Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A police officer certified to operate the Intoxilyzer, a self-contained breath-alcohol testing apparatus, used the device to test Defendant’s breath-alcohol content. Defendant was subsequently charged with criminal operating under the influence. Pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 29-A, 2431(2)(D), Defendant requested that the State produce a qualified witness to testify at his trial. The officer who administered the test was scheduled to testify at trial, but there was no other expert available. Before trial, Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the breath-alcohol test result from evidence. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the State failed to produce a qualified witness. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the statute does not require the State to produce expert testimony in order to have the results of the Intoxilyzer admitted into evidence; and (2) the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution is not implicated when the declarant who administered the breath test is available to testify. View "State v. Tozier" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of violating Me. Rev. Stat. 12, 6575-G, which makes it a Class D crime to fish for or take elvers within 150 feet of a dam with a fishway or within 150 feet of a fishway. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in convicting him based on conduct that was not alleged in the Uniform Summons and Complaint (USC). In the USC, the State charged Defendant with “fishing for elvers within 150 feet of a dam with a fishway,” but the district court found Defendant guilty of fishing for elvers within 150 feet of a fishway, not a dam. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court’s factual findings were insufficient to support a conviction for the violation charged in the USC. View "State v. Stanley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of his second offense of failing to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. Defendant appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in excluding relevant evidence from the Department of Public Safety, State Bureau of Identification that caused him to believe, erroneously, that he was no longer required to register. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that, to the extent that the court determined that Defendant’s purported reliance on the letter was not believable, the court made a credibility determination that should have been made by the jury, and therefore, the court erred in excluding the letter. View "State v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Donald Paradis applied for and obtained a building permit to construct a two-car garage on property in the Town of Peru. After Paradis constructed the garage, the Town sent Paradis a notice of violation, stating that the garage violated multiple ordinance provisions. The Board of Appeals concluded that the appeal was properly denied. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the Board of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Paradis’s appeal, which deprived the courts of jurisdiction to consider it, as the notice of violation was not an appealable decision. Remanded. View "Paradis v. Town of Peru" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) approved Fox Islands Wind’s (Fox Island) application for certification to build and operate a small-scale wind energy development project and issued a certification with a condition requiring Fox Island to implement a noise-reduction operation plan. After some neighbors, organized as Fox Island Wind Neighbors (FIWN), complained about the noise from the turbines, DEP demanded that Fox Island submit a revised operation protocol for approval. DEP subsequently issued a condition compliance order (CCO) accepting the revised protocol. FIWN filed a Rule 80C petition challenging the CCO, complaining that DEP’s action did not go far enough. The superior court reversed the CCO and remanded to DEP but denied FIWN’s constitutional claims. DEP and Fox Island appealed, and FIWN cross-appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the CCO was a judicially reviewable enforcement action; (2) the issuance of the CCO was supported by substantial record evidence and was within the discretion of the DEP; and (3) FIWN's First Amendment retaliation claim failed because there was no adverse action taken by DEP against FIWN that would deter FIWN from further exercising its constitutional rights. View "Fox Islands Wind Neighbors v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of misdemeanor assault and was sentenced to one year in jail and one year of probation for each of the assault counts, to be served consecutively. As a condition of probation, Defendant was prohibited from having contact with his son except as specifically permitted by the family court. Defendant filed a motion to amend the conditions of probation. The court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion because the district court, in a collateral parenting action, had already allowed him to have supervised contact with his son. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court did not unconstitutionally infringe on Collins’s parental rights when it increased the restrictions on his rights of contact with his son that had been set in the separate judicial proceeding. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

Wayne Perkins applied to the Ogunquit Planning Board seeking site plan review and design review approval to convert his garage into a lobster pound. The Board approved Perkins’s application without requiring Perkins to comply with certain mandatory provisions in the Ogunquit Zoning Ordinance and without making necessary factual findings. The Hartwells, abutting landowners, sought judicial review. The superior court vacated the Board’s approval of Perkins’s site plan review application. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not have the power to waive any of the mandatory provisions of the Ordinance in this case; and (2) there were inadequate factual findings from the Board regarding Perkins’s use of the property, and therefore, the cause must be remanded for further factual findings regarding the lobster pound’s proper use classification. View "Hartwell v. Town of Ogunquit" on Justia Law

Appellant, a convicted felon, completed serving his sentences with a termination of his probation in 2007. In 2013, Appellant submitted an application to the Department of Public Safety for a black powder permit. The Department denied Appellant’s permit application in accordance with Me. Rev. Stat. 15, 393(4)(A) due to the District Attorney’s objection to the issuance of the permit. Appellant appealed, arguing that section 393’s procedure for consideration of black powder permit applications is unconstitutional. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 393(4) does not create an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority; and (2) because there is no constitutional right or interest at stake that requires judicial protection, the potential for judicial review to be unavailable in certain circumstances under the statute presents no facial constitutional defect. View "Bouchard v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

Robert and Carol Rice filed a complaint against their neighbors, James and Carol Cook, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract regarding the parties’ shared boundary line and seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Cooks counterclaimed, seeking similar relief. After a jury-waived trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the Cooks and granted injunctive relief and monetary damages. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in (1) finding that the parties never reached an agreement regarding their common boundary line; (2) finding that the Rices’ fences were “unnecessarily high” or “unreasonably interfered” with the Cooks’ use and enjoyment of their property pursuant to a common law theory of nuisance; and (3) enjoining the Rices from building a fence of any height along a portion of their boundary with the Cooks based on its determination that the Rices built their fences with the intent to annoy the Cooks and to interfere with the Cooks’ use of their property. View "Rice v. Cook" on Justia Law

In 2014, Mother filed a complaint seeking a protection order against Father for herself and their two children. After a hearing, the district court found that Father had abused Mother and issued a protection order for the benefit of Mother and the children and granted Mother temporary custody. Father appealed, arguing that the court erred by denying his motion to continue the hearing. Father orally made the motion at the hearing after the attorney he purportedly retained did not appear. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion for a continuance. View "Daud v. Abdullahi" on Justia Law