Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1973, the City of South Portland issued a variance to Kay Loring that brought her parcel of land, which was previously nonconforming, into dimensional conformity. For purposes of land use regulation, Loring’s 4,703 square foot lot became the equivalent of a conforming 5,000 square foot lot. In 2013, the City’s Building Inspector issued a building permit based on the 1973 variance that authorized Loring to construct a single-family house on her lot. Mary Campbell and others (collectively, Campbell), who owned nearby lots, appealed the issuance of the permit. The South Portland Board of Appeals affirmed the Building Inspector’s action, and the superior court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the 1973 variance was still in force when the building permit was issued, and the Building Inspector was authorized to act on Loring’s permit application; and (2) Campbell did not preserve her argument for municipal or judicial review that the building permit was not lawful because the proposed development would exceed the density restrictions for that zoning district. View "Campbell v. City of S. Portland" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of manslaughter and aggravated leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a change of venue due to pre-trial publicity; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on testimony of her Father about statements that Defendant made in the hospital following the accident; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert testimony regarding the presence of THC metabolites in a sample of Defendant’s blood; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Lowe" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the district court terminated the parental rights of Father to his minor child. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed the judgment as to termination of Father’s parental rights, holding that the court rationally could have found that Father was unable to protect his child from jeopardy or take responsibility for his child within a reasonable time frame, that Father did not make a good faith effort to reunify, and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest; and (2) dismissed the appeal in all other respects, holding that the denial of Father’s placement request was not subject to appellate review. View "In re L.D." on Justia Law

Melanie Steadman was the biological daughter of Steven Pagels. After Steadman left her family’s home she commenced this action, asserting claims for sexual assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. After a trial, the district court found Pagels liable to Steadman for all three tort claims alleged in her complaint and awarded Steadman both compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) even if the district court committed error in admitting evidence of Pagels’ prior bad acts, any error was harmless; and (2) the district court properly found Pagels liable for both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. View "Steadman v. Pagels" on Justia Law

Lawrence Tardiff and Katherine Sullivan were divorced pursuant to a divorce judgment after the parties reached a settlement agreement. The judgment provided that the primary residence of the parties’ minor child would be with Sullivan and that Tardiff would pay weekly child support. Sullivan later filed a motion for contempt alleging that Tardiff had not complied with the divorce judgment by failing to pay his share of the child’s daycare expenses, the property settlement, and attorney fees. Tardiff subsequently filed a motion to modify the visitation schedule and child support award. The district court modified the child support provisions by increasing Tardiff’s weekly child support payment instead of ordering the reduction he had requested. The court also granted Sullivan’s motion for contempt and imposed remedial sanctions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in modifying Tardiff’s child support payments; and (2) the court did not err by imposing coercive imprisonment as a sanction for Tardiff’s contempt. View "Sullivan v. Tardiff" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned most of Mouse Island in the Town of Southport in common with Defendants. Plaintiffs filed a complaint for equitable partition. Defendants counterclaimed. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ complaint for equitable partition. After a trial, the court awarded Defendants damages for nonpayment of commonly-shared expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the rights of first refusal in the parties’ deeds violated the rule against perpetuities and were therefore void as a matter of law; (2) the rights of first refusal in the parties’ separate contractual agreements with one another were valid vis-à-vis each other and constituted an effective waiver of these parties’ rights to equitable partition; and (3) the superior court did not err in apportioning expenses. View "Pew v. Sayler" on Justia Law

David Sullivan and Zoe Rockwood were divorced after a contested hearing. Sullivan later filed a motions to modify and enforce the divorce judgment. In his motion to modify, Sullivan argued that his spousal support obligation should be reduced because there had been a substantial change int he parties’ financial circumstances. In his motion to enforce, Sullivan alleged that Rockwood had not used the proceeds from Sullivan’s retirement account to pay debts as the divorce decree required. The district court denied both motions after a hearing. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the portion of the district court’s judgment denying Sullivan’s motion to enforce, holding that the district court was compelled to grant Sullivan’s motion to enforce because the undisputed evidence established that Rockwood failed to comply with unambiguous terms of the judgment; and (2) affirmed in all other respects, holding that district court did not err when it denied Sullivan’s request to call Rockwood’s former boyfriend as a witness and did not abuse its discretion when it declined to modify Sullivan’s spousal support obligation. View "Sullivan v. Rockwood" on Justia Law

Father and Mother were the parents of a minor child. In 2004, the district court entered a parental rights and responsibilities order granting the parties shared parental rights and responsibilities and shared primary residence. In 2007, the court amended the order so that the child would reside primarily with Mother and would stay with Father on weekends. In 2013, Mother moved to modify the 2007 order seeking sole parental rights and responsibilities, primary residence of the child, and a requirement that Father’s contact with the child be supervised. The court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err when it implicitly found a substantial change in circumstances and expressly concluded that it was in the child’s best interest to grant Mother sole parental rights and responsibilities and to require that Father’s contact with the child be supervised. View "Pearson v. Ellis-Gross" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of elevated aggravated assault. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison for the elevated aggravated assault and a concurrent six months in prison for the violation of a condition of release. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on Defendant’s direct appeal. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The post-conviction court denied Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of Defendant’s petition, holding that the court did not err in finding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel did not provide “reasonably effective assistance” as required by Strickland v. Washington. View "Manley v. State" on Justia Law

Defendants executed a note and mortgage deed in favor of a third party, and after several transactions, all rights created by the instruments were assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Defendants later defaulted, and Wells Fargo initiated this action for foreclosure. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the notice of default issued by Wells Fargo did not comply with Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111. The district court granted Defendants’ motion and entered summary judgment for them. In that same order, the court dismissed the foreclosure action without prejudice. The court then amended its previous order so that summary judgment was granted “in part.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the court’s orders of partial summary judgment and dismissal of the foreclosure action, holding that the trial court erred by granting less than full summary judgment and by dismissing the foreclosure action without prejudice. Remanded for reinstatement of the initial entry of full summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Girouard" on Justia Law