Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of domestic violence assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that his right to confront witnesses against him under the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions was violated when the victim refused to testify and the court admitted hearsay statements from the victim in the form of an emergency 9-1-1 record and the victim’s statements to an EMT. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statements at issue that were admitted in evidence, including the 9-1-1 recording and the statements made to the EMT - were not testimonial in nature, and therefore, the trial court’s rulings did not exceed the bounds set by the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. View "State v. Kimball" on Justia Law

In 2013, Molly Jandreau filed a complaint for divorce from Daniel LaChance. The district court ordered LaChance to pay Jandreau $230 weekly in child support and divided the marital assets and liabilities. Jandreau appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by denying her requests for spousal support and attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Jandreau and vacated the portion of the judgment denying spousal support and attorney fees, holding that Jandreau was entitled to some amount of spousal support and that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to deny Jandreau’s request for attorney fees. View "Jandreau v. LaChance" on Justia Law

John and Judith Monahan were married in 1976. In 2011, John filed a complaint for divorce. After a final divorce hearing held in 2014, the district court made several factual findings. The court then entered an initial divorce judgment awarding Judith monthly spousal support. The judgment provided that the spousal support award was non-modifiable. John moved to amend the judgment seeking modifiable spousal support so that the award would conform with the district court’s preliminary memorandum of decision, which did not state that spousal support may not be modified. In an amended divorce judgment, the court declined to make the spousal support modifiable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment as amended, holding (1) the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in regard to the marital property division; but (2) the divorce judgment must be amended to remove the language prohibiting modification of spousal support, as, pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 951-A(4) as amended, the court could not direct that spousal support “may not be modified.” View "Monahan v. Monahan" on Justia Law

A New Jersey court entered a default judgment against Gawayne Dawson and for Safety Insurance Group. Safety Insurance subsequently sought enforcement of the judgment in Maine. The district court entered the New Jersey judgment and issued a notice of registration of foreign order. The court then issued a writ of execution. Safety Insurance moved to amend the writ to include post-judgment interest. The district court concluded that the post-judgment interest rate of New Jersey, rather than Maine, should apply to the foreign judgment. Before the court could finalize the writ, Safety Insurance brought this appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory and remanded so that the court may enter a final judgment after receiving the appropriate documentation. View "Safety Ins. Group v. Dawson" on Justia Law

After credit card fraud was discovered on vacations that Beth Rogers, a travel agent, had booked, Plaintiffs, two families, each filed a complaint against Mark Travel Corporation alleging breach of contract, economic duress, and violations of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The business and consumer docket granted summary judgment for Mark Travel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in determining that Plaintiffs’ claims against Mark Travel failed as a matter of law because Rogers was not an agent of Mark Travel, and Mark Travel did not authorize Rogers to act on its behalf, ratify Rogers’s fraudulent conduct, or hold Rogers out as its agent. View "Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of elevated aggravated assault, 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. 208-B(1)(A); elevated aggravated assault, 17-A, Me. Rev. Stat. 208-B(1)(B); and aggravated assault, Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A 208(1)(A). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Defendant voluntarily and intentionally waived his constitutional right to testify; (2) the evidence did not compel a determination that Defendant was not criminally responsible for the assault by reason of insanity; but (3) because the court sentenced Defendant for a single incident, and not three separate assaultive acts, the court erred by failing to consolidate the duplicative counts prior to entering its judgment of conviction or its sentence. Remanded for consolidated of the three counts through entry of a single conviction and for entry of a sentence on the single charge. View "State v. Murphy" on Justia Law

In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for statutory nuisance against Defendants, their neighbors, alleging that Defendants’ 2004 construction of a new home and garage resulted in damage to Plaintiffs’ home. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion on statute of limitations grounds without conducting a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the unopposed summary judgment record established that Plaintiffs’ complaint was barred by either the six-year limitations period for civil actions or the three-year limitations period for statutory nuisance claims. View "Halliday v. Henry" on Justia Law

Roland Gerrish created a trust consisting of certain property. The trust instrument provided that Julie and Shirley Gauthier would be the remainder beneficiaries upon Roland’s death. When Roland died, Shirley and Roland’s widow, Jacqueline, disputed the maintenance of property. Shirley filed a complaint for equitable partition against Jacqueline and the Gerrish Corporation and then requested an entry of default. The court issued default judgment and denied Jacqueline’s and the Corporation’s motion to join Julie as a necessary party. The superior court entered an order denying the motions to set aside the default and to join Julie, concluding that all necessary parties were joined, and granted the relief requested by Shirley. Jacqueline, the Corporation, and Julie appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred in concluding that all necessary parties were joined and in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before issuing the default judgment. Remanded. View "Gauthier v. Gerrish" on Justia Law

When Mason Station, LLC failed to pay assessed property taxes on multiple properties in the Town of Wiscasset, the Town filed a complaint against Mason Station for taxes owed on those properties and on certain personal property. Mason Station failed to timely file an answer, and the clerk entered a default and default judgment against Mason Station. Nearly eighteen months after the judgment was entered, Mason Station moved to set aside the default and for relief from default judgment, alleging that several days before the entry of the default judgment in favor of the Town, the Town had obtained ownership of the properties for which taxes were owed through automatic foreclosure and that the foreclosed properties had an assessed value in excess of the total amount owed on the judgment. The trial court declined to grant Mason Station relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the motions to set aside default and for relief from judgment, as Mason Station offered no good excuse for failing to file a timely answer to the Town’s complaint and failed to perform its duty to take legal steps to protect its own interests in the original litigation. View "Town of Wiscasset v. Mason Station, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2012, the district court entered an order protecting Jana Gehrke, Chad Gehrke’s ex-wife, and the parties’ sons. Thereafter, the order was twice modified, further constraining Chad’s contact with the children. In 2013, Jana filed her third motion to modify the protection order. After a hearing, the court found that Chad had committed abuse and entered an amended order prohibiting Chad from having any contact with Jana or the children. In 2014, Jana moved to extend the order of protection from abuse for two more years. The court entered a judgment extending the order of protection from abuse due to Chad’s pattern of violence, threats, suicide threats, and failure to comply with the increasingly restrictive court orders. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in relying on evidence of abuse that predated the initial protection from abuse order and determining that the extended order was necessary to protect Jana and the children; and (2) the extended protection order did not violate Defendant’s constitutionally protected parental rights. View "Gehrke v. Gehrke" on Justia Law