Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary and theft by unauthorized taking or transfer. Defendant was sentenced to two years and six months’ confinement on the burglary charge and a concurrent six-month sentence on the theft charge. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a witness to testify regarding the witness’s previous identification of Defendant in a now-unavailable surveillance video recording because the video was of poor quality and that the witness’s identification testimony was speculative and unreliable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court’s admission of the testimony was not an abuse of discretion, nor was it so unfairly prejudicial as to virtually deprive Defendant of a fair trial. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Marc Chamberlain was the father of two children who had been the care of their maternal grandmother for several years before and following the death of their mother. The children’s maternal grandmother and their maternal aunt petitioned the probate court for appointment as the children’s co-guardians. Chamberlain opposed the petition. The court entered a judgment appointing the grandmother, but not the aunt, as the children’s guardian. In making its decision, the court applied the plain language of Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 5-204(d) and found by a preponderance of the evidence that the grandmother was the children’s de facto guardian and that Chamberlain had not consistently participated in the children’s lives. Chamberlain appealed, arguing that section 5-204(d) is facially unconstitutional because it, and the statutes defining its terms, are unconstitutionally vague and violate due process. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the appointment of a guardian over a parent’s objection upon proof by the lower standard of a preponderance of the evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution. Remanded for the court to apply the constitutionally required standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence when applying section 5-204(d). View "In re Guardianship of Chamberlain" on Justia Law

During a party hosted by Delta Tau Delta’s (DTD) Gamma Nu chapter at its DTD fraternity house located on the University of Maine’s Orono campus, Plaintiff was sexually assaulted by Joshua Clukey and prevented from leaving his room for several minutes. Plaintiff filed a civil complaint against DTD and Delta Tau Delta National Housing Corporation (DTDNHC), alleging vicarious liability, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and premises liability. The trial court granted DTD and DTDNHC’s motion to dismiss with respect to the issue of vicarious liability and then granted summary judgment for DTD and DTDNHC on Plaintiff’s remaining claims, concluding that DTD and DTDNHC did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed dismissal of the vicarious liability claims; (2) vacated summary judgment in favor of DTD on the premises liability claim, holding that DTD had a duty to exercise reasonable care and take reasonable steps to provide premises that are reasonably safe and reasonably free from potential sexual misconduct by its members for all social invitees to chapter-sponsored events; and (3) affirmed summary judgment on the remaining counts. Remanded. View "Brown v. Delta Tau Delta" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder. After a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced to thirty-eight years’ incarceration and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,261. Defendant appealed from his judgment of conviction and applied to the Sentence Review Panel for the right to appeal his sentence to the Supreme Court. The Panel granted the application, but Defendant’s attorney for the appeals did not brief the sentencing issue. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction without mentioning the sentence appeal. Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction review, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on the sentence appeal. The trial court granted the petition and ordered that Defendant’s right to seek review of his sentence be reinstated. The Supreme Court granted Defendant’s motion to reinstate his sentence appeal and affirmed the sentence, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate any error in the court’s sentencing. View "State v. Butsitsi" on Justia Law

The dispute in this case involved the continuing existence, scope, and extent of easements over two roads leading to the beach or ocean in Kennebunk. In the Supreme Court’s opinion issued on the first appeal, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was vacated in part and remanded for consideration of issues the court had not reached related to the continued existence or abandonment of the easements. On remanded, instead of presenting evidence or testimony for trial, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Helen Rose and Nathaniel Merrill on their claim for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that because there were several genuine issues of material fact in dispute in this case, summary judgment was not appropriate. Remanded. View "Rose v. Parsons" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted theft by deception and two counts of tampering with public records or information. Defendant appealed, arguing that her conduct did not constitute a violation of Me. Rev. Stat. 12-A 456(1)(A), as interpreted in State v. Spaulding, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed after overruling Spaulding in part, holding (1) the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Defendant was guilty of attempted theft by deception; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of tampering with public records or information. View "State v. Beckwith" on Justia Law

After hearing what he described as a diesel-powered dump truck pass by his home one snowy morning in November, Plaintiff discovered that his mailbox had been damaged. Plaintiff filed a small-claims action against P&K Sand and Gravel, Inc., the town’s snowplow contractor, seeking $450 for the damage to his mailbox. The district court entered judgment in favor of P&K, concluding that Plaintiff had not met his burden of proof. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because Plaintiff’s appeal raised only issues of fact, the Court would not reach the merits of his arguments; and (2) the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for recusal. View "Yarcheski v. P&K Sand and Gravel, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of tampering with a witness, and on that basis, of violating a condition of release. Defendant appealed, arguing that the indictment was insufficient to inform him of the tampering charge and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction on that charge because he did not “expressly threaten the witness” and because the witness did not feel threatened by him. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because the statute allows a conviction for tampering with a witness based only on a defendant’s attempt to induce the witness not to testify against him, Defendant’s first argument was without merit; and (2) the remainder of Defendant’s arguments were not persuasive. View "State v. Clarke" on Justia Law

George Stanley filed a complaint against the Town of Greene alleging that the Town was interfering with his flea market business on his property by denying him a license. The Town counterclaimed against Stanley, seeking injunctive relief and fines for Stanley’s continued operation of his unlicensed flea market in violation of a town Ordinance. The superior court ultimately granted the Town’s motions to dismiss Stanley’s complaint for for default judgment on its counterclaim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Stanley’s motion for a temporary restraining order; (2) denying Stanley’s motions to set aside the default or for relief from default judgment; (3) denying Stanley’s motion to continue; and (4) denying Stanley’s motion for reconsideration. View "Stanley v. Town of Greene" on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant injured his left hand while working as a mechanic. Thereafter, the Maine Employers Mutual Insurance Company (MEMIC) began paying Appellant weekly workers’ compensation benefits. Appellant received checks from MEMIC for approximately six years, and Appellant stated that by signing the checks he regularly received he was agreeing that he was not working or receiving pay for work. In 2009, MEMIC discovered that Appellant was working full-time at a small-engine repair shop. In 2012, the Workers’ Compensation Board terminated Appellant’s benefits, after which MEMIC stopped issuing payments to Appellant. Appellant was subsequently found guilty of theft by deception in an amount exceeding $10,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) admitting certain testimony; (2) allowing the state to reopen its case after it had rested; and (3) failing to instruct the jury on an additional element of theft by deception. View "State v. Tucker" on Justia Law