Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After credit card fraud was discovered on vacations that Beth Rogers, a travel agent, had booked, Plaintiffs, two families, each filed a complaint against Mark Travel Corporation alleging breach of contract, economic duress, and violations of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The business and consumer docket granted summary judgment for Mark Travel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in determining that Plaintiffs’ claims against Mark Travel failed as a matter of law because Rogers was not an agent of Mark Travel, and Mark Travel did not authorize Rogers to act on its behalf, ratify Rogers’s fraudulent conduct, or hold Rogers out as its agent. View "Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of elevated aggravated assault, 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. 208-B(1)(A); elevated aggravated assault, 17-A, Me. Rev. Stat. 208-B(1)(B); and aggravated assault, Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A 208(1)(A). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Defendant voluntarily and intentionally waived his constitutional right to testify; (2) the evidence did not compel a determination that Defendant was not criminally responsible for the assault by reason of insanity; but (3) because the court sentenced Defendant for a single incident, and not three separate assaultive acts, the court erred by failing to consolidate the duplicative counts prior to entering its judgment of conviction or its sentence. Remanded for consolidated of the three counts through entry of a single conviction and for entry of a sentence on the single charge. View "State v. Murphy" on Justia Law

In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for statutory nuisance against Defendants, their neighbors, alleging that Defendants’ 2004 construction of a new home and garage resulted in damage to Plaintiffs’ home. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion on statute of limitations grounds without conducting a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the unopposed summary judgment record established that Plaintiffs’ complaint was barred by either the six-year limitations period for civil actions or the three-year limitations period for statutory nuisance claims. View "Halliday v. Henry" on Justia Law

Roland Gerrish created a trust consisting of certain property. The trust instrument provided that Julie and Shirley Gauthier would be the remainder beneficiaries upon Roland’s death. When Roland died, Shirley and Roland’s widow, Jacqueline, disputed the maintenance of property. Shirley filed a complaint for equitable partition against Jacqueline and the Gerrish Corporation and then requested an entry of default. The court issued default judgment and denied Jacqueline’s and the Corporation’s motion to join Julie as a necessary party. The superior court entered an order denying the motions to set aside the default and to join Julie, concluding that all necessary parties were joined, and granted the relief requested by Shirley. Jacqueline, the Corporation, and Julie appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred in concluding that all necessary parties were joined and in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before issuing the default judgment. Remanded. View "Gauthier v. Gerrish" on Justia Law

When Mason Station, LLC failed to pay assessed property taxes on multiple properties in the Town of Wiscasset, the Town filed a complaint against Mason Station for taxes owed on those properties and on certain personal property. Mason Station failed to timely file an answer, and the clerk entered a default and default judgment against Mason Station. Nearly eighteen months after the judgment was entered, Mason Station moved to set aside the default and for relief from default judgment, alleging that several days before the entry of the default judgment in favor of the Town, the Town had obtained ownership of the properties for which taxes were owed through automatic foreclosure and that the foreclosed properties had an assessed value in excess of the total amount owed on the judgment. The trial court declined to grant Mason Station relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the motions to set aside default and for relief from judgment, as Mason Station offered no good excuse for failing to file a timely answer to the Town’s complaint and failed to perform its duty to take legal steps to protect its own interests in the original litigation. View "Town of Wiscasset v. Mason Station, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2012, the district court entered an order protecting Jana Gehrke, Chad Gehrke’s ex-wife, and the parties’ sons. Thereafter, the order was twice modified, further constraining Chad’s contact with the children. In 2013, Jana filed her third motion to modify the protection order. After a hearing, the court found that Chad had committed abuse and entered an amended order prohibiting Chad from having any contact with Jana or the children. In 2014, Jana moved to extend the order of protection from abuse for two more years. The court entered a judgment extending the order of protection from abuse due to Chad’s pattern of violence, threats, suicide threats, and failure to comply with the increasingly restrictive court orders. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in relying on evidence of abuse that predated the initial protection from abuse order and determining that the extended order was necessary to protect Jana and the children; and (2) the extended protection order did not violate Defendant’s constitutionally protected parental rights. View "Gehrke v. Gehrke" on Justia Law

A police officer certified to operate the Intoxilyzer, a self-contained breath-alcohol testing apparatus, used the device to test Defendant’s breath-alcohol content. Defendant was subsequently charged with criminal operating under the influence. Pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 29-A, 2431(2)(D), Defendant requested that the State produce a qualified witness to testify at his trial. The officer who administered the test was scheduled to testify at trial, but there was no other expert available. Before trial, Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the breath-alcohol test result from evidence. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the State failed to produce a qualified witness. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the statute does not require the State to produce expert testimony in order to have the results of the Intoxilyzer admitted into evidence; and (2) the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution is not implicated when the declarant who administered the breath test is available to testify. View "State v. Tozier" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of violating Me. Rev. Stat. 12, 6575-G, which makes it a Class D crime to fish for or take elvers within 150 feet of a dam with a fishway or within 150 feet of a fishway. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in convicting him based on conduct that was not alleged in the Uniform Summons and Complaint (USC). In the USC, the State charged Defendant with “fishing for elvers within 150 feet of a dam with a fishway,” but the district court found Defendant guilty of fishing for elvers within 150 feet of a fishway, not a dam. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court’s factual findings were insufficient to support a conviction for the violation charged in the USC. View "State v. Stanley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of his second offense of failing to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. Defendant appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in excluding relevant evidence from the Department of Public Safety, State Bureau of Identification that caused him to believe, erroneously, that he was no longer required to register. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that, to the extent that the court determined that Defendant’s purported reliance on the letter was not believable, the court made a credibility determination that should have been made by the jury, and therefore, the court erred in excluding the letter. View "State v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Donald Paradis applied for and obtained a building permit to construct a two-car garage on property in the Town of Peru. After Paradis constructed the garage, the Town sent Paradis a notice of violation, stating that the garage violated multiple ordinance provisions. The Board of Appeals concluded that the appeal was properly denied. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the Board of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Paradis’s appeal, which deprived the courts of jurisdiction to consider it, as the notice of violation was not an appealable decision. Remanded. View "Paradis v. Town of Peru" on Justia Law