Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The dispute in this case involved the continuing existence, scope, and extent of easements over two roads leading to the beach or ocean in Kennebunk. In the Supreme Court’s opinion issued on the first appeal, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was vacated in part and remanded for consideration of issues the court had not reached related to the continued existence or abandonment of the easements. On remanded, instead of presenting evidence or testimony for trial, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Helen Rose and Nathaniel Merrill on their claim for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that because there were several genuine issues of material fact in dispute in this case, summary judgment was not appropriate. Remanded. View "Rose v. Parsons" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted theft by deception and two counts of tampering with public records or information. Defendant appealed, arguing that her conduct did not constitute a violation of Me. Rev. Stat. 12-A 456(1)(A), as interpreted in State v. Spaulding, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed after overruling Spaulding in part, holding (1) the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Defendant was guilty of attempted theft by deception; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of tampering with public records or information. View "State v. Beckwith" on Justia Law

After hearing what he described as a diesel-powered dump truck pass by his home one snowy morning in November, Plaintiff discovered that his mailbox had been damaged. Plaintiff filed a small-claims action against P&K Sand and Gravel, Inc., the town’s snowplow contractor, seeking $450 for the damage to his mailbox. The district court entered judgment in favor of P&K, concluding that Plaintiff had not met his burden of proof. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because Plaintiff’s appeal raised only issues of fact, the Court would not reach the merits of his arguments; and (2) the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for recusal. View "Yarcheski v. P&K Sand and Gravel, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of tampering with a witness, and on that basis, of violating a condition of release. Defendant appealed, arguing that the indictment was insufficient to inform him of the tampering charge and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction on that charge because he did not “expressly threaten the witness” and because the witness did not feel threatened by him. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because the statute allows a conviction for tampering with a witness based only on a defendant’s attempt to induce the witness not to testify against him, Defendant’s first argument was without merit; and (2) the remainder of Defendant’s arguments were not persuasive. View "State v. Clarke" on Justia Law

George Stanley filed a complaint against the Town of Greene alleging that the Town was interfering with his flea market business on his property by denying him a license. The Town counterclaimed against Stanley, seeking injunctive relief and fines for Stanley’s continued operation of his unlicensed flea market in violation of a town Ordinance. The superior court ultimately granted the Town’s motions to dismiss Stanley’s complaint for for default judgment on its counterclaim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Stanley’s motion for a temporary restraining order; (2) denying Stanley’s motions to set aside the default or for relief from default judgment; (3) denying Stanley’s motion to continue; and (4) denying Stanley’s motion for reconsideration. View "Stanley v. Town of Greene" on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant injured his left hand while working as a mechanic. Thereafter, the Maine Employers Mutual Insurance Company (MEMIC) began paying Appellant weekly workers’ compensation benefits. Appellant received checks from MEMIC for approximately six years, and Appellant stated that by signing the checks he regularly received he was agreeing that he was not working or receiving pay for work. In 2009, MEMIC discovered that Appellant was working full-time at a small-engine repair shop. In 2012, the Workers’ Compensation Board terminated Appellant’s benefits, after which MEMIC stopped issuing payments to Appellant. Appellant was subsequently found guilty of theft by deception in an amount exceeding $10,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) admitting certain testimony; (2) allowing the state to reopen its case after it had rested; and (3) failing to instruct the jury on an additional element of theft by deception. View "State v. Tucker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of domestic violence assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that his right to confront witnesses against him under the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions was violated when the victim refused to testify and the court admitted hearsay statements from the victim in the form of an emergency 9-1-1 record and the victim’s statements to an EMT. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statements at issue that were admitted in evidence, including the 9-1-1 recording and the statements made to the EMT - were not testimonial in nature, and therefore, the trial court’s rulings did not exceed the bounds set by the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. View "State v. Kimball" on Justia Law

In 2013, Molly Jandreau filed a complaint for divorce from Daniel LaChance. The district court ordered LaChance to pay Jandreau $230 weekly in child support and divided the marital assets and liabilities. Jandreau appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by denying her requests for spousal support and attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Jandreau and vacated the portion of the judgment denying spousal support and attorney fees, holding that Jandreau was entitled to some amount of spousal support and that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to deny Jandreau’s request for attorney fees. View "Jandreau v. LaChance" on Justia Law

John and Judith Monahan were married in 1976. In 2011, John filed a complaint for divorce. After a final divorce hearing held in 2014, the district court made several factual findings. The court then entered an initial divorce judgment awarding Judith monthly spousal support. The judgment provided that the spousal support award was non-modifiable. John moved to amend the judgment seeking modifiable spousal support so that the award would conform with the district court’s preliminary memorandum of decision, which did not state that spousal support may not be modified. In an amended divorce judgment, the court declined to make the spousal support modifiable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment as amended, holding (1) the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in regard to the marital property division; but (2) the divorce judgment must be amended to remove the language prohibiting modification of spousal support, as, pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 951-A(4) as amended, the court could not direct that spousal support “may not be modified.” View "Monahan v. Monahan" on Justia Law

A New Jersey court entered a default judgment against Gawayne Dawson and for Safety Insurance Group. Safety Insurance subsequently sought enforcement of the judgment in Maine. The district court entered the New Jersey judgment and issued a notice of registration of foreign order. The court then issued a writ of execution. Safety Insurance moved to amend the writ to include post-judgment interest. The district court concluded that the post-judgment interest rate of New Jersey, rather than Maine, should apply to the foreign judgment. Before the court could finalize the writ, Safety Insurance brought this appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory and remanded so that the court may enter a final judgment after receiving the appropriate documentation. View "Safety Ins. Group v. Dawson" on Justia Law