Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Scotts joined owned inland property located in the Town of Owls Head. The Edwardses jointly owned waterfront property near the Scotts’ property. A way extended across the Edwardses’ property, terminating in a cul-de-sac that was located partly on the Edwardses’ property. In 2011, the Edwardses sued the Scotts and the the Town seeking a declaratory judgment that the Scotts had no right to use and the Town had no interest in Plaintiffs’ property. The superior court concluded (1) a 1986 dedication and its acceptance by the Town created a public easement that extended over the way and cul-de-sac located on the Edwardses’ land; and (2) a 1924 conveyance created an easement over the beach located on the Edwardses’ property that benefitted the Scotts’ property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) did not err in finding that the Edwardses’ predecessor intended to create a public easement over the way and cul-de-sac; and (2) did not err in concluding that the dedication petition sufficiently described the property. View "Edwards v. Blackman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of gross sexual assault and fifteen counts of unlawful sexual contact. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction review, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing when Defendant was allegedly incompetent and was unable to exercise his right of allocution due to his emotional state. The court denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the evidence did not compel the court to find that Defendant was deprived of constitutionally effective assistance when his trial counsel proceeded with, rather than sought to continue, the sentencing hearing despite Defendant’s confused and emotional state. View "Middleton v. State" on Justia Law

After Father threatened his ex-girlfriend with sharpened knives and included his seven-year old child in the assault, the Department of Health and Human Services petitioned the district court for a child protection order. The court entered a jeopardy order by agreement. Thereafter, the Department filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights, alleging that Father’s involvement of the child in the assault constituted “heinous and abhorrent conduct” creating a presumption of parental unfitness. After a hearing, the court terminated Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court’s finding that Father’s conduct was “heinous and abhorrent” was sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Father was unfit to parent his child. View "In re J.V." on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating under the influence (OUI) enhanced with one prior OUI conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred by allowing the arresting officer to testify about Defendant’s statements and the officer’s observations indicating Defendant’s impairment from drugs other than alcohol because the officer lacked sufficient training or expertise in drug impairment recognition and could not perform certain evaluations that a drug recognition expert could have. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any deficiencies in an officer’s training or expertise goes to the weight, but not the admissibility, of the officer’s testimony regarding observations of impairment; and (2) the trial court in this case did not err in admitting the arresting officer’s testimony regarding his observations and the results of the field sobriety tests, as the officer was qualified to testify as to his observations, that evidence was relevant to the OUI charge, and its admission was not otherwise barred. View "State v. Atkins" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was discharged from her employment at a nursing home owned by Defendant, Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that Defendant violated the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) by terminating her because she had made complaints about staffing and patient safety. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the record was sufficient to allow a jury to reasonably find that Plaintiff’s complaints constituted a protected activity under the WPA and that the adverse employment action was substantially motivated at least in part by retaliatory intent; and (2) accordingly, Plaintiff presented a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation. View "Cormier v. Genesis Healthcare LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating under the influence (OUI). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial after the State’s attorney asked Defendant about prior interactions with police officers in the context of OUI offenses, as the State’s attorney did not ask the question in bad faith; and (3) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error by using a jury verdict form, as the use of the verdict form was entirely appropriate. View "State v. Fay" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted in Cumberland County for burglary and theft by unauthorized taking or transfer. Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to Class C theft by unauthorized taking or transfer. Appellant was subsequently indicted in York County for theft by receiving stolen property. The two indictments concerned the taking of items from a residence in South Portland and the sale of the items in Biddeford. The second case was resolved by a plea agreement. In January 2014, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief from the York County conviction and sentence, claiming that his trial counsel in the York County matter had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move the York County indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied Appellant’s request for relief, concluding that different conduct formed the basis of the Cumberland and York County cases. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the trial court’s judgment denying Appellant post-conviction relief, holding (1) the second indictment charged Appellant with the same offense for which he had already been convicted and punished; and (2) trial counsel’s failure to seek dismissal of the York County indictment established that Appellant was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. View "Ayotte v. State" on Justia Law

Mother and Father met in Guatemala, and their child was born there. When the child was approximately fifteen months old, Father filed a complaint in Maine to establish parental rights and responsibilities. Mother was not served in Maine and did not consent to jurisdiction in Maine, and neither Mother nor the child ever resided in Maine. Mother moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Maine lacked long-arm jurisdiction over her. The district court granted Mother's motion to dismiss, determine that Maine lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined that the UCCJEA governed its determination of jurisdiction in this matter. View "Seekings v. Hamm" on Justia Law

The Bowers Wind Project proposed to place sixteen wind turbines within the boundary of an expedited permitting area, making them visible from multiple scenic resources of state or national significance. Champlain Wind, LLC filed an application with the Department of Environmental Protection seeking permits to construct the Project. The Department denied Champlain’s application, concluding that the Project did not satisfy the statutory scenic standard. The Board of Environmental Protection affirmed the Department’s denial of Champlain’s permit application, concluding that the Project would “unreasonably adversely affect scenic character and existing uses related to scenic character.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not act unlawfully or arbitrarily in its determination that the visual impact of the Project would have an unreasonable adverse effect on the existing scenic character or existing uses related to scenic character of nine affected great ponds. View "Champlain Wind, LLC v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

William Googins committed an intentional assault of Eric Benson, which resulted in Benson’s death. Benson’s estate sued Googins in tort. Googins consented to a judgment in favor of the Estate and assigned to the Estate all rights he may have had against Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, whose potential liability stemmed from a homeowner’s policy it issued to Goggins’s grandmother that was active at the time of the assault. Pursuant to the agreement, the superior court entered a judgment against Googins, after which the Estate filed a reach-and-apply action against Metropolitan. Metropolitan filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a determination as to its obligation to indemnify Googins. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan, declaring that it had no contractual obligation to indemnify Googins. Specifically, the court found that the claim was precluded by an intentional loss exclusion because Googins intentionally assaulted Benson. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in determining that Googins’s conduct was within the scope of the intentional loss exclusion. View "Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Benson" on Justia Law