstated the law concerning tree stands. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to prove that IF&W made any misrepresentation in its publication that Defendant relied upon to his detriment, and therefore, the trial court correctly determined that the single source of controlling law was the statute duly enacted by the Legislature. View "State v. Austin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and related crimes. Before trial, Defendant moved for a change of venue on the ground that the pretrial publicity surrounding the case was so prejudicial that selecting the jury would be “an exercise in futility.” The court deferred ruling on the motion before the jury was impaneled. The jury was subsequently impaneled, and Defendant did not renew his motion for change of venue at any point in the proceedings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court did not err by declining to change the trial venue based on pretrial publicity, as there was no basis for the court to find that Defendant could not receive a fair trial in that venue; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. View "State v. Black" on Justia Law

In 2009, Mother and Father were divorced pursuant to a judgment of divorce that awarded Mother primary residence of the couple’s children and provided Father eight weeks of visitation with the children per year. In 2013, the district court modified the divorce judgment to provide for shared residence of the children. In 2014, Father again filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment and a motion for contempt. Thereafter, Mother requested a change of venue, which the district court granted. The court subsequently modified the divorce judgment by awarding Mother primary residence of the children and reducing Father’s visitation time. In addition, the court found Mother was in contempt for her refusal to comply with the terms of the 2013 order and granted Father’s request for attorney fees. The court declined to impose further sanctions on Mother. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) transferring this matter to a court where additional judicial resources were available; (2) modifying the divorce judgment; and (3) awarding attorney fees as a remedial sanction for Mother’s contempt and declining to impose additional sanctions. View "Hamlin v. Cavagnaro" on Justia Law

Carol Reece applied for a coastal sand dune permit to create a vehicle access way to her property abutting a beach and to develop and lawn and walkway on the property. The Department of Environmental Protection granted the permit. Abutting landowner Jonathan Day and others appealed. The Board of Environmental Protection reached a de novo decision granting Reece’s application. The superior court vacated the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court’s judgment, holding that the Board’s interpretations of its own ambiguous rules do not conflict with the relevant statutes or with the rules, and the rules do not compel at the interpretation reached by the superior court. Remanded for entry of a judgment affirming the Board’s decision to grant Reece the permit. View "Day v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Town of Eddington Planning Board and Board of Selectmen seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent a public vote on a moratorium on quarries and a declaration that any moratorium that might be approved was null, void, and of no legal effect because the town violated the open meeting requirements imposed by the Freedom of Access Act (FOAA) during an executive session. The trial court entered a judgment for the Town, determining that the executive session, invoked for the purpose of consulting with counsel, had complied with the FOAA. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the moratorium should be declared null and void. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in determining that the executive session complied with the conditions specified in the FOAA. View "Hughes Bros., Inc. v. Town of Eddington" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that a statement made by the prosecutor during closing argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct that deprived him of a fair trial, that the court’s jury instruction on self-defense was erroneous, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor’s statement did not constitute misconduct; (2) the court’s instructions were internally consistent and legally accurate; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a construction company, perfected a mechanic’s lien on Defendants’ property and filed a five-count complaint alleging that Defendants breached a contract with Plaintiff to renovate their house by failing to make any payments. The superior court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on its breach of contract, Prompt Payment Act, and mechanic’s lien claims. Defendants filed a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 59, arguing that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to the time and manner of payment. The court denied the motion and later dismissed the remaining counts of Plaintiff’s complaint. Defendants appealed, arguing that Plaintiff could not succeed on any of its claims because the parties’ oral contract was unenforceable pursuant to the Home Construction Contracts Act. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendants failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. View "Warren Constr. Group, LLC v. Reis" on Justia Law

John Dyer gave a promissory note and a mortgage on property securing the note to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The mortgage contained language naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as lender’s nominee. The Bank of New York later filed a complaint for foreclosure, asserting that Dyer had stopped making payments on the note and that he owed the Bank over $1 million. During the trial, the Bank filed a motion to dismiss its complaint without prejudice on the ground that it did not have the requisite standing to pursue its claim. Dyer filed an objection requesting that any dismissal be with prejudice and that he be awarded his attorney fees and costs. The district court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss without prejudice and declined to award additional attorney fees or costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint without prejudice and in declining to award Dyer his full attorney fees and costs. View "Bank of New York v. Dyer" on Justia Law