Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gerard Brady brought a claim against Cumberland County for employment retaliation pursuant to the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), alleging that disciplinary action taken against him by the County was motivated by complaints he made about the investigation of an incident at the Cumberland County jail. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County on Brady’s WPA claim, concluding that Brady failed to present a prima facie case of retaliation. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Brady produced sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that the adverse employment action taken against Brady was substantially motivated at least in part by retaliatory intent; and (2) the application of the compartmentalized three-step process set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green to the summary judgment stage of WPA retaliation cases is not appropriate. View "Brady v. Cumberland County" on Justia Law

A Bank filed a residential foreclosure complaint against Appellant, alleging that Appellant executed a promissory note and a mortgage securing the note on certain property and that Appellant defaulted on the note. The Bank claimed that, through a series of endorsements and assignments, the Bank had acquired rights in the mortgage and authority to enforce the note. The trial court entered a judgment in Appellant’s favor, concluding that the Bank failed to provide Appellant with a statutorily-complaint notice of the default and of his right to cure. The court then prospectively reserved to the Bank the right to relitigate a second foreclosure action. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the judgment reserving to the parties the right to relitigate all issues in a future foreclosure action, as the trial court entered a final judgments on the merits in favor of Appellant, and there was no special reason identified for affirmatively reserving the parties’ rights to relitigate. The Court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tannenbaum" on Justia Law

Wife was a passenger on a motorcycle operated by Husband when she was injured in an accident. At the time, Wife and Husband were named insureds on a motorcycle insurance policy from Insurer. Wife filed a complaint against Husband alleging negligence in connection with the accident. A jury found Husband negligent and awarded Wife $50,000 in damages. Husband moved to amend the judgment to obtain a credit for the amount in prejudgment payments that the Insurer had made to Wife. The superior court granted Husband’s motion to amend the judgment. Wife appealed, arguing that the court erred in interpreting Me. Rev. Stat. 24-A, 2426 to allow Husband a credit against the judgment for the medical payments maximum coverage of what Insurer had already paid to Wife’s medical providers before this action was commenced. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order amending judgment, as the court did not determine whether the payments Insurer paid Wife’s medical providers were medical or liability payments. Remanded for a factual determination of the type of prepayments Insurer made, whether liability payments pursuant to Husband’s policy, medical payments pursuant to Wife’s policy, or some other type of payment. View "Wood v. Wood" on Justia Law

Following a hearing on a petition filed by the Department of Health and Human Services to terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights to their son, the district court found three grounds of unfitness as to Mother, that Father was unwilling and unable to protect his son from jeopardy, and that these circumstances were unlikely to change within a time that was reasonably calculated to meet the son’s needs. The court also found that termination was in the son’s best interest. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the district court’s finding that they were not fit to parent their son, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the son’s best interest. View "In re B.P." on Justia Law

Following a hearing on a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her daughter, the district court entered a judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights, finding that Mother was unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child in a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The court subsequently denied Mother’s motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) based on her allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed after setting forth the process a parent and courts must follow when a parent claims ineffective assistance in a motion for relief from judgment, holding that the district court did not deny Mother’s due process rights when it declined to allow her to call additional witnesses at the Rule 60(b)(6) hearing or abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for relief from judgment. View "In re M.P." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of unlawful sexual assault. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction review, alleging that his trial counsel failed to provide effective representation during the pretrial and trial proceedings. After a hearing, the superior court denied Defendant’s petition based on its conclusion that Defendant failed to establish that he was “actually prejudiced by any such deficiencies.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the post-conviction judgment and remanded for reconsideration, holding that the superior court’s decision applied a test for prejudice that did not fully implement the proper standard of prejudice established in Strickland v. Washington. View "Theriault v. State" on Justia Law

In 2013, the district granted the parties in this case a divorce. The judgment provided that the parties were to share many parental rights and responsibilities and awarded primary residence of one child to Father and the other two children to Mother. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions to modify. The court struck the grant of the divorce itself and redesignated the remaining aspects of its previous orders as interim orders. After a final hearing, the district court issued a judgment awarding sole parental rights and responsibilities to Mother for one year and ordered that Father pay Mother spousal support. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the court gave proper deference and weight to prior orders issued in the case; (2) the court did not err in awarding sole parental rights and responsibilities to Mother; (3) the court properly assigned responsibility to a counselor for establishing a schedule of Father’s rights of contact with the children; (4) the court’s parental rights determination did not violate the children’s constitutional rights to procedural due process; (5) the court’s award of spousal support was not an abuse of discretion; and (6) the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Mother. View "Pearson v. Wendell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a former school property from the Town of Dexter for future redevelopment, and the Town initially supported Plaintiff’s redevelopment efforts. After Plaintiff contested the Town’s tax assessment of the property, the Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) issued a stop work order and notice of violation prohibiting all work on the property. Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendant, the Town of Dexter, alleging that the Town’s actions, through its CEO, were arbitrary and capricious and deprived him of equal protection of law and the use and enjoyment of property, in violation of both the federal and state constitutions. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages. The superior court granted the Town’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the grounds that Plaintiff (1) failed to allege that the CEO’s actions were taken pursuant to a municipal policy, (2) failed to pursue available administrative relief, and (3) failed to allege that he faced discriminatory treatment as compared with others who were similarly situated. View "Marshall v. Town of Dexter" on Justia Law

In 2009, John Flynn joined the law firm of Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. (LLO). In 2011, Flynn left LLO to open his own practice. LLO and Daniel Lilley subsequently filed a complaint against Flynn seeking a judicial declaration that any contingency fees earned in cases that Flynn brought to LLO were the property of LLO to be distributed at Lilley’s sole discretion and seeking the return of such fees that Flynn had already received. Flynn counterclaimed. In 2012, the superior court denied LLO’s motion to consolidate this case with the closely-related cases at issue in Tucker v. Lilley. After a jury trial, the superior court entered judgment awarding Flynn unpaid salary from his tenure at LLO and apportioned attorney fees between the parties in cases that Flynn brought to LLO from his former law firm. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the superior court abused its discretion in declining to consolidate this case with the cases at issue in Tucker v. Lilley, as this case was an integral member of the set of cases that “must be resolved in one consolidated action before a single fact-finder.” Remanded with instructions to grant LLO’s motion to consolidate. View "Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. v. Flynn" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife were divorced in 2011 by a judgment of the district court that incorporated a settlement agreement. Based on that agreement, Husband was ordered to pay Wife spousal support In 2012, the court approved another agreed-upon order incorporating a second settlement agreement by the parties that reduced Husband’s spousal support obligation. In 2013, Husband filed a second motion to modify seeking to reduce or terminate his spousal support obligation. The court granted Husband’s motion in part by adjusting Husband’s spousal support award to accommodate for loss in property value of the marital home but otherwise declining to adjust the award. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) determining that the 2012 order, rather than the original divorce judgment, was the most recent final order; (2) finding no change in the parties financial circumstances except for the loss of the value in the house; and (3) declining to consider Wife’s earning capacity and related factors when it modified the support award. View "Gomberg v. Gomberg" on Justia Law